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Abstract 
 
At the request of the LIBE Committee, this study assesses the extent to which 
EU Member States have delivered accountability for their complicity in the US 
CIA-led extraordinary rendition and secret detention programme and its serious 
human rights violations. It offers a scoreboard of political inquiries and judicial 
investigations in supranational and national arenas in relation to Italy, Lithuania, 
Poland, Romania and the United Kingdom. The study takes as a starting point 
two recent and far-reaching developments in delivering accountability and 
establishing the truth: the publication of the executive summary of the US 
Senate Intelligence Committee (Feinstein) Report and new European Court of 
Human Rights judgments regarding EU Member States’ complicity with the CIA.  
The study identifies significant obstacles to further accountability in the five EU 
Member States under investigation: notably the lack of independent and 
effective official investigations and the use of the ‘state secrets doctrine’ to 
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victims. The study puts forward a set of policy recommendations for the 
European Parliament to address these obstacles to effective accountability.  
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Although much has been done over the last ten years to overcome major obstacles to 
ensuring democratic and judicial accountability in respect of EU Member States’ complicity 
in the unlawful US CIA-led extraordinary rendition and secret detention programme, much 
remains to be done to uncover the truth and hold those responsible accountable for their 
actions. 
This study takes as a starting point two recent and highly significant developments that 
have helped to shed light on, and establish accountability for, the actions of EU Member 
States engaged in the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) rendition and detention 
programme. The first is the U.S. Senate Intelligence Committee “Study of the Central 
Intelligence Agency’s Detention and Interrogation Program” (also known as the Feinstein 
Report) published in December 2014, which provided further evidence of the nature of the 
relationship between the CIA and several European state authorities and their wrongdoing. 
The second is the collection of recent judgments of the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECtHR), particularly in the Al Nashiri and Abu Zubaydah cases, which have helped to 
provide substantive rule of law standards against which to measure national political 
inquiries and judicial investigations. 
Through the prism of these two important recent developments, this study builds on the 
2012 European Parliament study on “The results of inquiries into the CIA’s programme of 
extraordinary rendition and secret prisons in European states in light of the new legal 
framework following the Lisbon treaty”. First (section 2), it pinpoints the critical findings of 
the Feinstein Report and their relevance for EU Member State inquiries, in particular the 
new revelations that: the CIA was isolated both nationally and internationally; European 
states that collaborated with the CIA were quick to withdraw assistance when scrutiny 
increased, leaving the CIA on the run; the UK failed to refute unfounded CIA claims about 
the intelligence value of information extracted by torture; and the CIA paid large sums of 
money to cooperative Member States. The study also examines the media controversy 
provoked by the release of the Feinstein Report and the efforts made by certain actors to 
undermine its findings.  
The study then (section 3) offers an up-to-date account of political inquiries and judicial 
investigations in five Member States (Italy, Lithuania, Poland, Romania and the United 
Kingdom). It argues that, while political inquiries and domestic judicial investigations have 
been or are being conducted in all five Member States and there have been ECtHR cases 
regarding all but the UK, they have all been beset by obstacles to accountability. The 
response of the EU institutions is also analysed. While it is acknowledged that the European 
Commission has taken tentative steps to encouraging accountability (notably in sending 
letters to Member States in 2013 to request information on investigations underway), it is 
found that neither the Commission nor the Council have properly followed up on the 
European Parliament's recommendations. 
After providing a detailed analysis of the recent ECtHR judgments in the Al Nashiri and Abu 
Zubaydah cases (section 4) and detailing the rule of law benchmarks against which the 
effectiveness of national investigations can be tested, the study then measures the national 
political inquiries and judicial investigations and finds them wanting, either because of a lack 
of independence or because national security or state secrets have been invoked to prevent 
disclosure of the facts (section 5).  
Finally, the study examines what has prevented EU institutions from taking effective action 
in response to the CIA programme (section 6). It finds a general lack of political will 
exacerbated by an absence of a clear enforcement mechanism to ensure compliance with 
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the rule of law as laid down in Article 2 TEU, meaning that the important step taken by the 
Commission to send letters to Member States is bereft of a clear legal framework.  
In light of the above considerations, the Study formulates the following policy 
recommendations to the European Parliament: 
 
Recommendation 1: The Parliament, particularly the LIBE Committee, should establish 
regular structured dialogue with relevant counterparts in the U.S. Congress and Senate, 
which would provide a new framework for sharing information and cooperating more closely 
on interrelated inquiries in the expanding policy field of Justice and Home Affairs.  
Recommendation 2: The Parliament should use the recent LIBE Committee decision to 
draw up a Legislative Own-Initiative Report on an EU mechanism on democracy, the rule of 
law and fundamental rights to develop and bring further legal certainty to the activation 
phases preceding the use of Article 7 TEU. Parliament should also insist that the 
Commission periodically evaluate Member States’ compliance with fundamental rights and 
the rule of law under a new ‘Copenhagen Mechanism’ to feed into a new EU Policy Cycle on 
fundamental rights and rule of law in the Union.  
Recommendation 3: The Parliament should adopt a Professional Code for the 
transnational management and accountability of data in the EU. The Code would outline 
where ‘national security’ and ‘state secrets’ cannot be invoked (i.e. define what national 
security is not). It would additionally lay down clear rules aimed at preventing the use and 
processing of information originating from torture or any related human rights violations. 
Recommendation 4: The Parliament should demand that the Commission properly follow 
up on its resolutions and recommendations. 
Recommendation 5: The Parliament should call on the President of the European Council 
to issue an official statement on the rendition programme to the Plenary, stating clearly the 
degree of Member States’ complicity and detailing obstacles to proper accountability and 
justice for the victims. 
Recommendation 6: The Parliament should call for effective judicial investigations into the 
Feinstein Report's findings that the CIA paid large sums of money to Member States for 
their complicity in the rendition programme, which amount to allegations of corruption.   
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
This Study provides an updated analysis of the 2012 European Parliament Study on “The 
Results of Inquiries into the CIA’s Programme of Extraordinary Rendition and Secret Prisons 
in European States in light of the New Legal Framework following the Lisbon Treaty”. It 
consists of an in-depth assessment of EU and Member State actions and efforts to ensure 
accountability and conduct effective investigations into their complicity with the U.S. Central 
Intelligence Agency (CIA) extraordinary rendition and secret detention programme. It takes 
stock of the latest developments in domestic, supranational and international arenas 
towards establishing the truth about, and attributing legal responsibilities for, allegations of 
serious human rights obligations as a result of Member States’ cooperation with the CIA in 
the programme.  
1.1. The Path towards Accountability: A Background in Brief 
This study comes about ten years after the first media revelations – on 7 November 2005 – 
of EU collusion in the CIA extraordinary rendition programme.1 Since then, efforts to make 
the perpetrators accountable have been unprecedented and far-reaching. 
The geography of the CIA programme received wider attention following the leak of the 
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) Report on the detention conditions of 14 
‘high-value detainees’ (HVDs), which suggests that the CIA rendition programme took place 
between 2002 and 2006 and that, according to the US authorities, “no other people were 
held in the CIA detention program as of October 2006”.2 Overall, 119 detainees have been 
involved in the renditions and, according to an inquiry3 by Dr Crofton Black for the Bureau 
of Investigative Journalism into the status of the prisoners’ detention, 33 are still detained,4 
52 have been released, 7 are deceased, and 39 are in an unknown situation.5  
The investigations into Europe’s complicity in the CIA extraordinary rendition programme 
emerged in 2005 when Council of Europe (CoE) parliamentarians, led by Swiss Senator Dick 
Marty, started an inquiry into the alleged CIA renditions and the secret detention centres in 
Europe. The first Marty Report in 20066 dealt with complicity at EU level regarding the 
rendition flights and cooperation in kidnapping suspected terrorists and identified a global 
‘spider’s web’ of CIA detentions and transfers with the involvement of 14 Council of Europe 
Member States.  
                                          
1 D. Priest, 2005, “CIA Holds Terror Suspects in Secret Prisons”, The Washington Post, 2 November, available at 
www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/11/01/AR2005110101644.html. 
2 ICRC Report, 2007, “ICRC Report on the Treatment of Fourteen ‘High Value Detainees’ in CIA Custody”, 
www.therenditionproject.org.uk/pdf/PDF%20101%20[ICRC,%20Feb%202007.%20Report%20on%20Treatment%2
0of%2014%20HVD%20in%20CIA%20Custody].pdf, p. 25. 
3 C. Black, 2015, “Revealed: Only 29 detainees from secret CIA torture program remain in Guantánamo Bay”, 
available at www.therenditionproject.org.uk/prisoners/data.html and 
https://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/2015/01/15/28-detainees-secret-cia-torture-program-guantanamo-bay/. 
4 Twenty-nine in Guantanamo, one in Israel, two in Afghanistan and one in a maximum security US prison; some of 
the remaining 29 Guantanamo prisoners have not been charged in over 13 years of detention, e.g. Abu Zubaydah; 
16 of the 29 prisoners are considered high-value detainees (HVDs), the most wanted terrorist suspects of the CIA, 
according to the Bush administration. 
5 According to this same study 15 people were “wrongfully detained” by the CIA over the course of four years, 
between 2002 and 2006. 
6 Council of Europe, 2006, “Alleged secret detentions and unlawful inter-state transfers involving Council of Europe 
member states” (the ‘Dick Marty Report’). 
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A second report,7 released in 2007, reassessed the previous allegations but also presented 
further evidence to support the claim that Poland and Romania had hosted secret CIA 
prisons for the detention of HVDs between 2003 and 2005. These two reports combined 
with the 2011 Marty Report8 have been considered by the ECtHR as one of the most 
authoritative sources of knowledge and independent evidence on the issue of the CIA 
rendition programme and European states’ complicity. All the Marty Reports expressed 
concerns and were critical of obstacles to his inquiries placed by the governments alleged to 
be complicit in the US programme. The reports were critical of the misuses of ‘national 
security’ arguments and the ‘state secrecy doctrine’ to evade accountability in countries 
such as Poland, the UK and Italy, and urged relevant state authorities to conduct effective 
investigations. The report considered that it is in fact feasible to put in place judicial and 
parliamentary accountability procedures which still protect ‘legitimate’ state secrets, while 
still holding state agents accountable for murder, torture, abduction or other human rights 
violations. A landmark passage of the last Dick Marty Report stated9: 
Numerous European governments seem to have accepted the doctrine of the previous 
US Administration: terrorism is a phenomenon that cannot be dealt with by the 
judiciary and, to the extent that one claims to be at war, the Geneva Conventions are 
not or only very partially applicable. Worse: security must have precedence over 
freedom, as if the two concepts were irreconcilable. It is obvious that over the last 
years, also due to the over dramatization of the ‘war against terrorism’, the balance 
between the different powers of state has shifted in favour of the executive, to the 
detriment of parliament and of the judiciary. Parliaments are not without blame for this 
situation.  
Numerous parliamentarians seem to give priority, all too often, to governmental and 
party-political solidarity rather than to their duty to assume their responsibility of 
critical scrutiny. Democracy, as we know, is based on a complex and delicate balance 
which must be protected carefully. I believe that it is precisely up to the 
parliamentarians who belong to this Assembly to be particularly vigilant on this point 
and to be at the forefront to defend the fundamental principles of the separation of 
powers and of ‘checks and balances’. The systematic and arbitrary invocation of the 
state secrecy privilege, in particular for the purpose of ensuring the impunity of public 
officials, is a dangerous movement against which parliamentarians must be the first to 
react.10 
The European Parliament, during its sixth and seventh legislatures, played a decisive role in, 
and made a proactive contribution to, the scrutiny of the alleged human rights violations 
resulting from Member States’ active or passive complicity in the US CIA-led rendition and 
secret detention programme. The Parliament set up in 2006 the Temporary Committee on 
the alleged use of European countries by the CIA for the transportation and illegal detention 
of prisoners (TDIP) chaired by Portuguese MEP Carlos Coelho, with former Italian MEP 
                                          
7 Council of Europe, 2007, Report, “Secret detentions and illegal transfers of detainees, involving Council of Europe 
member states: second report”. 
8 Council of Europe, 2011, Report, “Abuse of state secrecy and national security: obstacles to parliamentary and 
judicial scrutiny of human rights violations”, 6 September. 
9 Ibid. p. 19. 
10 Ibid, p. 19. 
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Claudio Fava as rapporteur. The Fava Report,11 published in 2007, was an in-depth re-
examination of the main facts and available evidence and reached the overwhelming 
conclusion that approximately 1,245 rendition flights used European airspace between 2001 
and 2005.  
Five years after the Fava Report the Parliament adopted the Flautre Report in 2012. With 
Green MEP Hélène Flautre as rapporteur, it expressly singled out Romania, Poland and 
Lithuania for their involvement in rendering detainees and even hosting on their territory 
CIA illegal secret detention centres. The Flautre Report brings to public attention the lack of 
accountability regarding these allegations within European Member States such as Finland, 
Denmark, Portugal, Italy, the UK, Germany, Spain, Ireland, Greece, Cyprus, Romania and 
Poland, all of which had been mentioned in the TDIP Report.  
The Flautre Report raised serious concerns and deplored the existence of various obstacles 
to pursuing accountability in certain Member States, in particular those related to “lack of 
transparency, classification of documents, prevalence of national and political interests, 
narrow remits for investigations, restriction of victims’ right to effective participation and 
defence and lack of rigorous investigative techniques and of cooperation between 
investigative authorities across the EU”.12 In her political statement after the Parliament’s 
Justice and Civil Liberties Committee supported her report, Flautre blamed European 
governments for having “not properly fulfilled their obligation under international law to 
investigate serious human rights violations connected with the CIA programme”.13 The 
Flautre Report also included a set of requests and recommendations addressed to national 
authorities of the relevant Member States, as well as to European institutions and agencies 
in order to ensure the establishment of the truth, prevent impunity and safeguard 
fundamental rights and rule of law obligations within the Union.  
Some European Member States and candidate countries have been subject to supranational 
judicial oversight by the European Court in Strasbourg for their complicity in the CIA 
extraordinary renditions programme. In December 2012, the Grand Chamber of the ECtHR, 
which is specialised in judging extraordinary rendition cases, condemned the Former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia for the arbitrary arrest, detention, interrogation and 
inadequate provision of effective remedies to Mr El-Masri. The ruling, the first of its kind, 
was of especial importance because it found that the allegations by the victim, including 
those of torture and other human rights violations, were established “beyond reasonable 
doubt”.14 
The 2013 European Parliament Resolution on “Alleged transportation and illegal detention of 
prisoners in European Countries by the CIA”15 is another step forward in achieving 
                                          
11 European Parliament, 2007, Report on the alleged use of European countries by the CIA for the transportation 
and illegal detention of prisoners, 30 October (the ‘Fava Report’). 
12 European Parliament, 2012, Report on the alleged transportation and illegal detention of prisoners in EU 
countries by the CIA “follow-up of the European Parliament TDIP Committee Report”, 2012/2003, 2.8.2012 (the 
‘Flautre Report’), and the Resolution which followed, available at 
www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=REPORT&reference=A7-2012-0266&language=EN. 
13 See EU Observer at euobserver.com/justice/116973. 
14 ECtHR, Judgment: Case of El-Masri v. The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (Application No. 39630/09), 
Strasbourg, 13 December 2012, p. 80.  
15 European Parliament, 2013, Resolution 2013/2702 on Alleged transportation and illegal detention of prisoners in 
European countries by the CIA. 
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accountability, since it pushed for Member States to conduct effective, independent and 
transparent investigations. More specifically, Lithuanian authorities were called to reopen 
the criminal investigations regarding the country’s alleged involvement in the renditions and 
to support the investigations led by the ECtHR in the Abu Zubaydah case. In the case of 
Romania the Parliament Resolution calls for effective investigations into the country’s 
involvement in hosting the secret detention site. The UK is also mentioned for failure to 
provide substantive support in ensuring the right to the truth in the civil claim of Abdel 
Hakim Belhadj. 
Two rulings of the European Court of Human Rights were prominent in 2014, concerning 
Polish complicity in the CIA rendition and secret detention operations in the Abu Zubaydah 
and Al Nashiri cases (Section 4 of the study deals extensively with the ECtHR rulings and 
their impact on accountability). Three individual applications are currently pending against 
Italy, Lithuania and Romania. In the cases against Poland, the victims, still currently 
detained in Guantanamo Bay – Abd al-Rahim Al Nashiri and Zayn al-Abidin Muhammad 
Husayn (Abu Zubaydah) – had claimed that they were secretly detained in Poland in 2002 
and 2003, and that they were tortured by the CIA. The court found Poland guilty of having 
known the nature and purposes of the CIA’s activities on its territory, and of having 
“cooperated in the preparation and execution of the CIA rendition, secret detention and 
interrogation operations”.16 The court found Poland guilty of violating the European 
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) on various counts: Article 2 (right to life); Article 3 
(prohibition of torture); Article 5 (right to liberty and security); Article 6 (right to a fair 
trial); Article 8 (right to respect for private and family life); and Article 13 (right to an 
effective remedy).  
Released in December 2014, the redacted version of the executive summary of the U.S. 
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) Report (“Study of the Central Intelligence 
Agency’s Detention and Interrogation Program”17), known as the Feinstein Report, has 
provided a full account of how the CIA’s extraordinary rendition programme was developed 
and implemented across the world. From the European perspective the document provides 
incontestable evidence of the involvement of some European states and it backs up the 
allegations put forward, since 2006, by various European institutions and investigators. 
Although it proves that the allegations were correct and that some European states 
participated in the capture, detention, rendition and transfer of detainees, as well as the 
corruption of state officials (the report refers to large sums of money – “millions of dollars” 
given by the CIA authorities to the Member States in return for their support), no official 
investigation has followed the release of the redacted Feinstein Report.  
Following up on the discoveries of the SSCI Study, Amnesty International released in early 
2015 the “Breaking the Conspiracy of Silence”18 study, where the colour codes of the 
Feinstein Report are revealed for six European countries (Poland, Lithuania, the UK, 
Romania, Germany and Macedonia) in addition to an updated state of play. Indeed, the role 
that civil society organisations and non-governmental organisations such as Amnesty 
                                          
16ECtHR, Press release, “Judgment: Al Nashiri v. Poland, Judgment: Husayn (Abu Zubaydah) v. Poland”. 
17 Feinstein Report, also known as the SSCI Study, available at 
www.feinstein.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?p=senate-intelligence-committee-study-on-cia-detention-and-
interrogation-program. 
18 Amnesty International, 2015, “Breaking the Conspiracy of Silence: USA’s European ‘Partners in Crime’ must act 
after Senate Torture Report”, available at www.amnesty.org/en/documents/EUR01/002/2015/en/. 
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International, Human Rights Watch, Helsinki Human Rights Council, Open Society Institute 
(OSI) etc. play in the process of public accountability should not be underestimated; their 
contribution show the central role they have in times of establishing the truth regarding 
governments’ wrongdoing in a context of impunity and secrecy (see the bibliography of this 
study for a full list of reports and studies).  
These non-governmental actors also provided evidence of central importance as third-party 
interveners in the above-mentioned cases before the ECtHR. Furthermore, the Universities 
of Kent and Kingston in the UK established a research project into the CIA extraordinary 
rendition programme, mapping the flights, detention centres and personnel involved.19 
Graph 1 below provides a timeline showcasing how these investigations concerning EU 
involvement in the CIA rendition and detention programme have developed and progressed 
since 2005. 
Against this backdrop - and with a focus on the ramifications of the Feinstein Report and 
ECtHR rulings - this study builds upon a 2012 European Parliament study on “The results of 
inquiries into the CIA’s programme of extraordinary rendition and secret prisons in 
European states in light of the new legal framework following the Lisbon treaty"20, which 
assessed inquiries that had been conducted or were still ongoing in several European 
countries three years ago. That study directly fed into the preparation of the European 
Parliament’s Report on the alleged transportation and illegal detention of prisoners in EU 
countries by the CIA “follow-up of the European Parliament TDIP Committee Report”, also 
known as the ‘Flautre Report’, as it was led by former Member of the European Parliament 
(MEP) Hélène Flautre21.  
The study follows the logical structure of these developments, explaining firstly the findings 
of the Feinstein report, then assessing its impact in a broader political context. It moves on 
to address the state of play in terms of accountability in five European Member States. Last 
but not least, it evaluates the obstacles to accountability for the CIA renditions programme 
at national and European level before formulating some policy recommendations for the 
European Parliament.  
                                          
19 See the results of “The Rendition Project”, available at www.therenditionproject.org.uk/. 
20 S. Carrera, E. Guild, J. Soares da Silva and A. Wiesbrock, 2012, “The Results of Inquiries into the CIA’s 
Programme of Extraordinary Rendition and Secret Prisons in European States in light of the New Legal Framework 
following the Lisbon Treaty”, DG IPOL, European Parliament, Brussels. 
21 European Parliament, 2012, Report on the alleged transportation and illegal detention of prisoners in EU 
countries by the CIA “follow-up of the European Parliament TDIP Committee Report”, 2012/2003, 2.8.2012 (the 
‘Flautre Report’), and the Resolution which followed, available at 
www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=REPORT&reference=A7-2012-0266&language=EN. 
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Graph 1: Chronology of Supranational Inquiries and Reports in Response to CIA Rendition Programme 
and EU Member States’ Complicity 
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1.2. Methodology 
A few methodological considerations have been made in developing this study. The main 
research design follows closely the analytical framework and interdisciplinary approach of 
the previous 2012 study for the European Parliament22. This has now been updated with 
relevant national, European and international developments, which are examined in detail in 
the main corpus of the study.  
The study covers what has come to be known as the ‘CIA-led extraordinary rendition and 
secret detention (high-value detainee) programme’. There is no universally recognised legal 
definition of extraordinary rendition and secret detention.23 According to the 2012 judgment 
provided by the ECtHR in the case of El-Masri v. Macedonia, extraordinary renditions have 
been defined as “extrajudicial transfer of persons from one jurisdiction or State to another, 
for the purposes of detention and interrogation outside the normal legal system, where 
there was a real risk of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment”.24 Furthermore, 
as we will develop below, the levels and kinds of complicity or activities by Member State 
governments and authorities have widely varied in nature and scope. These have included 
claims ranging from transiting a Member State by rendition flight for various reasons 
(transit, refuel, rest, transfer of prisoners, to create diversion – ‘dummy’ flights to conceal 
other flights in Finland and Lithuania), to hosting secret detention centres (Romania, 
Lithuania, Poland), to going as far as complicity in capture, abduction and interrogation 
under torture. For the purposes of this study, we will refer to the extraordinary rendition 
and secret detention programme or the detention and interrogation programme, which 
encompasses all these varying activities and degrees of involvement. 
Regarding the obstacles faced in national and European accountability processes, the study 
takes as its starting point the concept and standards developed by the ECtHR when testing 
the effectiveness of investigations in cases of serious human rights violations. As we will 
study in detail in Section 5 below, these supranational rule of law standards insist on 
Member States’ responsibility to conduct an “effective official investigation” in a “prompt 
and thorough” manner, with “independence” from the executive. The victim should be 
granted the possibility to participate in the investigation, “in one form or another”, and 
when invoking the ‘state secrets doctrine’, the investigating authorities should not be 
allowed to refuse to disclose the information or evidence to the victim and the public. The 
Court has also invoked the so-called ‘right to the truth’ not only of the victims, but also of 
their families and the public at large, as an extra precondition for safeguarding the rule of 
law and preventing impunity for serious violations of human rights. 
As illustrated in Graph 2 below, the study distinguishes between various types of 
accountability, at national and supranational levels, of democratic/political or judicial type. 
The results of the mapping exercise are summarised around these main categories, 
following a more specific distinction between political inquiries (of a parliamentary or 
                                          
22 Carrera et al., op. cit. 
23 In ECtHR, El-Masri v. The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Application no. 39630/09, Statement of Facts, 
p. 3, rendition was defined as a “process of one State obtaining custody over a person suspected of involvement in 
serious crime (e.g. terrorism) in the territory of another State and/or the transfer of such a person to custody in 
the first State’s territory, or a place subject to its jurisdiction, or to a third State”. See also European Commission 
for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission) available at www.venice.coe.int/docs/2006/CDL-AD(2006)009-
e.pdf for a definition of the concept. 
24 Ibid., paragraph 221.”El-Masri. 
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executive nature) and judicial investigations in Section 3. Because the 2015 mapping 
exercise revealed no evidence of inquiries being conducted by the ombudsman, this 
category has been eliminated. 
Graph 2: Types and levels of Accountability 
 
 
These levels of accountability have been indirectly studied and touched upon in a series of 
supporting investigations undertaken by the Council of Europe and the European 
Parliament, international organisations and even national investigations. The most 
important insights from these investigations are briefly outlined in the synthesis of existing 
evidence provided in Section 3 of the Study, which is in turn based on the more detailed 
account and overview presented in Annexes 1 and 2.  
1.3. Understanding the Evidence of EU Collusion in the CIA 
Rendition Programme: The Five Selected EU Member States  
The research and analysis provided in the study has been based on desk research and a 
detailed overview and assessment of key primary and secondary sources, providing updated 
information on international, regional and national inquiries and investigations into the CIA-
led rendition and secret detention programme as well as the active/passive collaboration of 
European states. This has been complemented with a set of semi-structured interviews and 
informal discussions with a selection of policy-makers from key European institutions as well 
as representatives from civil society organisations, non-governmental organisations, 
investigative journalists and experts, which have provided extremely useful additional 
information and facts. In addition, CEPS organised a closed-door expert meeting in early 
July where the preliminary findings of the study were presented and discussed with a 
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selected group of experts and which contributed to fine-tuning and ensuring the relevance 
of our findings and policy recommendations. 
Our assessment focuses in particular on the state of play of the accountability processes 
across various domestic arenas in the EU. The following five Member States have been 
selected for a more in-depth assessment: Italy, Lithuania, Poland, Romania and the UK. The 
selection criteria were based on the existing evidence of their degree of 
involvement/complicity in the CIA-led programme. 
The information obtained in the aftermath of the 2012 Flautre Report25 proves that the 
complicity of these Member States in the CIA rendition programme is no longer an 
‘allegation’ but actually a corroborated fact. Since the European Parliament last visited this 
issue formally in February 2013, four black sites (illegal detention centres) in Europe have 
been clearly identified and their presence has been confirmed by former officials in public 
offices at the time the detentions occurred: one in Poland,26 two in Lithuania27 and one in 
Romania.28 Two major breakthroughs or milestones have contributed to confirming, beyond 
reasonable doubt, the allegations regarding the involvement of some Member States in the 
implementation of the CIA rendition programme. First, the three ECtHR judgments, one 
against the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia29 (2013) and two against Poland (the 
2014 Abu Zubaydah30 and Al Nashiri31 cases), and the three cases pending against Italy,32 
Lithuania33 and Romania,34 respectively. Second, the above-mentioned U.S. Senate 
Feinstein Report acknowledging Europe’s complicity in the CIA rendition programme. 
The public sources and the cumulative evidence which contributed to shedding more light on 
European states’ involvement in the CIA rendition programme have now been acknowledged 
by the ECtHR in Strasbourg as admissible evidence35 to back up the allegations pertaining to 
                                          
25 European Parliament, 2012 (‘Flautre Report’), op. cit. 
26 Rzeczpospolita, 2014, “Kwaśniewski i Miller o raporcie ws. tortur CIA”, 10 December, available at 
www.rp.pl/artykul/10,1163797-Kwasniewski-i-Miller-o-raporcie-ws--tortur-CIA.html.  
27 M. Cole, 2009, “Officials: Lithuania Hosted Secret CIA Prison to Get ‘Our Ear’”, ABC News, 20 August, available at 
http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/story?id=8373807. 
28 K. Verseck, 2014, “Black Site”, in Rumänien: Ehemaliger Spionagechef gibt Existenz von CIA-Lager zu, Spiegel 
Online, 13 December, www.spiegel.de/politik/ausland/rumaenien-ex-spionagechefspricht-ueber-black-site-der-cia-
a-1008333.html; see also R.-S. Marinas and C. Lowe, 2014, “U.S. Torture Report Puts Romania’s Role under 
Scrutiny,” Reuters, 16 December, http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/12/16/us-usa-cia-torture-romania-
idUSKBN0JU29H20141216. 
29 ECtHR, El-Masri v. Macedonia, Application No. 39630/09, 18 September 2009, 2012 final judgment released in 
2012. 
30 ECtHR, Abu Zubaydah v. Poland, logged in March 2013 and judged on the 24 July 2014. 
31 ECtHR, Al Nashiri v. Poland, logged on 6 May 2011 and sentenced in 2014. 
32 ECtHR, Nasr and Ghali v. Italy, logged in 2009. 
33 ECtHR, Abu Zubaydah v. Lithuania, logged 28 October 2011. 
34 ECtHR, Al Nashiri  v Romania, logged in 2012. 
35 In its judgments in the cases of El-Masri v. Macedonia, Al Nashiri v. Poland and Abu Zubaydah v. Poland, the the 
EctHR acknowledged: “The difficulties involved in gathering and producing evidence in the present case caused by 
the restrictions on the applicant’s communication with the outside world and the extreme secrecy surrounding the 
US rendition operations have been compounded by the Polish Government’s failure to cooperate with the Court in 
its examination of the case. In consequence, the Court’s establishment of the facts is to a great extent based on 
circumstantial evidence, including a large amount of evidence obtained through the international inquiries, 
considerably redacted documents released by the CIA, other public sources and evidence from the experts and the 
witness” (from Abu Zubaydah v. Poland Judgement, 24 July 2014, paragraph 400). 
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each case. These sources of information consist of: reports and evidence collected by 
international organisations such as the UN, Council of Europe, the European Parliament and 
civil society; first-hand testimonies provided by some prisoners to the International 
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC); and information regarding CIA flights provided by the 
Dick Marty Reports36 and investigations into the UK-based renditions programme. A new 
addition to the pool of evidence is represented by the redacted version of the executive 
summary of the U.S. Senate Intelligence Committee (SSCI) Report on the CIA extraordinary 
rendition programme.37 
Publicly available evidence is synthesised in Graph 3 below. In light of the above overview 
of the resources provided by investigations thus far, we developed a system for taking stock 
of the evidence available backing the allegations brought against each Member State in 
terms of the degree of complicity in the CIA rendition programme. In assessing the 
evidence, we attached greater weight to official sources (international and regional inquiry 
reports, court rulings and public statements made by officials) than to allegations and 
unofficial statements.  
Second, we have examined the degree of complicity of Member States in the CIA renditions. 
Here complicity ranges from more direct (active) participation to more indirect (passive) 
involvement. Thus, at the lower end of the scale, Member States allowed transit rendition 
flights in national airspace (most European countries cooperated in this regard). Others 
provided intelligence leading to the rendition of individuals (e.g. Sweden) or assisted the 
CIA with intelligence in the capture, detention, interrogation and rendition of suspected 
terrorists (e.g. the UK allegedly providing Diego Garcia as an interrogation site). And others 
still hosted black detention sites for implementing the rendition mechanisms; collaborated in 
the use of so-called ‘enhanced interrogation methods’ (e.g. Poland, Lithuania and Romania); 
or wilfully failed to protect detainees from serious abuses suffered on their national territory 
and their transfer to other locations where they faced similar or worse treatment, and even 
the possibility of the death penalty. 
In light of the above, three out of the five countries selected are Poland, Lithuania and 
Romania (although they denied their collusion with the CIA, these countries have not yet 
conducted any effective investigation into the allegations and have failed to provide 
evidence against the claims made by the Dick Marty, Fava and Flautre Reports). The last 
two countries selected are Italy and the UK. Italy has been chosen due to the case the 
country is facing before the ECtHR on the CIA rendition programme. The UK has faced an 
ongoing national judicial investigation in the rendition of two Libyan citizens. Moreover, 
recent reports in the press allege that the UK’s Diego Garcia airport might have been more 
than a transit site for rendition flights – allegedly it was used by the CIA during renditions 
as a temporary interrogation site.38 
                                          
36 Council of Europe, 2011, Report on the “Abuse of state secrecy and national security: obstacles to parliamentary 
and judicial scrutiny of human rights violations”, doc. 12714, 16 September; Council of Europe, 2006, Report on 
the “Alleged secret detentions and unlawful inter-state transfers involving Council of Europe member states”, 
Parliamentary Assembly, 12 June. 
37 Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, 2012, Committee Study on the CIA’s Detention and Interrogation 
Program, available at www.therenditionproject.org.uk/documents/RDI/141209-SSCI-
Torture_Report_Executive_Summary.pdf. 
38 Information provided by Laurence Wilkerson, Chief of Staff to former U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell, 2002-
05, to Vice magazine, available at https://news.vice.com/article/exclusive-cia-interrogations-took-place-on-british-
territory-of-diego-garcia-senior-bush-administration-official-says. 
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The following Graph 3 has been designed in an attempt to assess the degree of evidence made 
available and to select five countries or cases to be mapped.   
Graph 3: Overview of the evidence and information available by EU 
Member State 
EU MEMBER 
STATE 
CoE 
European 
Parliament  National  
ECtHR 
cases 
‘Dick Marty’ 
1st Report 
‘Dick Marty’ 
2nd Report 
 ‘Fava’ Report 
 
‘Flautre’ 
Report 
Lack of 
effective 
investigation 
 
Ongoing 
national 
judiciary 
inquiries 
 
 
Austria X  X     
Belgium X  X     
Bulgaria    X     
Croatia    X     
Cyprus X  X X+ RPE    
Czech 
Republic    X     
Denmark X  X X+ RPE    
Estonia    X     
Finland    X X+ RPE    
France         
Germany X X X X+ RPE    
Greece X  X X+ RPE    
Hungary    X     
Ireland X  X X+ RPE    
Italy 
X  X X+ RPE X 
Nasr and 
Ghali v. 
Italy 
Latvia    X     
Lithuania 
   X X+ RPE X 
Abu 
Zubaydah 
v. 
A Quest for Accountability? EU and Member State Inquiries into the CIA Rendition and Secret Detention Programme 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
21 
 
Lithuania 
Luxembourg    X     
Malta    X     
Netherlands    X    
Poland 
X X X X+ RPE X 
 Al Nashiri 
& Husayn 
(Abu 
Zubaydah
) v. 
Poland 
Portugal X  X X+ RPE    
Romania 
X X X X+ RPE  
Al Nashiri 
v. 
Romania 
Slovakia    X     
Slovenia    X     
Spain X  X X+ RPE    
Sweden X  X     
United 
Kingdom X X X X+ RPE X   
 
X: Black Sites 
RPE: Request to Provide Evidence 
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2. THE U.S. SENATE SELECT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE 
REPORT ON THE CIA PROGRAMME – PERSPECTIVES 
FROM EUROPE 
KEY FINDINGS 
 The Feinstein Report provides insight into the cooperation of European and 
other states with the CIA in its detention and interrogation programme.  
 It describes the programme as one of indefinite secret detention, and 
Senator Feinstein has categorised some of the interrogation techniques as 
torture.  
 In the Feinstein Report the CIA operations appear to be highly unstable, 
with the CIA constantly on the run from international and national 
accountability and scrutiny.  
 Countries such as the UK failed to refute unfounded CIA claims about the 
efficiency of the rendition and detention programme to prevent terrorist 
plots. 
 The CIA isolated itself not only within its own administration and country 
but also internationally. 
 The Feinstein Report reveals that the CIA offered and paid substantial sums 
of money to various Member State officials to secure compliance and 
participation in the implementation of the rendition programme.  
 It acknowledges that both US and some European authorities were aware of 
the inhuman and degrading treatment the detainees were to be – and were 
- subjected to in EU States during rendition. 
 Since its publication, minority voices have developed a narrative to de-
legitimise the Feinstein Report’s findings. Stopping short of justifying 
torture under certain conditions, they still invoke a ‘situation of exception’ 
as a justification for “privileges of the executive” to run clandestine 
programmes and enjoy immunity for their secret services.  
 On both sides of the Atlantic, parliamentary and judicial inquiries have 
condemned the idea of specific privileges for the executive to conduct 
clandestine programmes that led to major breaches of fundamental rights.  
This section provides an assessment of the most interesting aspects and implications of the 
U.S. Senate Select Intelligence Committee Report. Since the summaries of the report were 
published in December 2014, it has attracted widespread controversy and debate in the US 
and in Europe. What have been its main findings and relevance from an EU perspective? 
Secondly, it provides an assessment of the way in which the Feinstein report has been 
received by the global audience, while explaining the reasons for this reception and the way 
in which efforts have been made to undermine the findings of the Report.  
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2.1. Scope and Key Findings 
The U.S. Senate Intelligence Committee initiated a review of the CIA detention and 
interrogation programme in March 2009 led by Chairwoman Senator Dianne Feinstein. The 
Committee approved the study on 13 December 2012 by a vote of nine members in favour 
to six against. Following further discussions, including with the CIA, the Committee voted 11 
to three on 3 April 2014 to declassify the study. The executive summary of the report was 
approved at the highest levels of the US government for public disclosure on 11 December 
2014. It comprises more than 500 pages. The report itself, which runs to 6,700 pages, has 
not been released to the public. 
The report examines the CIA’s extraordinary rendition and secret detention programme, 
instituted after the attacks in the US of 11 September 2001, as regards the capture of 
individuals outside the US, their transfer to various sites around the world and their 
interrogation. The executive summary describes the programme as one of indefinite secret 
detention, and Feinstein has categorised some of the interrogation techniques as torture. 
Both acts are contrary to US law and US international human rights obligations. Feinstein 
also condemns these acts as contrary to American values.  
The executive summary attracted substantial political and press interest. The Committee’s 
failure to reach a unanimous decision on the report has been widely used by the opponents 
of its conclusions to discredit it.39 Those who have been vocal critics of the CIA-led 
programme welcomed the report. The Committee had access to all CIA information on the 
programme from its inception, though it quickly discovered there were substantial gaps, for 
instance videotapes of a number of interrogations had been destroyed.40 Notwithstanding an 
agreement between Committee Chairwoman Feinstein and the then former director of the 
CIA that the Committee would have unfettered access to the CIA computer system, without 
surveillance, this agreement was breached on a number of occasions by the CIA, which 
searched Committee member and staff email exchanges and, according to Feinstein, leaked 
false information to the public and to the Department of Justice about the activities of the 
Committee and its staff. The report of the CIA Accountability Board exonerating the CIA 
regarding these activities triggered a new controversy. 
The report’s documentation of torture as an intended and planned activity carried 
out by CIA personnel and contractors with approval from the highest levels of 
government has been the important revelation in the US. It has dominated 
international discussion about the report, the CIA and the detention and interrogation 
programme. The US president admitted at the end of July 2014 that the CIA had tortured 
some people41, thus paving the way for the report’s findings. However, these findings do not 
come as much of a surprise to an EU public where three Council of Europe (CoE) Member 
States have already been condemned by the Court in Strasbourg and by the UN Human 
Rights Committee for complicity in torture through their cooperation with the CIA in the 
detention and interrogation programme and cases against three more (Italy, Lithuania and 
                                          
39 See http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2014/12/dianne-feinsteins-travesty-113486.html#.Vd7BtPmqrp5. 
40 Specifically, those of the interrogation of Abu Zubaydah and Abd al-Rahim Al Nashiri, which were destroyed by 
the CIA in 2005 according to the Chairwoman. 
41 Foster, P., 2014, “President Barack Obama: the US ‘used torture’ after 9/11”, The Telegraph, 1 August, available 
at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/northamerica/usa/11007320/President-Barack-Obama-the-US-
used-torture-after-911.html. 
Policy Department C: Citizens' Rights and Constitutional Affairs 
______________________________________________________________________ 
24 
 
Romania) are still pending.42 As highlighted and analysed elsewhere in this study, the 
European Parliament and the CoE have both dedicated extensive resources to the 
investigation of European states’ complicity in CIA-instigated torture and have underlined 
the lack of cooperation by governments and authorities of European states under 
investigation.  
According to the executive summary, the findings of the report fall into four main 
groups: 
1. The CIA’s ‘enhanced interrogation techniques’ were not effective. 
2. The CIA provided extensive inaccurate information about the operation of the 
programme and its effectiveness to policy-makers and the public. 
3. The CIA’s management of the programme was inadequate and deeply flawed. 
4. The CIA programme was far more brutal than the CIA represented to policy-
makers and the American public.43 
From a European perspective, it is surprising that a report which describes extreme torture 
carried out in the name of the state and with the knowledge of the highest authorities in the 
US, should have as its first finding a question of efficacy. While the Committee Chairwoman 
Feinstein describes the programme as ‘a strain on our values and on our history‘44, from the 
perspective of a Europe deeply engaged with human rights (as enshrined in the ECHR and 
the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights) it seems odd that an indictment of the programme's 
effectiveness should be the first conclusion presented. The prohibition of torture is absolute, 
ius cogens and inter omnes not only for EU states but internationally. Whether ‘useful’ 
information was extracted from victims of torture is irrelevant to the starting position in 
international law that torture is always prohibited and must always be criminalised. 
Chairwoman Feinstein, however, was ultimately adamant that the activities of the CIA were 
normatively unacceptable, leaving aside any questions of efficiency or effectiveness. 
The second finding, that the CIA provided inaccurate information to US policy-
makers and the public, is of course a very important constitutional issue in the US. 
However, from the European perspective, as the CIA is under no legal duty to tell European 
governments or their public the truth about anything, this is of less interest.  
The third finding is also of somewhat little interest to a European public – that the 
programme was poorly managed and executed is a matter for US internal 
discussion about how intelligence agencies ought to carry out their activities. It is 
more closely linked to issues of financial management and good value for expenditure 
rather than more normative issues of human rights.  
                                          
42 Sweden by the UN Committee against Torture in Agiza v. Sweden, Communication No. 233/2003, U.N. Doc. 
CAT/C/34/D/233/2003 (2005) and by the UN Human Rights Committee in Mohammed Alzery v. Sweden, 
Communication No. 1416/2005, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/88/D/1416/2005 (2006); Macedonia by the European Court of 
Human Rights in El-Masri v. The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 13 December 2012; and Poland by the 
European Court of Human Rights in Husayn (Abu Zubaydah) v. Poland and Al Nashiri v. Poland both of 24 July 
2014.  
43See http://www.feinstein.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?p=senate-intelligence-committee-study-on-cia-detention-
and-interrogation-program.   
44 Idem. 
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The fourth finding is more closely associated with European concerns: the brutality of the 
CIA programme is something which has been denied by a number of governments when 
required to explain the complicity of their agencies in it. In the three above-mentioned 
decisions of the ECtHR on the complicity of Macedonia and Poland in the CIA programme, 
those states argued, among other things, that they did not have sufficient knowledge of the 
brutality of the programme to make the assessment that it was contrary to the ECHR. Once 
again, though, as one would expect from a study designed primarily for an audience of US 
lawmakers, the focus is on what was revealed to them by the CIA and what was not 
disclosed. 
2.2. Main Implications  
Even for a European public already well aware of the profound human rights abuses carried 
out under the CIA’s programme, there is still substantial information about the nature 
of the relationship of the CIA with European state authorities which merits further 
investigation. Three central issues which arise from the report are: 
1. How intelligence agencies in EU states (primarily the UK) cooperated and provided 
‘cover’ for the CIA regarding the effectiveness of the detention and rendition programme 
when it was under attack by other agencies in the US (such as the FBI). 
2. The CIA’s perception that the cooperation of their allies in Europe that provided sites for 
detention and torture was inherently unstable as a result of information leaks about the 
presence of the detention centres on their territory and the pursuit of the states by 
international organisations, such as the International Committee of the Red Cross 
(ICRC), which caused European states to withdraw their cooperation. 
3. The relative and increased isolation of the CIA from other US bodies and agencies, such 
as the refusal of cooperation by the US military in the provision of detention sites and 
the contradiction of CIA claims by the FBI, which appears to have led to greater reliance 
on European counterparts. 
2.2.1. European Cooperation with the CIA Extraordinary Rendition Programme – from the 
Feinstein Report 
One of the aspects of the Feinstein Report which is particularly striking from a European 
perspective relates to the committee’s assessment of the effectiveness of the CIA 
programme. The committee examined eight principal representations by the CIA that its 
programme had produced critical intelligence which ‘saved’ someone from a terrorist attack. 
The committee concluded that all the claims were false and that the CIA’s claim that it 
extracted critical information from those they were torturing was untrue. On the contrary, 
the committee found that all the critical information on the basis of which the 
eight representations were made came from other sources unrelated to torture. Of 
the eight ‘successes’, three related to targets in the UK and plots primarily or exclusively 
carried out in the UK. This raises the fascinating question of whether the CIA was carrying 
out torture to keep London safe.  
The three UK-based plots which the CIA claimed it uncovered were:  
1. The UK Urban Targets Plot. 
2. The arrest and conviction of Sajid Badat. 
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3. The Heathrow Airport and Canary Wharf Plot. 
The first plot, which resulted in a UK criminal trial and conviction of the main participants, 
consisted of two parts. The first was known as the Gas Limos Plot, where the individuals 
planned to park explosives-laden courier vans or limousines in underground garages and 
then detonate them. The second part of the plot was to extract the radiation components 
from 10,000 smoke detectors in order to make a dirty bomb. The far-fetched quality of 
these plans is striking. Nonetheless, the instigator was sentenced to 30 years imprisonment 
by a UK court on the basis of evidence which the UK authorities told the CIA was mainly 
based on terrorist-related materials recovered during property searches before the arrests. 
The FBI’s assessment was that “the main plot presented in the Gas Limos Project is unlikely 
to be successful as described…”  
The second incident, the arrest of Sajid Badat, is rather complex. Badat was an associate of 
the ‘shoe bomber’ Richard Reid and had originally been involved in a plot to bomb a plane. 
But he withdrew from the operation in December 2001. In 2005 he pleaded guilty to 
conspiracy before a UK court which sentenced him to 11 years in prison (originally 13 years 
but reduced on appeal). He was released after five years under an agreement whereby he 
became a cooperating witness for the US and UK authorities, according to the Feinstein 
Report. Once again, the CIA’s claims that their torture techniques had been central to 
obtaining information about Badat were dispelled by the committee which found that in fact 
the UK authorities provided central information about Badat to the CIA, not the other way 
around.  
The third plot, which revolved around preparations for an attack on Heathrow Airport and 
Canary Wharf in London, never proceeded beyond the most preliminary discussions. The 
idea was to hijack multiple airplanes departing from Heathrow and crash them back into the 
airport itself. Then the plan changed as security at Heathrow was considered too efficient, 
and it was planned to hijack the airplanes leaving Eastern European airports and crash them 
into Heathrow. The plan never got beyond speculation, as the plotters could not find pilots 
willing to undertake the job. The four men considered to be responsible for the plot were 
captured mainly in Pakistan, handed over to US authorities, and eventually detained at the 
US base in Guantanamo Bay, according to the Feinstein Report. It also states, however, that 
the plot was known to the CIA before they commenced torturing the men.  
 
The relatively amateur nature of the three UK-based plots is striking. But the evidence of 
their discovery is important. It seems that when the CIA made their claims to have 
uncovered the plots through the use of torture, the UK authorities did not 
intervene to suggest an alternative narrative closer to the actual situation. Indeed, 
it would seem that the UK authorities assisted the CIA in a variety of ways but never set the 
record straight. In particular, one UK intelligence agency was investigating a number of ‘UK-
based extremists’ and providing extensive information to the CIA. These extremists included 
Moazzam Begg, who had already spent a substantial period of time at Guantanamo Bay.45 
His book store in Birmingham was the object of a raid by UK authorities in 2000, which 
revealed various invoices for copies of books which the authorities considered to be 
                                          
45M. Begg, 2007, Enemy Combatant: A British Muslim’s Journey to Guantanamo and Back,London: Free Press. 
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extremist Islamist literature. Other sources in the UK indicate that the raid on the bookstore 
was instigated by the UK intelligence agency MI5.46 
From the Feinstein Report, it appears that the CIA’s claims regarding the 
effectiveness of extracting information by torture to prevent the UK-targeted plots 
were never contradicted by the UK intelligence agencies or police/criminal justice 
authorities even when, as in the case of Sajid Badat, he was convicted at trial in the UK 
obviously on the basis of evidence unrelated to torture. It would seem that the CIA’s efforts 
to justify torture on the basis of efficacy encountered resistance in the US from the FBI, but 
where such claims were made in respect of the UK, there was silence regarding their 
accuracy, leaving the impression that the CIA could justify the claim. The report shows that 
the CIA claims in respect of the UK targets were just as inaccurate as those regarding US 
targets. 
2.2.2. The Instability of CIA Cooperation with European and Other Partners 
As detailed in the introduction to this study, the cooperation of European countries with the 
CIA in its detention and interrogation programme has been the subject of detailed work by 
the CoE and the European Parliament. From the detailed work of the ECtHR in obtaining the 
facts of the decided cases, it is clear that the CIA moved prisoners from one country to 
another at short notice. However, the Feinstein Report reveals a rather different 
picture of this instability regarding the places of detention.  
According to the report, initially the CIA considered that the best place to carry out the 
detention and interrogation programme was at US military bases (Finding 11). Indeed, it 
seems that the CIA attempted on numerous occasions to convince the Department of 
Defence to allow the relocation of their prisoners into US military custody (including in 2005 
– Finding 19). However, the Department of Defence was reluctant to be implicated and 
refused to cooperate. It even refused CIA requests to provide medical care to detainees 
(Finding 19). One of the issues which the report reveals is that the Department of Defence 
appears to have refused to hide CIA prisoners at its bases from the ICRC (Finding 11). So it 
appears that the CIA chose to negotiate with other countries to detain its 
prisoners on their soil as a second-best alternative and expressly to avoid the eye 
of the ICRC (Finding 11).  
The use of non-US territory was seen as a source of instability for the CIA-led 
programme. According to the report (Finding 19), the CIA was forced to relocate detainees 
out of every country in which it had established a detention facility because of pressure 
from the host government or public revelations about the programme. It would seem there 
was a ‘cat and mouse’ game going on whereby the CIA would make an agreement 
to detain prisoners in one country only to have international organisations and the 
press ‘spoil’ the game and the authorities of the host country would withdraw 
their authorisation for the CIA presence rather than risk the opprobrium of public 
revelation of their complicity in torture.  
This nervousness on the part of potential host countries even went so far as to result in the 
mothballing of two facilities which the CIA had built but was never able to use at all (at 
great expense, though the actual figure is not revealed) because the host country 
                                          
46 See http://ww.newstatesman.com/politics/2015/01/mcbain-begg.  
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became increasingly concerned about the potential political fallout (Finding 20). It 
seems the CIA had to pay millions of dollars in cash to foreign governments to encourage 
them to host clandestine CIA detention sites. To this end, CIA headquarters apparently 
encouraged CIA stations to construct ‘wish lists’ of proposed financial assistance to 
unnamed entities of foreign governments and to ‘think big’ in terms of that assistance 
(Finding 20).  
From the perspective of the CIA, relations with foreign countries regarding the 
hosting of detention centres were unstable and unreliable. This was due to the 
reluctance of the authorities of those countries to withstand (potential) national and 
international condemnation regarding complicity in the CIA’s torture activities. More than 
once in the report, the ICRC’s vigilance in fulfilling its mandate to visit detainees wherever 
they are held47 is referred to as an important risk to the CIA programme. This is particularly 
the case in respect of the willingness of foreign states to assist. For observers and activists 
this comes as something of a surprise as the power of the CIA to convince authorities in the 
potential host countries and to act in accordance with its plan is often accepted as 
‘obvious’.48  
The report shows that the CIA programme appeared rapidly to lose support both 
internationally and nationally and the efforts of some within the CIA to shore up the 
programme proved increasingly unsuccessful. Yet, the literature seems to suggest that the 
CIA had immense powers and the only solution to the ill of extraordinary rendition, 
detention and torture would come from better control by the US government. 49 While the 
Feinstein report shows that it lied systematically to Congress, the executive, the media and 
the public, in fact it was international organisations (and the refusal of cooperation by the 
US military) which caused instability to its programme. As the report states: “By 2006, 
press disclosures, the unwillingness of other countries to host existing or new detention 
sites, and legal and oversight concerns had largely ended the CIA’s ability to operate 
clandestine detention facilities” (Finding 19).  
2.2.3. The Isolation of the CIA 
The CIA’s use of torture isolated it not only from other agencies in the US but also 
abroad. According to the report, the FBI and the U.S. Department of Defence were among 
the first to withdraw cooperation with the CIA on this programme (Finding 8). The CIA 
refused to allow the FBI access to detainees or to share information with other US agencies, 
which did not help matters. Relations with the State Department appear to have been 
particularly poor, as the Feinstein Report reveals that the CIA asked local government 
officials in two countries with detention sites not to mention the fact to the US ambassadors 
to those countries (Finding 8). In one country, the State Department ordered its 
ambassador to deliver a demarche to the authorities of the country concerned demanding 
that the country allow full ICRC access to detainees, including, it would seem, those being 
held at a CIA site in that country (Finding 20). According to the Report, the CIA programme 
                                          
47 See https://www.icrc.org/en/what-we-do/visiting-detainees. 
48 Weissbrodt, D. and Bergquist, A., 2006, “Extraordinary Rendition: A Human Rights Analysis”, Harvard Human 
Rights Journal 19: 123. 
49 L. N. Sadat, 2007, “Extraordinary rendition, torture and other nightmares from the war on terror” George 
Washington Law Review 75: 101; A. Singh, 2013, “Globalizing Torture: CIA Secret Detention and Extraordinary 
Rendition”, Open Society Justice Initiative, Open Society Foundations. 
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created tensions with US partners and allies and both damaged and complicated intelligence 
relationships (Finding 20). By 2006 the CIA Director acknowledged that, without a decision 
by the US administration to do something with the detainees, the CIA was “stymied” and 
“the program could collapse under its own weight” (Finding 19).  
2.2.4. The Dynamics of Power  
The Feinstein Report also reveals the errors inherent in any narrative which 
exaggerates the unity of the locus of power. The description of the CIA’s race to find 
places/countries willing to host its programme, the fear of administrations in third countries 
that they would be discovered allowing the CIA free rein in their states, the struggles with 
other (US) agencies, and the CIA’s support being limited to the U.S. Secretary of State 
show that the ‘exception’ never produced a reconfiguration of the norms. The allies and 
states complicit with the CIA have tried as far as possible to ‘pass the buck’ 
regarding their own responsibility to anyone else available. But they also tried to 
reduce as much as possible the CIA’s use of them for its rendition programme.  
Therefore, far from being the omnipotent armed guard of the all-pervasive state of 
exception, the CIA appears to act more like Tilly’s ‘mafia’50, always fearful of being found 
out and punished. Immunity from prosecution for its agents became the obsession of all 
senior CIA officers. What the Feinstein Report shows is that we have to think once again 
about the US state, not as a single actor, but as a realm of interlocking groups 
with very different views about the hierarchy of threats and risks and, to an even 
greater degree, about how to counter them. Only such an approach can allow one to 
analyse the contradictions among the actors.  
The CIA’s need to find complicit states all over the world because they were weak within 
their own state structures becomes understandable. The fact that the CIA never succeeded 
in persuading the Pentagon to participate in its programme becomes an important factor. It 
is clear that, in Europe, the CIA succeeded in gaining support for its narrative of prevention 
from some actors in the UK who accepted the argument that the CIA needed to have 
information ‘at whatever cost’. Yet the CIA does not appear to have succeeded in having its 
UK counterparts provide detention centres for torture.  
The UK intelligence agencies seem to have been more uneasy about the CIA’s passage from 
an espionage to a detention and torture agency. Their advisors seem to have pointed out 
the risk of court action, including at the European level.  
These new pieces of evidence enable us to study the multiple instances of dispute and 
resistance among some individual members of the U.S. Senate, the Judge Advocate 
General’s Corps of the U.S. Army, some circuit courts inside the US federal system, many 
US city administrations, and, of course, some actors in civil society, such as librarians, civil 
rights lawyers and many NGOs. Especially after the creation of the Department of Homeland 
Security under the Bush administration and influenced by the strong ideological impetus 
provided by neo-conservatives within the administration, in particular former Secretary of 
State Donald Rumsfeld and his ‘one per cent doctrine’, the US government and its executive 
branch were never in a position of absolute domination over other departments. The Justice 
Department, the State Department and others appear never to have been convinced about 
                                          
50 Tilly, C., 1985, “War Making and State Making as Organized Crime” in “”Bringing the State Back”, in Evans, P., 
Rueschemeyer, D., Skocpol, T., Cambridge University Press. 
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the need and rationale for launching a war on terror in order to justify attacks on 
Afghanistan or Iraq. These other actors seem to have proposed other coercive alternatives, 
less costly in terms of international image and expenditure.  
The U.S. Department of Justice, despite its successive neoconservative heads, has tried to 
keep intact, as far as possible, the boundaries of its responsibility inside the country – to the 
complete exclusion of the CIA. The FBI obediently followed the political line of the Bush 
administration. Yet it sought to counterbalance the weight of the CIA and NSA regarding the 
launch and development of the war on terror. The CIA, on the contrary, adopted 
wholeheartedly the neoconservative doctrine of a ‘global civil’ war implying a ‘global 
counterterrorism approach’. For the agency, this was perhaps a chance to take the lead 
among the many US intelligence agencies with security responsibilities. The CIA is shown in 
the Report as considering itself the only agency with enough knowledge from sources 
outside the country to safeguard the US internally against both outside enemies and the 
potential enemy within.   
The CIA Director perhaps saw it as an opportunity to become the right hand of the White 
House Defence Secretary at a time when the Pentagon and Chiefs of Staff (leaders of the 
army, navy and air force) were hostile or at least reluctant to place the armed forces into 
the position of ‘remodelling the Middle East’ welcomed by those close to the President. The 
CIA benefited from the clash between Rumsfeld’s ‘one per cent doctrine’, justifying 
extracting information from every suspect, and the more legalistic approach of the 
Pentagon’s generals, who worried that the strategy undermined the status of prisoner of 
war and thus threatened potential US prisoners. Some warned enhanced interrogation 
techniques would damage relations between the US and its allies and tarnish the image of 
US soldiers. 
The CIA’s inability to convince other agencies to participate in its programme of 
extraordinary rendition pushed the agency to ‘take risks’ in order to re-establish 
its legitimacy in the intelligence sector, notwithstanding the potential (and actual) 
trouble this would cause with the justice system. These internal problems, however, 
obliged the CIA to rely ever more on their connections outside US agencies, 
especially less legitimate connections (those with previous and present dictatorships) to 
extract information from their high- value detainees. 
2.2.5. The Changing Nature of the Controversy 
At least two reports have tried to limit the influence of the Feinstein Report. They have 
contested its findings by arguing it lacks an understanding of the context of 11 September 
2001 and uses a narrow legalistic view. The first is the “Minority Views of Vice Chairman 
Chambliss Joined by Senators Burr, Risch, Coats, Rubio, and Coburn”,51 and the second is 
the “Overview of CIA-Congress Interactions Concerning the Agency’s Rendition-Detention-
Interrogation Program”,52 which reiterated the position of CIA officials of June 2013. 
                                          
51 U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, 2014, “Minority Views of Vice Chairman Chambliss Joined by 
Senators Burr, Risch, Coats, Rubio, and Coburn,” Committee Study of the Central Intelligence Agency’s Detention 
and Interrogation Program, 159 pp. 
52 CIA, 2014, “Overview of CIA-Congress Interactions Concerning the Agency’s Rendition-Detention-Interrogation 
Program”, 43 pp. One can also add CIA, 2014, “June 2013 Response to the SSCI Study on the Former Detention 
and Interrogation Program”, 136 pp. 
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When reading these contributions it becomes clear that the emphasis is no longer so much 
on the tenuous distinction between ‘enhanced interrogation techniques’ and torture, or 
denying the malpractices of CIA agents as such. They have instead tried to convince their 
audience that the Feinstein Report constitutes de facto a recognition of the inherent 
difficulties of their jobs and of the need to use secret violent actions against state enemies 
in a context characterised by a ‘global civil war’. That notwithstanding, these narratives 
claim that the Feinstein Report is unfair because it is ideologically conditioned by 
the Democrats and that this majority report avoids fully addressing the question of 
the legitimacy of the role of the secret services in the struggle against terrorism.  
Tactically, CIA supporters also avoided the legal debate over the immunity of CIA personnel 
as soon as they received assurances that it was not one of the possible outcomes of the 
Report. They therefore tried with some success to temper the implications of the Report. 
The strategy of the Report’s opponents has been to consider that its authors “took 
things out of context” and made false accusations, thus devaluing the facts they 
“discovered” based on their ignorance of the broader situation leading to decisions 
in bureaucracies.53  
The tentative shift to discredit the findings of the Report can be traced to the attempt to 
replace a discussion focused on torture with another one, more general in nature, 
about the need for secret services in combatting violence in the world. It has been 
argued that the Report ignores the post 9/11 context and thus why it became ‘reasonable’ 
to consider tough, possibly illiberal responses to terrorist violence and (real or perceived) 
threats, trumping democratic values in the name of security. Such arguments have sought 
to downplay the question of torture, immunity and human rights as secondary to the 
primary question of security.  
Interestingly, Democrats and some NGOs that valued the Feinstein Report have fought back 
against this shift. However, such a ‘fight-back’ also seems to have been a way to ‘forget’ the 
immediate consequences of the Report for some members of the Obama administration and 
the European governments engaged in the fight against terrorism, leading them to 
downplay as much as possible the Feinstein Report and all the possible legal consequences 
of the complicity of their own secret services in the CIA extra-territorial operations of 
“clandestine state violence”.54  
Far from recognising its importance and the fact that the Feinstein Report was itself a 
follow-up to the previous inquiries of the Council of Europe and the European Parliament, 
EU governments have often relied on the opponents’ arguments in insisting that, 
while torture cannot be justified, the idea of a ‘permanent state of exception’ related to 
jihadist terrorism has to be accepted as a coherent framing of the last 15 years, and that 
anyone who refuses this ‘evidence’ is playing the fool. 
Given that, for once, a committee with its own reason to conduct a rigorous investigation 
into its country’s own secret service was ready to describe the latter’s practices with a rare 
level of detail,55 one would have expected international relations and political science 
                                          
53 www.reuters.com/article/2014/12/11/us-usa-cia-torture-idUSKBN0JM24I20141211. 
54 E.-P. Guittet, 2014, “Review of Donatella Della Porta (2013) Clandestine Political Violence, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press”, Critical Studies on Terrorism.  	
55 The CIA spied on the Senate Intelligence committee itself and on Dianne Feinstein herself to establish what the 
committee did and did not know, as well as to get their stories straight before the committee (Cf. Guittet). 
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specialists to be among the first to contribute to the analysis of the Report’s significance and 
details. Surprisingly, this has not been the case at all. On the contrary, the few scholarly 
articles have preferred to downplay the knowledge produced by the Report, 
providing as a pretext that specialists knew already and were wise enough not to discuss 
these elements in public, as they may damage national security.  
The publication of the Feinstein report led to a storm of media controversy, which was 
accompanied by widespread silence among concerned European governments regarding 
their complicity in serious human rights violations and the use of an unlawful security 
apparatus.56 
Key questions at the heart of this controversy have not only concerned the safeguarding of 
human rights recognised as ius cogens and the refusal of national security or state secrets 
exemptions, but have also concerned the changing relationship between liberal 
democracies, the rule of law and fundamental rights. In particular, is the immunity of 
government representatives and intelligence services agents possible in a democracy? Is 
the ‘reason of state’ and ‘national security’ as interpreted by a given government at a 
specific time,57 or allegiance to political leaders, sufficient to exonerate persons who have 
been complicit in these forms of torture and other serious human rights violations?  
While the Feinstein Report has not addressed directly these sensitive issues, its 
unequivocal conclusions send a strong message that something needs to be done to 
restore justice and that a democracy cannot use torture or other related unlawful 
practices. The Report reveals that torture is most of the time ‘ineffectivet’ in terms of 
finding any truth, and it entails huge political costs for any democracy, as other democracies 
and even different security actors within the same state tend to distance themselves from 
these practices. 
The Feinstein Report has obliged those who are still defending the use of ‘enhanced 
interrogation techniques’ by the secret security services to shift their arguments from 
the necessity of using torture to the necessity of ‘state secrets’ and the 
classification of information as ‘closed evidence’, allowing secret service communities 
to perform their activities in a manner in keeping with ‘exceptional or emergency times’ and 
to evade responsibility in cases of wrongdoing. This change of narrative ultimately 
downgrades, and to a certain extent prevents, an open and detailed discussion of the 
importance of the Report’s main findings and their legal consequences for the 
actors involved.  
The Study argues that despite the various limitations characterising the Feinstein Report, it 
constitutes a key tool for critically studying (both sociologically and historically) the 
strategies used to water down its findings and conclusions, as well as the struggles over 
how the security apparatus in liberal democracies works in practice. The Feinstein Report 
provides us with a clear picture of many otherwise invisible practices that shape the most 
fundamental assumptions of what it means for someone to be treated as a human being in 
a democratic society. The information it reveals is most valuable when describing the 
                                          
56 A. Leber, 2014, “A Resounding Silence: Regional Reactions to the Senate’s Report on U.S. Use of Torture”, 
available at www.brookings.edu/blogs/markaz/posts/2014/12/29-middle-east-reaction-torture-report. 
57 For a study on the notions of national security and ‘reason of state’, refer to European Parliament, 2014, Study 
on “National Security and Secret Evidence in Legislation and Before the Courts: Exploring the Challenges”. 
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contested and unstable relationship of the CIA with all the other security agencies inside the 
US and with allies of the CIA’s activities abroad. The details of these practices and the 
struggles which occurred between the relevant security services illustrate the limits of many 
academic contributions on these matters.  
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3. STATE OF PLAY ON NATIONAL INQUIRIES AND 
INVESTIGATIONS: A SCOREBOARD OF LATEST 
DEVELOPMENTS  
KEY FINDINGS 
 The national political inquiries and judicial investigations in the five Member 
States under assessment present a rather heterogeneous picture as regards 
the degree of effective accountability for alleged complicity with the CIA.  
 In all five Member States, political inquiries have taken place, though their 
actual nature and scope has greatly differed.  
 Most of the governments and relevant parliamentary bodies have by and 
large denied any involvement in the CIA rendition and detention programme 
(except Lithuania). 
 Judicial investigations are/have been conducted in the five Member States 
and all but the UK have been or still are subject to proceedings before the 
ECtHR. In all five states, criminal investigations are being or have been 
conducted and face different challenges in terms of effectiveness, 
independence and impartiality.  
 The responses provided by the European institutions (in particular the 
European Commission and the Council) concerning the Member States’ 
complicity in the CIA operations have been mixed. 
This section offers an update on Member States’ domestic inquiries and judicial 
investigations into human rights violations resulting from complicity in the CIA-led 
extraordinary rendition and secret detention programme. It provides a scoreboard of the 
latest developments with direct relevance when assessing the degree and scope of 
accountability in the EU; builds on the analysis included in the previous 2012 Parliament 
Study58 on the state of play of the inquiries conducted in Member States; and aims to take 
stock of the new information that has emerged since then and highlight the most 
relevant developments in the five Member States under examination: Italy, 
Lithuania, Poland, Romania and the UK. The analysis needs to be read in conjunction 
with Annexes 1 and 2, which give a detailed account of relevant domestic information. 
Graph 4 below illustrates the inquiries and investigations. The resulting picture is one of 
important divergences with regard to effective accountability across the Union 
depending on the Member State. As will be illustrated below, a majority of political 
inquiries have been finalised at this stage, while some other domestic efforts to achieve 
accountability are still ongoing.   
The results of the state of play exercise, summarised in an updated “Scoreboard of Inquiries 
and Investigations” in Figure 1 below, following Graph 4, can be grouped into political 
inquiries (Section 3.1) and judicial investigations (Section 3.2). The Study differentiates 
                                          
58 Carrera, S., E. Guild, J. Soares da Silva and A. Wiesbrock, 2012, “The Results of Inquiries into the CIA’s 
Programme of Extraordinary Rendition and Secret Prisons in European States in light of the New Legal Framework 
following the Lisbon Treaty”, DG IPOL, European Parliament, Brussels. 
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between two types of ‘political’ inquiries: democratic, which are those conducted by 
parliaments or relevant parliamentary committees; and executive, which are driven by 
governmental bodies, ministries or agencies, and which therefore can be positioned more at 
a distance from effective accountability. The category for Ombudsmen inquiries has been 
removed since there are no ongoing initiatives of the kind. Furthermore, responses by the 
European institutions are also covered in Section 3.3. 
 
Graph 4: State of Play in National and Supranational Inquiries 
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Figure 1 : Scoreboard of Inquiries and Investigations 
 
POLITICAL INQUIRIES  JUDICIAL INQUIRIES 
REPARATION 
AND REMEDIES 
VICTIM 
STATUS 
Parliamentary  Executive National ECtHR   
Committee Others        
Poland  X   X  X  X  X 
UK  X   X  X   X   X   
Italy   X  X  X  X  X   
Lithuania  X    X   X    
Romania  X    X  X    
* Grey symbolises closed investigations, inquiries or remedies offered, while white stands 
for ongoing investigations. 
3.1. Political (Democratic/Executive) Inquiries59 
Political inquiries have been conducted in the five selected Member States. The 
actual nature and scope of each inquiry diverged significantly from country to country. In 
two (the UK and Italy60) of the five states, both governmental and parliamentary authorities 
have conducted investigations. 
In the UK, as shown in Annexes 1 and 2, an All-Party Parliamentary Group on Extraordinary 
Rendition (APPG) was created in 2005. This cross-party group is actively contributing to the 
debate regarding the UK’s involvement in the rendition programme. The committee in 
charge of the democratic control of intelligence services within the UK Parliament, the 
Intelligence and Security Committee (ISC), was also involved in the investigations and in 
2007 it released a study61 that examined Britain’s possible collusion in the extraordinary 
rendition programme. The results have been inconclusive according to the APPG.62 The 
                                          
59 See Annexes 1 and 2 for detailed information concerning the state of affairs regarding political inquiries in each 
country. See also Figure 1 (“Scoreboard of Inquiries and Investigations”).  
60 Letter sent by the Romanian Prime Minister’s Office to the European Parliament, 10 January 2006, available at 
www.statewatch.org/cia/documents/romania-letter-PM-10-01-06.pdf. 
61 ISC Report, 2007, available at 
www.therenditionproject.org.uk/pdf/PDF%2094%20[UK%20ISC,%20Jul%202007.%20Rendition].pdf. 
62 Sir Andrew Tyrie, founder of the APPG, in a public statement following the release of the Feinstein Report, 
available at www.extraordinaryrendition.org/document-library/finish/26/391.html. 
A Quest for Accountability? EU and Member State Inquiries into the CIA Rendition and Secret Detention Programme 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
37 
 
Gibson/Detainee Inquiry, launched at the executive level by the British Prime Minister, was 
closed soon after its establishment due to allegations regarding its lack of independence.63 
In Italy64 parliamentary inquiries were conducted in 2005 by the Senate and Chamber 
regarding the kidnapping of Abu Omar, the conduct of CIA agents and the position of the 
Italian government.65 The Parliamentary Committee for Intelligence and Security Services 
and for State Secrecy conducted an internal investigation with the cooperation of the 
directors of SISMI and SISDE (Italian security services), the General Secretariat of the 
Comitato Esecutivo per i Servizi di Informazione e Sicurezza (CESIS, Executive Committee 
for the Intelligence and Security Services) and the Undersecretary of State responsible for 
the coordination of intelligence services.66 The Italian government was also involved in the 
investigations, which are now closed. 
In the case of Romania, the Parliamentary Senate Committee inquiry was established in 
2005 with the mandate to investigate the claims of the 2006 Dick Marty Report on rendition 
flights and black sites. The Committee established was called the “Senate Committee of 
Inquiry to investigate the allegations regarding the use of Romanian territory for CIA 
detention facilities or flights by CIA-chartered aircraft” and was led67 by Member of the 
Parliament Norica Nicolai and co-chaired by George Cristian Maior, who was head of the 
Romanian Intelligence Service from October 2006 to January 2015.68 The composition of the 
parliamentary inquiry team was in this way very closely connected to the secret services, 
hampering the impartiality of the investigation. The Romanian government’s 2007 secret 
inquiry also concluded that the accusations were groundless, while the Senate report 
remains classified.69 In the case of Romania, more evidence was presented in a 2011 
investigation by German media about a secret prison in Bucharest. The Romanian president 
at the time the renditions occurred, Ion Iliescu, first denied any knowledge of the subject.70 
Later, in 2015, he confirmed its existence, after former Head of the Secret Services, Ioan 
Talpes, admitted during testimony the presence of a secret rendition site in Bucharest. The 
detention site was operated in the basement of the government’s National Registry Office 
for Classified Information in north-west Bucharest.71 
                                          
63 See www.amnesty.org.uk/detainee-inquiry?gclid=COnU8LeZpscCFTGWtAodwQULiQ#.VcygL_mqrp4. 
64 European Parliament, Questionnaire, National Parliaments’ activities on alleged CIA activities in European 
countries – Italy (Chamber), available at www.statewatch.org/rendition/rendition.html; European Parliament, 
Questionnaire, National Parliaments’ activities on alleged CIA activities in European countries – Italy (Senate), 
available at www.statewatch.org/rendition/rendition.html. 
65 Ibid.  
66 Ibid., Italy (Chamber only). 
67 See http://assembly.coe.int/CommitteeDocs/2007/EMarty_20070608_NoEmbargo.pdf. 
68See http://stirileprotv.ro/stiri/actualitate/george-maior-si-a-dat-demisia-din-functia-de-sef-al-sri.html. 
69 Amnesty International, 2011, “Romania must come clean over secret prisons”, 9 December, available at  
https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2011/12/romania-must-come-clean-over-secret-prisons/ Amnesty 
International, 2015, “Romania Country Report”, available at https://www.amnesty.org/en/countries/europe-and-
central-asia/romania/. 
70 A. Goldman and M. Apuzzo, 2011, “AP Exclusive: Inside Romania’s Secret CIA Prison,” Associated Press, 8 
December, http://news.yahoo.com/ap-exclusive-inside-romanias-secret-cia-prison-050239912.html. 
71 Ibid. 
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The governments of UK, Romania72 and Italy73 were also involved in the investigations, 
making the process less independent and transparent.  
In Lithuania the investigations were more conclusive. In 2009 the Committee on National 
Security and Defence conducted a parliamentary inquiry.74 The Committee released its 
findings the same year, recognising the existence of two black sites managed with the help 
of the Lithuanian Security Services (SSD).75 The report was followed up by the Prosecutor 
General’s Office, which began an official investigation into the complicity of the SSD.76 In 
April 2012, Members of the European Parliament visited Lithuania to investigate the 
situation.77 One of the Lithuanian detention centres, in a former riding school outside 
Vilnius, had been purchased by a mysterious company, Elite LLC, registered in Washington, 
D.C., and Panama and operated via power of attorney given to an individual named Wouter 
Scklauscas. It was alleged that the US embassy in Vilnius had purchased the company78.  
In Poland a parliamentary inquiry conducted by the Committee for Special Services 
(Komisja do Spraw Służb Specjanych) took place in November and December 2005. All 
allegations regarding the state’s collusion in the CIA renditions were dismissed. The above-
mentioned Marty Reports repeatedly state that the Polish authorities did not comply with 
their obligation to conduct an effective investigation.  
Surprisingly, all of these political inquiries have been dismissed – in Italy, 
Lithuania,79 Romania, Poland and the UK – without finding the governments of the 
Member States guilty of anything or involved in any way. All the governments and 
parliaments denied any involvement or participation in the rendition and detention 
programme – with the exception of Lithuania (e.g. see how the Romanian Prime Minister 
reacted to the claims80). Following these inquiries some public authorities have been found 
guilty: CIA agents (Italy); intelligence services (Poland, the UK, Italy and Lithuania); 
military officials (Italy); former politicians (Poland) and private parties (Elite LLC).  
 
                                          
72 Amnesty International, 2011, op. cit. 
73Hopper, J., 2009, “Judges deal blow to CIA ‘kidnap’ trial”, The Guardian, 12 March, available at 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/mar/12/cia-kidnaps-terrorism-suspect-trial/print. 
74 C. Whitlock, 2009, “Lithuania investigates possible CIA black site”, The Washington Post, 19 November, available 
at www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/11/18/AR2009111803994.html. 
75 Amnesty International, 2011, “Current Evidence: European Complicity in the CIA Rendition and Secret Detention 
Programmes”, 25 January, pp. 4-5. 
76 Ibid. 
77 Liberal Democrat Members of the European Parliament, 2012, “Ludford: Rendition inquiries in Lithuania positive 
but incomplete”, 27 April, available at http://libdemmeps.com/?p=600. See also 15min.lt, 2012, “After visit to 
Lithuania, EP delegates say there are unanswered questions about alleged CIA prison”, 27 April, available at 
www.15min.lt/en/article/in-lithuania/after-visit-to-lithuania-ep-delegates-say-there-are-unanswered-questions-
about-alleged-cia-prison-525-214492#ixzz1v2jYJYjR.IS.  
78 I. Cobain, 2011, “Lithuania faces legal action over prisons set up for CIA rendition programme”, The Guardian, 
27 October, available at www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/oct/27/lithuania-cia-rendition-prisons-european-court. 
79 Whitlock, op. cit. 
80 Letter sent by the Romanian Prime Minister’s Office to the European Parliament, op. cit. 
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3.2. Judicial Investigations81 
Since the analysis prepared in 2012, the situation of judicial investigations at 
national and international (ECtHR) levels has evolved considerably.  
First, judicial inquiries have been/are being conducted at national level, and in four out of 
the five states, there have also been proceedings before the European Court of Human 
Rights (ECtHR) (Section 3.2.1).  
Second, national judicial inquiries have been conducted in Poland, the UK, Italy and 
Lithuania. Meanwhile, in all five states, criminal investigations have been or are being 
conducted. Two investigations have been carried out by the Prosecutor General’s Office 
(Lithuania and Italy). Civil claims have been filed in Romania82 and the UK. Poland launched 
an investigation but no effective progress has been made since its launch in 2008 (Section 
3.2.2 below). 
Graph 5 below presents a timeline of the proceedings before the ECtHR on European 
countries’ complicity in the CIA’s extraordinary rendition and secret detention programme, 
taking into account previous decisions upheld by the United Nations Human Rights 
Committee or national courts. 
 
Graph 5: Chronology of Supranational Legal and Judicial Investigations 
 
                                          
81 See Annexes 1 and 2 for detailed information concerning the state of affairs regarding judicial inquiries in each 
country. See also Figure 1 on “Scoreboard of Inquiries and Investigations”. 
82 Ibid. 
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3.2.1.ECtHR Cases 
A total of six applications have been logged before the ECtHR in Strasbourg: two against 
Poland (Al Nashiri and Abu Zubaydah), one against Italy (Abu Omar), one against 
Macedonia (El-Masri), one against Lithuania (Abu Zubaydah) and one against Romania (Al 
Nashiri). Three rulings have been made at the time of writing this study. The claims against 
the Member States involved alleged violations of Articles 2, 3, 5, 6 § 1, 8 and 13 of the 
European Convention of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and Article 1 of Protocol 
No. 6 to the Convention. The facts of the cases and the Court’s main decisions can be 
summarised as follows:  
 El-Masri v. Macedonia:83 In 2009 the Open Society Justice Initiative represented 
the German citizen Khaled El-Masri before the ECtHR in a case against the Former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia concerning his kidnapping and rendition in 
Macedonia and Afghanistan. According to the proceedings of the case, the victim left 
Germany on 31 December 2003 and headed to Skopje, Macedonia, for a holiday. At 
the Serbian/Macedonian border crossing, at Tabanovce, he was stopped and 
questioned about possible ties with Islamic organisations. When the interrogation 
finished, he was taken to the Skopski Merak Hotel in Skopje where he was 
interrogated repeatedly and kept incommunicado, without access to a lawyer or 
judge and without being accused of anything. He was denied the request to contact 
the German embassy. On 23 January 2004 he was put in a car and taken to Skopje 
Airport and flown to Afghanistan where he was detained and tortured for four months 
before his release and return to Germany. The Macedonian state denied any 
involvement in the capture, detention and rendition of El-Masri. The ECtHR ruled in 
favour of El-Masri and found Macedonia responsible for multiple violations, such as: 
Article 3 (prohibition of torture), Article 5 (prohibition against arbitrary detention), 
failure to investigate (Articles 2, 3 and 5), Article 13 (right to an effective remedy) 
and the right to truth and compensation. 
 Al Nashiri  v. Poland:84 In October 2002 Abd al-Rahim Al Nashiri , a Saudi national 
and suspect in the terrorist attacks on both the US Navy destroyer USS Cole in the 
port of Aden, Yemen, and the French oil tanker MV Limburg in the Gulf of Aden, was 
captured in Dubai, United Arab Emirates, transferred to a secret CIA prison in 
Afghanistan, which was known as the “Salt Pit”, and then to another black site prison 
in Bangkok, Thailand, where he was detained, interrogated and tortured. In 
December 2002 he was transferred to the Polish site of Stare Kiejkuty with the 
authorisation of the Polish authorities. In 2003 Al Nashiri was transferred out of 
Poland with the cooperation of the national authorities. The Polish authorities were 
accused of knowingly allowing Al Nashiri ’s rendition to Polish territory, of aiding and 
enabling the CIA agents to detain and torture him, and of allowing his transfer from 
Poland despite the real risk of his being tortured or tried before a military court and 
sentenced to death. The case is assessed in detail in Section 4 below. Suffice here to 
say that the ECtHR found Poland guilty on various counts, such as: a violation of 
                                          
83 Applications to European Court of Human Rights: El-Masri v. Macedonia, Application No. 39630/09, 18 
September 2009, 2012 final judgement released in 2012 available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-
115621#{"itemid":["001-115621"]}.  
84 ECtHR, Al Nashiri v. Poland, Application lodged on 6 May 2011 and sentenced in 2014. See 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-146044#{"itemid":["001-146044"]}. 
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Article 3 (prohibition of torture and inhuman or degrading treatment), in both its 
substantive and procedural aspects; a violation of Article 5 (right to liberty and 
security); a violation of Article 8 (right to respect for private and family life); a 
violation of Article 13 (right to an effective remedy); and a violation of Article 6 § 1 
(right to a fair trial). 
 Abu Zubaydah v. Poland:85 On 23 March 2013 the UK-based Interights Centre 
submitted a complaint before the ECtHR on behalf of Zayn al-Abidin Muhammad 
Husayn, known more widely as Abu Zubaydah, a stateless Palestinian born in Saudi 
Arabia, on account of his being rendered and tortured by the CIA with the help of the 
Polish authorities. According to the 2007 ICRC report on 14 high-value detainees, he 
was considered one of the most valuable terrorist suspects. He was captured in 
Faisalbad, Pakistan, on 28 March 2002 and rendered until September 2006, when he 
was transferred to the US detention facility in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, where he still 
is today. He has never been charged with a crime, neither in proceedings before a 
military commission nor in a civilian court. The allegations against Poland state that 
the victim, between December 2002 and 22 September 2003, was transferred to the 
black site of Stare Kiejkuty, where he was subjected to enhanced interrogation 
techniques. As will be studied in more detail in Section 4 below, the ECtHR ruled in 
favour of Abu Zubaydah and found Poland in violation of: Article 3 (prohibition of 
torture and inhuman or degrading treatment); Article 5 (right to liberty and 
security); Article 8 (right to respect for private and family life); Article 13 (right to an 
effective remedy); and Article 6 § 1 (right to a fair trial). 
 Abu Zubaydah v. Lithuania (pending):86 In 2011 the UK-based Interights Centre 
submitted a complaint before the ECtHR against Lithuania on behalf of Abu 
Zubaydah. According to the allegations, the plaintiff was subjected to unlawful 
detention, torture and ill treatment at a secret detention facility in Lithuania, the 
deprivation of his right to private and family life, his unlawful transfer from Lithuania 
to an unknown detention centre where he was subjected to further violations and the 
ongoing denial of his right to any legal recourse. In February 2005, Abu Zubaydah 
was rendered to Lithuania where he was held in a secret detention facility near the 
capital, Vilnius. Abu Zubaydah was later transferred from Lithuanian territory to an 
unknown detention centre, from which he was then transferred to Guantanamo Bay, 
where he is currently detained. 
 Al Nashiri v. Romania (pending):87 The applicant, Al Nashiri, won aprevious case 
against Poland before the ECtHR (see above). In the application against Romania, Al 
Nashiri claims to have been the victim of rendition to, and detention at, a secret 
black site in Romania provided by the state to CIA authorities. The claims allege that 
the Romanian state knowingly allowed the CIA to use a government building for 
rendition and detention and that the state was aware of the inhuman and degrading 
treatment that occurred during detention at the site. According to the applicant, 
                                          
85 Abu Zubaydah v. Poland, logged in March 2013 and judged on the 24 July 2014, available at 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-146047#{"itemid":["001-146047"]}. 
86Abu Zubaydah v. Lithuania, logged 28 October 2011, available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-
115816#{"itemid":["001-115816"]}. 
87 ECtHR, Al Nashiri v. Romania, logged in 2012 available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/fre?i=002-
7210#{"itemid":["002-7210"]}. 
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Romania enabled the American authorities to transfer him to another location where 
there was an evident risk of being rendered again and where he could have faced the 
death penalty. The claims against Romania are violations of: Articles 2 (right to life), 
3 (prohibition of torture and inhuman or degrading treatment), 5 (right to liberty and 
security), 6 § 1 (right to a fair trial), 8 (right to respect for private and family life), 
10 (freedom of expression) and 13 (right to an effective remedy), and under Protocol 
No. 6 (abolition of the death penalty). 
 Nash and Ghali v. Italy (pending):88 In 2003 Egyptian imam Osama Mustafa 
Hassn Nasr, better known as Abu Omar, was abducted by CIA agents, allegedly with 
the cooperation of Italian nationals, transferred to Egypt and kept in secret detention 
and tortured over the next few months. The claims brought against Italy allege the 
following violations: abduction with the participation of the Italian authorities, ill 
treatment, impunity on grounds of state secrecy, and the failure to enforce the 
sentences passed on the convicted US nationals owing to the refusal of the Italian 
authorities to request their extradition. The claims fall under Articles 3 (prohibition of 
inhuman and degrading treatment), 5 (right to liberty and security), 6 § 1 (right to a 
fair trial), 8 (right to respect for private and family life in connection to his wife – 
Nabila Ghali) and 13 (right to an effective remedy). On 23 June 2015 the Court held 
the last hearing of the case and it entered the deliberation phase. A ruling is 
expected in the next few months. 
3.2.2. National Judicial Investigations 
The situation is even more complex regarding domestic judicial investigations in 
the Member States. Figure 2 provides an account of the remedies and reparations granted 
to the injured individuals. Since 2005, when the first allegations of Romania hosting a 
secret CIA black site were made public, very little has been done at national level in terms 
of effectively investigating the acts and prosecuting the responsible parties. Criminal 
proceedings have been initiated at national level and before the ECtHR on behalf of Abd al-
Rahim Al Nashiri, who was secretly detained in the ‘Bright Light’ rendition site between 2004 
and 2006. The Romanian investigations have not moved forward in any way,89 according to 
APADOR-CH, the third party which brought the case before the Romanian authorities as part 
of the Open Society Justice Initiative. In 2015, Ion Iliescu, the Romanian President at the 
time of the renditions in Bucharest, and his then Head of Intelligence Services Ioan Talpes, 
recognised that Romania hosted CIA secret prisons on its territory but that it did so without 
knowing about the rendition programme taking place there. In the Amnesty International 
Report “Breaking the Conspiracy of Silence”, whose authors claimed to have cracked the 
colour-coding system of the Feinstein Report’s redacted executive summary, there is 
reference to Romania as being the “DETENTION SITE BLACK” (which Amnesty abbreviates 
to “DSBK”).90 The U.S. Senate Intelligence Committee Feinstein Report refers (on page 79) 
                                          
88 ECtHR, Nasr and Ghali v. Italy, Application no. 44883/09, logged in 2009 available at 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-113123#{"itemid":["001-113123"]}. 
89 See http://apador.org/publicatii/raport_cia.pdf. 
90 See Amnesty International, 2015, op. cit., p. 14. 
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to the sums of money offered by the CIA authorities to the Romanian authorities in 
exchange for their support.91 
In Poland, national judicial proceedings, launched in March 2008, have stalled, with yet no 
effective judicial investigation or prosecution taking place. However, the two claimants, Abd 
al-Rahim Al Nashiri and Abu Zubaydah, have received victim status. As explained in the 
ECtHR rulings, during the criminal proceedings the prosecutor was replaced and the case 
transferred from Warsaw’s prosecutor’s office to Krakow’s, causing delays in the 
investigations. The Amnesty International 2015 Report92 refers to the comments provided 
by Adam Bodnar, Vice President of the Helsinki Foundation for Human Rights in Warsaw, 
that these changes in location and personnel are not coincidental but rather reflect the 
strategy of the Polish state to prolong the proceedings as much as possible.93 Moreover, the 
ECtHR judgments in the cases of Al Nashiri and Abu Zubaydah refer to Polish prosecutors 
making several requests for Mutual Legal Assistance (MLA) to the US in an effort to seek 
more evidence on the CIA rendition programme in Poland. The requests went unanswered94 
since the US invoked state secrecy. This allowed the Polish authorities to delay the 
investigations even longer, while waiting for more evidence to turn up. However, as the 
ECtHR states in the previous cases against Poland mentioned above, the amount of existing 
evidence is, beyond reasonable doubt, sufficient to conduct an effective investigation. 
Testimonies such as those of former President Aleksander Kwasniewski and former Prime 
Minister Leszek Miller are reinforcing this95.  
In the UK some criminal investigations96 are ongoing while others have been settled out of 
court.97 Operation Hinton was Scotland Yard’s criminal investigation into an MI5 agent 
accused of aiding and abetting the mistreatment of Binyam Mohamed al-Habashi (an 
Ethiopian national and British resident) during his interrogation and detention in Pakistan. 
The British government paid £1 million compensation in an out-of-court settlement.98 In 
Operation Iden, a police investigation into the actions of the MI6 officer who interrogated 
suspects at the US-run prison at Bagram, Afghanistan,99 no prosecution took place due to 
lack of evidence. Civil lawsuits have been launched by rendition programme victims (Binyam 
Mohamed, Bisher al-Rawi, Jamil el-Banna, Richard Belmar, Omar Deghayes, Moazzam Begg 
and Martin Mubanga) against the British authorities and most of them have settled out of 
court. Two cases remain open: 
                                          
91 Ibid. “[D]etainees were first transferred to the DSBK in the fall of 2003; the CIA offered the authorities in that 
country millions of dollars to show their appreciation for their support, including an additional unsolicited subsidy in 
the million/s of dollars.” 
92 Amnesty International, 2015, op. cit., p. 10. 
93 Ibid. 
94 Ibid. 
95 Al Jazeera, 2015, “Romania President admits allowing CIA site’, 27 April, available at 
www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/04/romania-president-admits-allowing-cia-site-150427140351035.html. 
96 See Cobain, op. cit. 
97 See press release available at www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2012/12/20121213144316327160.html. 
98 SSCI Study, pp. 238-239. In the SSCI Study, Binyam Mohamed’s name is spelled Binyam Mohammad. 
99 See Cobain, op. cit.  
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o Case of Yunus Rahmatullah (Pakistani national): captured by UK forces in Iraq in 
2004, handed over to US forces and held at Bagram Airbase. In November 2014 the 
British High Court allowed the case against the UK government to proceed.100  
o Operation Lydd (Libyan dissidents Abdul Hakim Belhaj and Sami al-Saadi): criminal 
investigation into two secret rendition operations mounted by MI6 in 2004 in 
cooperation with Muammar Gaddafi’s intelligence service; the Appeal Court in 
London allowed the case to go to trial, overruling the state secrets doctrine.101 
In Lithuania, as detailed in Annex 2 of this Study, the criminal proceedings started in 
January 2010 and were stopped by the General Prosecutor’s office in 2011 for reasons of 
‘state secrecy’.102 In December 2014 the Vilnius Regional Court ruled that Mustafa al-
Hawsawi had the right to an effective investigation despite the General Prosecutor’s office 
having refused to investigate the case103 in the first place, calling the evidence “groundless”. 
The same 2015 Amnesty International Report104 that deciphered the colour codes of the 
Feinstein Report concludes that Lithuania hosted the “DETENTION SITE VIOLET” (DSV). The 
Feinstein Report refers to the DSV and alleged sums of money passed by the CIA to local 
authorities.105 
In Italy, the national judicial investigation concerns the disappearance and extraordinary 
rendition of Osama Mustafa Hassan Nasr, alias Abu Omar. In February 2003 the Milan public 
prosecutor’s office started to investigate the disappearance of Nasr. After significant efforts 
to conduct an effective investigation, such as tapping telephones, interviews and an Italian 
Military Intelligence Service inquiry, the authorities confirmed the actions leading to the 
abduction and rendition of Abu Omar. In 2009 the ruling in the case led to the conviction of 
22 CIA officials, one US military official and two Italian agents.106 The two Italian 
intelligence agents were sentenced to three years in prison for impeding the investigations. 
Investigations concerning five other members of the Italian Military Service (including 
former Head Pollari and Deputy Head Mancini) plus two others were abandoned due to 
claims of state secrecy. In total Italian prosecutors had charged the 22 American officials 
and seven members of the Italian military intelligence agency. The Italian court awarded €1 
million in compensation to Nasr107 and €500,000 to his wife Nabila Ghali, but these sums 
were never paid. With regard to the enforcement of the decision, it is important to mention 
that no effort was made to make the CIA agents involved accountable for their acts.  
In 2009 the Milan Court decided to prosecute five Italian officials: Pollari, Mancini, Di Troia, 
Di Gregori and Ciorra. In 2012 the Court of Cassation rejected the decision of the Milan 
Court, invoking state secrets, and ordered a halt to the proceedings. On 12 February 2013 
                                          
100 See www.reprieve.org.uk/case-study/yunus-rahmatullah/. 
101See www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2014/10/uk-notorious-rendition-torture-case-allowed-go-trial/. 
102 Amnesty International, 2011, “Unlock the Truth in Lithuania: Investigate Secret Prisons Now”, p. 5, available at 
www.amnesty.org/en/library/info/EUR53/002/2011/en. 
103 See www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2014/01/lithuania-court-decision-cia-detention/. 
104 Amnesty International, 2015, op. cit. 
105 Ibid., p. 17: “The CIA offered officials in the country that housed DSV an undisclosed number of millions of 
dollars to ‘show appreciation’ for support of ‘the program’ and developed ‘complex mechanisms’ for the delivery of 
money” (p. 99 of Feinstein Report). 
106 See www.statewatch.org/analyses/no-254-abu-omar-yasha.pdf. 
107 J. Hooper, 2009, “Italian court finds CIA agents guilty of kidnapping terrorism suspect”, The Guardian, 4 
November, available at http://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/nov/04/cia-guilty-rendition-abu-omar. 
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the Milan Court of Appeal convicted Pollari (and sentenced him to 10 years), Mancini (nine 
years), Di Troia, Di Gregori and Ciorra (six years). On 13 February 2013 the Constitutional 
Court annulled these sentences (see Annex 2 for more details). The 2014 European 
Parliament Study on National Security and States secrets108 deals extensively with the 
Italian Abu Omar case and how the ‘state secrets doctrine’ was applied, reaching the 
conclusion that the Italian legal system does not allow the use of secret evidence and thus 
does not permit intervening in the investigations. 
 
One striking finding of the Feinstein Report, which is of great relevance to this Study, is that 
the CIA had to pay millions of dollars in cash to foreign governments for their ‘support’ of its 
operations. The 2015 Amnesty Report authors, by decoding the redactions of the Feinstein 
executive summary, found that it makes two specific references to alleged bribes paid by 
CIA officials to Lithuanian109 and Romanian110 officials in exchange for their cooperation. 
Moreover, information appeared in the press revealed that the Polish authorities were 
instructed by superiors to allow CIA rendition flight on the Szymany airport “at any cost”111. 
In the face of such claims some questions arise: Where did the money come from and 
where did it go precisely? How was it possible for CIA officials to transfer money without 
being discovered? What institutions should monitor this kind of transaction?  
 
Figure 2 : Reparation and Remedies  
EU MEMBER STATE  VICTIM REPARATIONS AND 
REMEDIES  
POLAND 
Abd al-Rahim Al Nashiri  
(Saudi Arabian national) 
 
Following ECtHR ruling, 
financial compensation of 
€100,000 applied; 
granted victim status 
Abu Zubaydah (stateless 
Palestinian born in Saudi 
Arabia) 
 
Following ECtHR ruling, 
financial compensation of 
€130,000 applied; 
granted victim status 
                                          
108 European Parliament, 2014, “National Security and Secret Evidence in Legislation and Before the Courts: 
Exploring the Challenges”, Study, Italy country fiche, p. 112. 
109 See footnote 126 above. 
110 Idem. 
111 Delgado, M., 2014, “'CIA paid me to use airstrip as rendition zone... and to look the other way': Former airport 
director reveals secret Polish staging post for U.S. torture programme”, Daily Mail, 13 December, available at 
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2873010/CIA-paid-use-airstrip-rendition-zone-look-way-Former-airport-
director-reveals-secret-Polish-staging-post-U-S-torture-programme.html.  
Policy Department C: Citizens' Rights and Constitutional Affairs 
______________________________________________________________________ 
46 
 
Walid bin Attash (Yemeni 
national) 
Granted injured person 
status 
Mustafa al-Hawsawi (Saudi 
Arabian national) 
Seeking injured person 
status, rejected twice  
UK 
16 people, including Bisher 
al-Rawi, Jamil el-Banna and 
Binyam Mohamed 
 
Abdul-Hakim Belhaj and wife 
Fatima Boudchar 
Friendly settlement with UK 
government 
 
Offered to settle the case for 
the sum of £3 million and the 
recognition of the acts 
committed112 
ITALY 
Abu Omar (Egyptian national 
with political refugee status 
in Italy) 
€1 million compensation; 
ECtHR application 
Abu Omar’s wife €500,000 compensation
LITHUANIA Abu Zubaydah  ECtHR application 
ROMANIA Abd al-Rahim Al Nashiri ECtHR application 
3.3. Responses by the European Institutions 
The European institution which has taken its role most seriously when scrutinising 
allegations of Member States’ cooperation with the CIA has been the European 
Parliament. The Parliament has repeatedly condemned the human rights violations 
resulting from the CIA rendition and secret detention programme and the passivity of 
relevant Member States. It has demanded effective national investigations and inquiries to 
ascertain the truth and to hold legally responsible those collaborated directly or indirectly 
with the CIA.113  
The setting up in 2006 of a special Parliament Committee (Temporary Committee on 
the Alleged use of European countries by the CIA for the transportation and illegal 
detention of prisoners, TDIP), with then MEP Claudio Fava as rapporteur, and the 
publication of its final report in 2007 constituted key milestones in establishing democratic 
                                          
112 Barret, D., 2014, ‘Libyan Rebel leader Abdul Hakim Belhaj wins latest stage in rendition payout bid’, 30 October, 
The telegraph, available at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/law-and-order/11197431/Libyan-rebel-
leader-Abdul-Hakim-Belhaj-wins-latest-stage-in-rendition-payout-bid.html  
113 European Parliament, 2013, Press Release, op. cit.  
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accountability for Member States’ actions. A key finding was the lack of cooperation by 
some Member States in the investigations conducted by the TDIP Committee, and a serious 
lack of concrete answers. The 2007 Fava Report also underlined that “the behaviour of 
Member States, in particular the Council and its Presidencies, has fallen far below the 
standard that Parliament is entitled to expect”.114 The Parliament also denounced the 
Council’s granting the US government request to keep information requested by Parliament 
confidential, and pointed out that these shortcomings implicated all Member State 
governments.115 
The Fava Report called on the Parliament to follow up politically on the proceedings and 
requests, to closely monitor any important developments, and, “in particular, in the event 
that no appropriate action has been taken by the Council and/or the Commission, to 
determine whether there is a clear risk of a serious breach of the principles and values on 
which the European Union is based, and to recommend to it any resolution, taking as a 
basis Articles 6 and 7 of the Treaty on European Union, which may prove necessary in this 
context”. 
During its seventh legislature the Parliament answered this ‘follow-up’ call with a 
2012 report on the alleged transportation and illegal detention of prisoners in EU 
countries by the CIA. The ‘Flautre Report’, as it is known, was the work of rapporteur 
MEP Hélène Flautre, with MEP Sarah Ludford as the rapporteur for opinion in the Foreign 
Affairs Committee. The previously cited study conducted by CEPS fed into the background 
work of this report and was quoted in the Parliament Resolution adopted in 2012.116 
The adoption of the Flautre Report marked a decisive political step forward in terms of 
democratic scrutiny. It dedicated a section to the “Response of the EU Institutions” that 
called on the EU to officially condemn “all abusive practices in the fight against terrorism”117 
and highlighted a number of recommendations to each European institution. 
Regarding its findings, the Flautre Report recognised the few initiatives by the European 
Commission in response to previous Parliament Resolutions. It acknowledged that 
the European Commission had issued several statements “on the need for the Member 
States concerned to conduct investigations into allegations of involvement in the CIA 
rendition and secret detention programme”. The report also referred to the Commission’s 
sending of four letters to Poland, four to Romania and two to Lithuania between 2007 and 
                                          
114 European Parliament, 2007, Report on the alleged use of European countries by the CIA for the transportation 
and illegal detention of prisoners, 30 October. Paragraph 13. The Report also deplored in paragraph 22 “the failure 
by the Council and its Presidency to comply with their obligations to keep Parliament fully informed of the main 
aspects and basic choices of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and of work carried out in the field of 
police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters pursuant to Articles 21 and 30 of the Treaty on the European 
Union”. 
115 See Paragraphs 23-26 of the 2007 Fava Report. 
116 Refer to Carrera et al., op. cit. 
117 Paragraph 21. 
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2010.118 It, however, regretted that these initiatives had not been part of a wider agenda 
and strategy “to ensure accountability for human rights violations committed in the context 
of the CIA programme and the necessary redress and compensation for victims”.119  
The Parliament put forward the following specific requests to the Commission:  
1. Examine the extent to which Member States’ complicity has implied a breach of 
‘EU obligations’ in the scope of asylum and judicial cooperation in criminal 
matters.120 This recommendation needs to be read in the context of the 2007 
Parliament Report that called on the Commission to conduct an evaluation of all 
anti-terrorist legislation (including both formal and informal arrangements 
between Member States and third-country intelligence services) from a human 
rights perspective and to present relevant proposals “to avoid any repetition of 
the matters”.121 
2. Facilitate and support the national accountability processes and any 
investigations.122 
3. Adopt “within a year” a framework for monitoring and supporting national 
accountability processes, including adopting common EU guidelines on human 
rights-compliant inquiries, which would be based on the standards developed by 
the Council of Europe and the United Nations.123 
4. Adopt “measures aimed at strengthening the EU's capacity to prevent and redress 
human rights violations at EU level and to provide for the strengthening of 
Parliament’s role”.124 
5. Propose measures establishing permanent cooperation and information exchange 
between the Parliament and relevant parliamentary committees responsible for 
the oversight of intelligence communities of Member States.  
6. Present proposals for developing common arrangements for ensuring democratic 
accountability for ‘cross-border intelligence activities’ in the context of EU 
counterterrorism policies. This recommendation corresponds to the request 
issued in the above-mentioned 2007 Parliament Report in which the Parliament 
called for the establishment of a “system for the democratic monitoring and 
control over the joint and coordinated intelligence activities at EU level”, and 
called for the Parliament to play an important role.125   
                                          
118 See for instance one of the letters sent to the Romanian government published by Statewatch at 
www.statewatch.org/cia/documents/romania-letter-PM-10-01-06.pdf. As stated in the previous CEPS study: “In 
Romania’s case, and in light of the 2007 Inquiry Commission’s decision that the allegations could not stand, the 
European Commission requested more detailed information ‘in particular, concerning the concrete steps taken 
during the investigation, the authorities involved and the material findings which led to this conclusion’”. See page 
41 of the study. 
119 Paragraph 31. 
120 Paragraph 32. 
121 Refer to paragraph 193 of the 2007 Parliament Report.  
122 Paragraph 33 states that the Parliament “[c]alls on the Commission to facilitate and support human-rights-
compliant mutual legal assistance and judicial cooperation between investigating authorities and cooperation 
between lawyers involved in accountability work in Member States, and in particular to ensure that important 
information is exchanged and to promote the effective use of all available EU instruments and resources”. 
123 Paragraph 34 of the Parliament Report. 
124 Paragraph 35. 
125 See paragraph 206 of the 2007 Parliament Report. 
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The Flautre Report also advanced a set of specific actions for the Council:126  
1. Issue a declaration acknowledging Member States’ complicity in the CIA 
programme and referring to the “difficulties encountered” by Member States in 
their national investigations.127 
2. Apologise for having violated the principle of sincere and loyal cooperation 
enshrined in the EU Treaties “when it incorrectly attempted to persuade 
Parliament to provide deliberately shortened versions of the minutes of the 
meetings of COJUR (the Council Working Group on Public International Law) and 
COTRA (the Council Working Party on Transatlantic Relations) with senior North 
American officials; expects apologies from the Council”. 
3. Include the item of national accountability and inquiries on the agendas of JHA 
Council meetings “sharing all information, providing assistance to inquiries and, 
in particular, acceding to requests for access to documents”.128 This request 
relates to the recommendation issued in the 2007 Parliament Report which called 
on the Council to put pressure on all the relevant governments “to give full and 
thorough information to the Council and the Commission, and where necessary to 
start hearings and commission an independent investigation without delay”.129 
4. Hold a meeting with relevant EU home affairs agencies such as the European 
Union’s Law Enforcement Agency (Europol) and the European Union’s Judicial 
Cooperation Unit (Eurojust), as well as the EU Counter-Terrorism Coordinator, to 
clarify their knowledge of the existence and running of the programmes. 
5. Propose safeguards on human rights compliance in cross-border intelligence-
sharing and cooperation “and a strict delimitation of roles between intelligence 
and law-enforcement activities so that intelligence agencies are not permitted to 
assume powers of arrest and detention”, and report to the Parliament within a 
year on these points.130 
6. Encourage Member States to share ‘best practices’ on parliamentary and judicial 
supervision of their intelligence services. 
The Flautre Report called on the European Ombudsman “to investigate the failures of the 
Commission, the Council and the EU security agencies, notably Europol and Eurojust, to 
respect fundamental rights and the principles of good administration and loyal cooperation 
in their response to the TDIP recommendations”. It also instructed the LIBE Committee, 
together with the Human Rights Sub-Committee, to continue assessing the extent to which 
the Parliament’s recommendations had been properly followed up and called on all the other 
                                          
126 The Flautre Report stated that “whereas the Council admitted on 15 September 2006 that ‘the existence of 
secret detention facilities where detained persons are kept in a legal vacuum is not in conformity with international 
humanitarian law and international criminal law’, but has so far failed to recognise and condemn the involvement of 
Member States in the CIA programme, even though the use of European airspace and territory by the CIA has been 
acknowledged by the political and judicial authorities of Member States”. 
127 Paragraph 23. 
128 Paragraph 24. 
129 Paragraph 228 of the 2007 Parliament Report.  
130 Paragraph 26. 
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relevant institutional actors to keep the Parliament informed of any relevant 
developments.131 
The Parliament followed up the Flautre Report with a 2013 Resolution which concluded that 
“there have been no substantive replies from the Council or the Commission to Parliament’s 
recommendations”.132 The Parliament reiterated the above-mentioned recommendations to 
both the Commission and the Council, and called for new EU measures to ensure the rule of 
law and accountability for fundamental rights violations, “especially by intelligence services 
and law enforcement authorities”. The Parliament also called for its powers to conduct 
effective inquiries (for investigating fundamental rights violations) to be reinforced, which 
should “include full power to hear under oath the people involved, including government 
ministers”. Resolution paragraph 24 called on the new Parliament (eighth legislature) “to 
continue to fulfil and implement the mandate given by the Temporary Committee and 
consequently to ensure that its recommendations are followed up, to examine new elements 
that may emerge and to make full use of, and develop, its rights of inquiry”.  
Following the Flautre Report the Commission sent additional letters in 2013 to all 
Member States (in addition to those previously sent to Poland, Lithuania and 
Romania), requesting information on the state of their national investigations of 
alleged complicity in the CIA programme. The scope and relevance of these letters are 
assessed in Section 6 below. The 2013 Resolution acknowledged the non-country specific 
letters sent in March 2013 to all the Member States, “to which only a few Member States 
(Finland, Hungary, Spain and Lithuania) replied”. That notwithstanding, the Parliament was 
“deeply disappointed” by the Commission’s refusal to reply to the substance of the Flautre 
Report. It also deemed the letters insufficient “on account of their generic nature”.133 
It is important to note that, in a letter from the former European Ombudsman (Nikiforos 
Diamandouros) to the Finnish authorities dated 15 February 2013, it was stated that the 
European Ombudsman had not begun any inquiry in response to the 2012 Resolution 
“because the detailed criticisms of the EU institutions…seem primarily to concern failures to 
cooperate with that Committee’s investigations [which] is a matter for Parliament itself to 
                                          
131 Paragraph 56 states that Parliament “[i]s determined to continue fulfilling the mandate given to it by the 
Temporary Committee, pursuant to Articles 2, 6 and 7 TEU; instructs its Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and 
Home Affairs, together with the Subcommittee on Human Rights, to address Parliament in plenary on the matter a 
year after the adoption of this resolution; considers it essential now to assess the extent to which the 
recommendations adopted by Parliament have been followed and, where they have not been followed, to analyse 
why this is the case”. It also called on all the relevant institutions and actors addressed or covered in the Report to 
keep the Parliament informed of any relevant developments.  
132 See Recital E of the 2013 European Parliament Resolution on alleged transportation and illegal detention of 
prisoners in European countries by the CIA. Paragraph 1 of that resolution stated that Parliament “[d]eeply 
deplores the failure to implement the recommendations contained in its aforementioned resolution of 11 September 
2012, notably by the Council, the Commission, the governments of the Member States, the candidate states and 
the associated countries, NATO, and the United States authorities, especially in the light of the serious fundamental 
rights violations suffered by the victims of the CIA programmes”. 
133 Paragraph 10. The Parliament also referred to ”the letters sent by the rapporteur to the Romanian, Polish and 
Lithuanian prosecutors and the Romanian, Polish and Lithuanian heads of state in November 2012 highlighting the 
country-specific recommendations made in Parliament’s resolution, to which none of the Member States concerned 
has replied” and to “Oral Questions 0079/2013 and 0080/2013 raised by its Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice 
and Home Affairs and its Committee on Foreign Affairs”.  
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deal with politically”.134 The letter highlighted that an inquiry by the European Ombudsman, 
“who has no enforcement powers”, would serve no added value or purpose.  
There has been no specific further action by the Council or any subsequent EU 
Presidency in answer to the Parliament’s recommendations. In a 17 December 2014 
Plenary debate on the Feinstein Report,135 the Council representative (representing the 
Italian presidency, which held office in the second half of 2014) stated generally that these 
techniques run counter to EU values and are not helpful in combatting terrorism and that 
they should not be used again. The Council representative also stressed that the 
activities and cooperation of intelligence services remain under national 
competence, and that inquiries on the ‘alleged involvement’ of Member States in 
the CIA programme are equally under the exclusive competence of Member States 
and not the EU.  
On the same occasion, the Commissioner for Migration and Home Affairs, Dimitris 
Avramopoulos, stressed during his speech before the Plenary that the EU condemns all 
forms of torture and ill treatment in “all circumstances” and that any efforts in the fight 
against terrorism have to conform to European values and comply with rule of law as well as 
international human rights, refugee and humanitarian law. He emphasised that all 
concerned Member States should conduct independent, impartial and in-depth 
investigations to establish the facts and responsibilities and provide remedies to the victims. 
Avramopoulos added that this had been stated in the set of letters sent by the Commission 
to all Member States in 2013. The Commissioner confirmed that “the EU will keep on 
monitoring the situation”, yet did not add further details as to how it would do so.  
Parliament representatives stressed during this Plenary debate the central importance of 
accountability and the importance of preventing impunity in a democracy. The Parliament 
also expressed concerns about the input by the Council representative before the Plenary. 
One MEP even stressed that the Council had said nothing about its role and there had been 
no statement by the Council. As a follow-up to this discussion, a Parliament Resolution on 
the U.S. Senate Report was adopted on 11 February 2015.136 It requested the LIBE 
Committee to resume its inquiry into alleged transportation and illegal detention 
of prisoners in European countries by the CIA and report back to the Plenary 
within a year.  
The Resolution stipulated that “the report by the US Senate Select Committee on 
Intelligence reveals new facts that reinforce allegations that a number of Member States, 
their authorities and officials and agents of their security and intelligence services were 
complicit in the CIA’s secret detention and extraordinary rendition programme, sometimes 
through corrupt means based on substantial amounts of money provided by the CIA in 
exchange for their cooperation”. On this basis, and among the various follow-up measures 
                                          
134See www.ombudsman.europa.eu/register/2013/OUT2013-001257/OUT2013-001257_M0.pdf; refer also to 
www.oikeusasiamies.fi/Resource.phx/pubman/templates/5.htx?id=1046. 
135Available at www.europarl.europa.eu/ep-
live/en/plenary/video?debate=1418825069831&streamingLanguage=en. 
136 Retrievable from www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+TA+P8-TA-2015-
0031+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN. 
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which were envisaged,137 it called on Parliament to gather “all relevant information and 
evidence on possible bribes or other acts of corruption linked to the CIA”.  
  
                                          
137 The Resolution called on Parliament to: first, follow up on the recommendations made in its above-mentioned 
Resolution of 11 September 2012 on alleged transportation and illegal detention of prisoners in European countries 
by the CIA (“follow-up of the European Parliament TDIP Committee Report”); second, facilitate and support human 
rights-compliant mutual legal assistance and judicial cooperation between investigating authorities and cooperation 
between lawyers involved in accountability work in Member States; third, organise a hearing involving national 
parliaments and practitioners to take stock of all past and ongoing parliamentary and judicial inquiries; fourth, 
organise a Parliamentary fact-finding mission involving all interested political groups to the Member States where 
CIA secret detention sites allegedly existed; and finally, gather all relevant information and evidence on possible 
bribes or other acts of corruption linked to the CIA programme. See Points 10 and 11. 
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4. SUPRANATIONAL JUDICIAL ACCOUNTABILITY AND 
EXTRAORDINARY RENDITION: AN APPRAISAL OF THE AL 
NASHIRI AND ABU ZUBAYDAH CASES BEFORE THE 
EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS 
KEY FINDINGS 
 The relevance of the ECtHR landmark judgments in the the Al Nashiri and 
Abu Zubaydah cases against Poland in July 2014 is central to the debate on 
accountability and the rule of law. 
 The Court found Poland in violation of various human rights laid down in the 
Convention, chiefly the prohibition against torture and inhuman and 
degrading treatment and lack of effective remedies to the victims (Articles 3 
and 13 ECHR).  
 The two rulings concerning Poland’s complicity in the CIA programme are 
also important because they show the lack of compliance by the Polish 
government with the obligation laid down in Article 38 ECHR to cooperate 
fully with an investigation conducted by the Court.  
 In these cases the ECtHR further developed the rule of law standards 
necessary to ensure “effective official investigations” into alleged serious 
human rights violations. 
The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) delivered in July 2014 two landmark 
judgments against Poland for its alleged complicity in the CIA secret detention and 
extraordinary rendition programme, in the Al Nashiri and Abu Zubaydah cases.138 
The ECtHR examined them simultaneously due to their intrinsic factual and practical 
linkages. Both applicants alleged that Poland had helped the CIA to detain them secretly in 
its territory as part of the ‘high-value detainee’ (HVD) programme, and to subsequently 
transfer them to Guantanamo Bay. By doing so Poland had allowed the CIA to subject them 
to serious human rights violations which included torture, incommunicado detention as well 
as deprivation of any access to their families. They also submitted that Poland had failed to 
conduct an effective investigation into their allegations. 
The ECtHR found that Poland was responsible for these human rights violations 
due to its complicity in the CIA-led extraordinary rendition programme.139 It 
concluded that despite the lack of direct knowledge, there were numerous public sources 
alluding to the actual risks of ill treatment and abuse of suspects of terrorism by the CIA. 
The Strasbourg Court concluded that in both cases Poland knew of the scope and purposes 
of the CIA’s activities, and ought to have known that by helping the CIA to transfer and 
                                          
138 See footnote 106 above. The judgments became final the 16 February 2015 after the ECtHR Grand Chamber 
rejected the Polish government appeal. See https://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/2015/02/17/polands-
complicity-in-cia-torture-programme-confirmed-as-european-court-rejects-warsaws-appeal/ 
139 See ECtHR definition of “extraordinary renditions” as “extrajudicial transfer of persons from one jurisdiction or 
State to another, for the purposes of detention and interrogation outside the normal legal system, where there was 
a real risk of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment” in Case El-Masri v. Macedonia, Application No. 
39630/09 of 13 December 2012. 
Policy Department C: Citizens' Rights and Constitutional Affairs 
______________________________________________________________________ 
54 
 
detain these suspects they would be directly exposed to treatments which are in direct 
contravention to ECHR.140 
The Court found Poland in violation of Articles 2 and 3 ECHR.141 It called on the Polish 
government to seek to remove the risk of the death penalty faced by Al Nashiri in the US as 
soon as possible, “by seeking assurances from the USA authorities that he will not be 
subjected to the death penalty”.142 Reportedly, Poland did so by sending an official note to 
US authorities in March 2015.143 In the Al Nashiri case, the Court held that Poland had to 
pay the applicant an award of €100,000. In the case of Abu Zubaydah, the Court awarded 
the applicant €130,000.144 A Polish government representative declared to the press: “This 
is very sad news and a shameful event for Poland. It not only means financial costs for 
Poland, but also a very significant blow to its image”.145 
This section provides a critical appraisal of the main implications stemming from these two 
judgments.  
4.1. Poland’s Compliance with Article 38 ECHR 
A first common feature in both cases is that the ECtHR found a lack of compliance by the 
Polish government with the obligation laid down in Article 38 ECHR.146 This provision 
requires any state party to furnish the ECtHR with all the necessary facilities and 
information/documentary evidence for a proper and effective examination of a pending 
case147. Such an obligation is particularly central in cases entailing far-reaching 
and serious human rights obligations enshrined in the Convention, and allegations 
concerning the lack of effective and independent investigations (Articles 3 and 13 ECHR).148 
                                          
140 Refer to § 441 Al Nashiri Case and § 511 Abu Zubaydah Case. The Court concluded, “[T]here were good reasons 
to believe that a person in US custody under the HVD Programme could be exposed to a serious risk of treatment 
contrary to those principles”. See § 441 Al Nashiri Case. For a discussion see hwww.ejiltalk.org/the-ecthr-finds-the-
us-guilty-of-torture-as-an-indispensable-third-party/#comments. 
141 In combination with Article 1 of Protocol No. 6 to the Convention. 
142 § 589 Al Nashiri Case. 
143 Refer to http://uk.reuters.com/article/2015/03/31/uk-usa-cia-torture-poland-idUKKBN0MR1RJ20150331. 
144 § 571 Abu Zubaydah Case. 
145 G. Steinhauser and J. Bravin, 2014, “European Court Assails Poland over Role in CIA ‘Black Sites’”, The Wall 
Street Journal, 24 July, available at www.wsj.com/articles/eu-court-rules-against-poland-in-cia-rendition-case-
1406193988. 
146 Article 38 ECHR states, “The Court shall examine the case together with the representatives of the parties and if 
need be, undertake an investigation, for the effective conduct of which the High Contracting Parties concerned shall 
furnish all necessary facilities”. 
147 In § 400 of the Al Nashiri judgment the Court states that “…the difficulties involved in gathering and producing 
evidence in the present case caused by the restrictions on the applicant’s communication with the outside world 
and the extreme secrecy surrounding the US rendition operations have been compounded by the Polish 
Government’s failure to cooperate with the Court in its examination of the case. In consequence, the Court’s 
establishment of the facts is to a great extent based on circumstantial evidence, including a large amount of 
evidence obtained through the international inquiries, considerably redacted documents released by the CIA, other 
public sources and evidence from the experts and the witness”. The relevant paragraphs where the Court assesses 
the facts and evidence related to the Al Nashiri case are 401-439. 
148 The Court underlined in § 362 of the Al Nashiri judgment that: “The obligation laid down in Article 38 is a 
corollary of the undertaking not to hinder the effective exercise of the right of individual application under Article 
34 of the Convention. The effective exercise of this right may be thwarted by a Contracting Party’s failure to assist 
the Court in conducting an examination of all circumstances relating to the case…Both provisions work together to 
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The judgments are comprehensive and exemplary in terms of providing evidence on the 
Polish government’s failure to comply with the evidential requests issued on several 
occasions by the Strasbourg Court.149 As laid down in the judgments, the Polish 
government attempted to justify its lack of cooperation in its internal (and still 
pending after more than six years) criminal investigations into the Al Nashiri and Abu 
Zubaydah allegations150 on the grounds of the national investigation’s secrecy and 
need to maintain confidentiality. In addition to these domestic legal impediments, the 
Polish government argued that the ECtHR Rules of Procedure do not provide for any special 
procedure or sufficient safeguards for handling ‘classified documents’ submitted by state 
parties, or the exact ways in which these documents will be used so as to guarantee 
confidentiality.151 
The ECtHR did not accept the Polish government views on this matter and held Poland 
in violation of Article 38 ECHR.152 It underlined that it was mindful of the sensitivity and 
particular circumstances of the case, and that the information requested of Poland “was 
liable to be of a sensitive nature or might give rise to national-security concerns”.153 In light 
of these considerations, the Court had given the government an explicit guarantee of 
confidentiality, and emphasised that “the Convention institutions have established sound 
practice in handling cases involving various highly sensitive matters, including national-
security related issues”.154 Furthermore, it held that the government’s plea on the secrecy 
of the investigation could not be accepted as a reason for not complying with the 
Court’s evidential request.155 It also underlined that Poland’s conduct during relevant 
international inquiries demonstrated denial and a lack of cooperation characterised by a 
“marked reluctance” to disclose information on the CIA rendition activities in the country.156 
4.2. Rule of Law Standards for an Effective Investigation 
When examining the ECHR violations by the Polish government the ECtHR used a set of 
rule of law standards for determining the ‘effectiveness’ of national investigations 
                                                                                                                                     
guarantee the efficient conduct of the judicial proceedings and they relate to matters of procedure rather than to 
the merits of the applicants’ grievances under the substantive provisions of the Convention or its Protocols”. See a 
replica in § 354 of the Abu Zubaydah judgment.  
149 This took place between July 2012 and on 20 March and 25 April 2014 respectively in each of the cases. During 
this time the current President of the European Council Donald Tusk was Prime Minister of Poland. It was for this 
reason that the ECtHR also asked all the relevant parties in the proceedings to comment on the governments’ 
compliance with this obligation. Refer to § 17-40 of the Al Nashiri Case. 
150 § 346 of the Al Nashiri Case. A similar paragraph appears in § 340 of the Abu Zubaydah case. 
151 § 348 of Al Nashiri case; § 342 of the Abu Zubaydah case. 
152 Refer to § 374 and 376 of the Al Nashiri Case. Moreover, the Polish government did not affirm or deny any of 
the facts submitted by Al Nashiri and Abu Zubaydah, nor did it contest the admissibility, accuracy or credibility of 
the testimonies. Refer to § 377-378 of the Al Nashiri case. The ECtHR stated, “It is a fundamental requirement that 
the requested material be submitted in its entirety, if the Court has so directed, and that any missing elements be 
properly accounted for. In addition, any material requested must be produced promptly and, in any event, within 
the time-limit fixed by the Court, for a substantial and unexplained delay may lead the Court to find the respondent 
State’s explanations unconvincing.” See § 364 of the Al Nashiri judgment. 
153 § 367 Al Nashiri case. 
154 § 371 Al Nashiri case. 
155 § 373 in Al Nashiri case.  
156 §433 Al Nashiri case. 
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developed previously in various cases.157 These standards were also followed closely in the 
previous ECtHR judgment in the El-Masri case of 13 December 2012 against Macedonia, a 
country which was held responsible for its complicity in the CIA secret rendition 
programme.158 These standards are fundamental when determining whether a state party 
has complied with its legal commitments under the Convention. They can be summarised as 
follows: 
1. In cases where an individual alleges violations of Article 3 ECHR (absolute prohibition 
to subject someone to torture or inhuman/degrading treatment or punishment), 
which according to the Court enshrines one of the most fundamental values of 
democratic societies,159 there should be an “effective official investigation”.160 The 
investigation should enable the identification and potential punishment of those held 
responsible for the human rights violations (Article 13 ECHR).161 
2. The investigation should be “prompt and thorough”. This means that the authorities 
should take all reasonable steps available and “must act of their own motion once 
the matter has come to their attention and must always make a serious attempt to 
find out what happened and should not rely on hasty or ill-founded conclusions to 
close their investigation or to use as the basis of their decisions”.162 Such an 
obligation needs to be read in combination with the interpretation given to Article 13 
ECHR which requires “a rigorous scrutiny of the claim that there exist substantial 
grounds for fearing a real risk of treatment contrary to Article 3”.163 
3. The investigation should be “independent” from the executive. It should not include 
any hierarchical or institutional link or any practical/informal connections.164 In the 
above-mentioned El-Masri case against Macedonia, the ECtHR held that the rejection 
by the relevant public prosecutor of the case for lack of evidence fell short of what 
would have been expected from an independent authority. It concluded that the 
public prosecutor had ruled on the sole basis of papers submitted by the Macedonian 
                                          
157 E. Guild (ed.), 2009, War or Crime? National Legal Challenges in Europe to the War in Iraq, Nijmegen: Wolf 
Legal Publishers.  
158 Case of El-Masri v. Macedonia, op. cit., § 3. In this case the applicant alleged Macedonia to be complicit with the 
CIA, namely that agents from this country “had arrested him, held him incommunicado, questioned and ill-treated 
him, and handed him over at Skopje Airport to agents of the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) who had 
transferred him, on a special CIA-operated flight, to a CIA-run secret detention facility in Afghanistan, where he 
had been ill-treated for over four months”. 
159 The Court stated in § 507 of the Al Nashiri case that: “Article 3 of the Convention enshrines one of the most 
fundamental values of democratic societies. Unlike most of the substantive clauses of the Convention, Article 3 
makes no provision for exceptions and no derogation from it is permissible under Article 15 § 2 even in time of war 
or other public emergency threatening the life of the nation. Even in the most difficult circumstances, such as the 
fight against terrorism and organised crime, the Convention prohibits in absolute terms torture and inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment, irrespective of the conduct of the person concerned”. 
160 § 485 Al Nashiri Case, and § 479 Abu Zubaydah case. See also El-Masri, §182. 
161 Article 13 ECHR stipulates: “Everyone whose rights and freedoms are set forth in [the] Convention are violated 
shall have an effective remedy before a national authority notwithstanding that the violation has been committed 
by persons acting in an official capacity”. 
162 § 486 Al Nashiri case and § 480 Abu Zubaydah case. See also El-Masri, §183. 
163 § 549 Al Nashiri case, and §  Abu Zubaydah case. 
164 § 486 Al Nashiri case and § 480 Abu Zubaydah case. See El-Masri, §184. 
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Ministry of Interior and did not consider going beyond these assertions by 
undertaking any other investigations.165 
4. The victim should be granted the possibility to participate in the investigation “in one 
form or another”.166 
5. In cases related to national-security issues or a government’s reliance on ‘state 
secrets’ and ‘confidentiality’, the investigating authorities should not have complete 
discretion in refusing the disclosure of the information or evidence to the victim and 
the public.167 The ECtHR held that 
“even if there is a strong public interest in maintaining the secrecy of sources 
of information or material, in particular in cases involving the fight against 
terrorism, it is essential that as much information as possible about 
allegations and evidence should be disclosed to the parties in the proceedings 
without compromising national security. Where full disclosure is not possible, 
the difficulties that this causes should be counterbalanced in such a way that 
a party can effectively defend its interests”168 [emphasis added]. 
The Court made also reference to the ‘right to the truth’ not only of the victims in the 
case at hand, but also other victims facing similar realities as well as the public at 
large. In the words of the Court, intense public scrutiny of the investigations and 
their results is essential in securing accountability, which in turn “is essential in 
maintaining public confidence in their adherence to the rule of law and in preventing 
any appearance of impunity, collusion in or tolerance of unlawful acts”.169 The ECtHR 
highlighted that a key challenge in these cases related to improper democratic 
accountability of intelligence services, which called for appropriate safeguards (in law 
and practice) against intelligence services violating ECHR rights, “notably [in] the 
pursuit of their covert operations”.170 
6. The Court restated its “clear, constant and unequivocal position” in respect of the 
admission of torture evidence in judicial proceedings. This constitutes a flagrant 
violation of international standards on the right to a fair trial and the rights of the 
defence. It was held that  
No legal system based upon the rule of law can countenance the admission 
of evidence – however reliable – which has been obtained by such a barbaric 
                                          
165 § 188 and 189 of El-Masri judgment. The Court stated: “The complexity of the case, the seriousness of the 
alleged violations and the available material required independent and adequate responses on the part of the 
prosecuting authorities”. 
166 Ibid., El-Masri§ 185. 
167 § 494 Al Nashiri case, and § 488 Abu Zubaydah case. 
168 Ibid. See also § 529 Al Nashiri case, which states: “Although the investigation of terrorist offences undoubtedly 
presents the authorities with special problems, that does not mean that the authorities have carte blanche under 
Article 5 to arrest suspects and detain them in police custody, free from effective control by the domestic courts 
and, in the final instance, by the Convention’s supervisory institutions, whenever they consider that there has been 
a terrorist offence”. 
169 § 495 Al Nashiri case, and § 530 Abu Zubaydah case. See also El-Masri, § 192, where the ECtHR quoted the 
Council of Europe Guidelines of 30 March 2011 on eradicating impunity for serious human rights violations; see 
also § 105 of the same judgment.  
170 The Court stated: “The circumstances of the instant case may raise concerns as to whether the Polish legal 
order fulfils this requirement”. See § 498 Al Nashiri Case, and the replica in § 492 Abu Zubaydah Case. 
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practice as torture. The trial process is a cornerstone of the rule of law. 
Torture evidence irreparably damages that process; it substitutes force for 
the rule of law and taints the reputation of any court that admits it. Torture 
evidence is excluded in order to protect the integrity of the trial process and, 
ultimately, the rule of law itself. The prohibition of the use of torture is 
fundamental171 [emphasis added]. 
In light of the above, the ECtHR concluded in both the Al Nashiri and Abu Zubaydah cases 
that the Polish authorities failed to comply with these standards and that the investigations 
were inadequate and ineffective.172 This corresponded with the views and concerns 
expressed by international organisations that carried out independent 
investigations/inquires, and which alluded to the non-cooperative attitude of the Polish 
government as well as the national investigations’ lack of transparency, obscurity of the 
exact investigative scope/coverage, and the lengthy delays, secrecy and negative 
implications for the rights of the defence.173 Moreover, the Court held that:  
"…this failure to inquire on the part of the Polish authorities, notwithstanding the 
abundance of publicly accessible information of widespread ill-treatment of al’Qaeda 
detainees in US custody emerging already in 2002-2003, could be explained in only 
one conceivable way. As shown by the sequence of the subsequent events, the 
nature of the CIA activities on Polish territory and Poland’s complicity in those 
activities were to remain a secret shared exclusively by the intelligence services of 
the two cooperating countries."174  
                                          
171 § 564 Al Nashiri case, and the replica can be found in § 554 in Abu Zubaydah Case. 
172 Also in § 492 Al Nashiri case, the Court held that: “Poland’s denial of any complicity in the CIA operations and 
failure to cooperate at international level cannot be seen in isolation from an officially undeclared but, for all 
practical purposes, perceptible lack of will to investigate at domestic level the allegations that they were denying. 
The authorities decided not to carry out any further domestic inquiry from November-December 2005 until March 
2008. This resulted in the opening of any proper investigation being delayed by nearly two and a half years. Having 
regard to the exceptional gravity and plausibility of the allegations, encompassing crimes of torture and 
undisclosed detention, such delay must be considered inordinate. As pointed out by the applicant, it inevitably 
undermined the Polish prosecution authority’s ability to secure and obtain evidence and, in consequence, to 
establish the relevant facts”. On the parliamentary inquiry and criminal investigation in Poland as regards El-Masri, 
see § 128-140 and 550 of the El-Masri judgment. Related information in the case of Abu Zubaydah is provided in § 
122-166 of the judgment. 
173 In § 490 Al Nashiri case, the Court states: “Nor did the inquiries instituted by the Council of Europe and the 
European Parliament prompt the Polish State to probe into those widely disseminated assertions of human rights 
violations. Indeed, the only response of the Polish authorities to the serious and prima facie credible allegations of 
their complicity in the CIA rendition and secret detention was to carry out a brief parliamentary inquiry in 
November-December 2005. The inquiry produced no results and was held behind closed doors. None of its findings 
have ever been made public and the only information that emerged afterwards was that the exercise did not entail 
anything ‘untoward’”. See also § 173-176 Al Nashiri case. 
174 Refer to § 490 Al Nashiri case. 
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5. AN ASSESSMENT OF THE MAIN CHALLENGES IN 
NATIONAL INQUIRIES 
KEY FINDINGS 
 Our assessment has concluded that no national official investigation has 
been conducted in compliance with the ECtHR rule of law standards 
highlighted above. 
 The main obstacles to accountability consist of the lack of independence and 
impartiality of the judicial investigations; and the use of the ‘state secrets 
doctrine’ or classified information arguments to evade responsibilities and 
disclosure of the facts concerning the allegations.  
This section addresses the main challenges to accountability at national levels. The major 
obstacles in achieving accountability for the CIA rendition programme in Europe, and 
particularly in the five Member States under investigation, can be summarised as: first, the 
lack of independence and impartiality of the judicial investigations (Poland, 
Lithuania, Italy, UK and Romania); and second, the use of the ‘state secrets 
doctrine’ or classified information arguments to evade responsibilities and 
disclosure of the facts concerning the allegations (Poland, Italy, UK and 
Lithuania). 
No Member State under examination in this study has conducted an investigation 
fully complying with the rule of law standards developed by the ECtHR in the cases 
against Macedonia and Poland assessed in Section 5.2 above. The lack of effective 
investigations constitutes a worrying challenge to the rule of law and fundamental rights 
protection in the EU. All major supranational investigations carried out so far, whether by 
the CoE, the European Parliament, or latterly the ECtHR in respect of Poland, have clearly 
signalled the lack of willingness by the concerned Member States’ governments to cooperate 
in the investigations and meet their obligations under the ECHR in providing effective 
remedies to the victims and establishing the truth.  
Although Section 3 above showed that there have been some national inquiries conducted 
by Member States resulting in some evidence being disclosed, no government or public 
official has so far been held accountable. Some inquiries such as these conducted in 
Italy, Germany, Denmark, Finland and Lithuania made some progress in achieving 
accountability. Yet they all failed to enforce the decisions of their national courts. 
Despite sustained efforts from 2005 onwards to shed more light on the EU’s complicity in 
the CIA rendition programme, no effective investigations have taken place at national 
judicial level, perhaps with the sole exception of Italy, which managed to convict some 
guilty parties but where the decision of the Milan Court was overruled by the Constitutional 
Court. In the Abu Omar case in Italy, reasons of state secrecy in the defence of national 
security and foreign affairs were invoked in order to ensure that, during the criminal 
proceedings, no sensitive information was disclosed. In 2010 the Milan Court of Appeal 
accepted the claims of state secrets privilege in the case of Nicolo Pollari and Marco Mancini. 
They were not asked to testify, since, under Italian law, punishment for the disclosure of 
state secrets is very severe. In 2012 the Supreme Court of Cassation disagreed with the 
previous judgment on the grounds that SISMI (Italian Military Intelligence and Security 
Service) claimed not to be involved in Abu Omar’s kidnapping. The Supreme Court 
Policy Department C: Citizens' Rights and Constitutional Affairs 
______________________________________________________________________ 
60 
 
interpreted this as a proof that the Italian officials acted without mandate. Therefore, the 
Court overruled the Court of Appeal’s judgment and called for a retrial of Pollari and 
Mancini. In 2013 they were sentenced by the Milan Court to 10 and nine years in prison. In 
2014 the Constitutional Court acquitted them both on grounds of state secrets privilege.175  
Although most political inquiries and judicial investigations have cleared the public 
authorities involved, most of the processes of investigation had accountability 
challenges which did not comply with the ECtHR rule of law standards. As 
previously mentioned in Section 4, this benchmark includes criteria for ensuring a fair and 
effective investigation, such as ensuring the investigation is prompt, thorough and 
independent from the executive. The ECtHR has also not accepted that states parties to the 
ECHR may cite ‘state secrets’ as grounds to refuse disclosure of information or evidence to 
the Court, the victim and the public at large.   
Regarding the criterion of prompt and thorough investigation, it is now possible to conclude 
that in the face of incontestable evidence of involvement in the CIA renditions, a majority 
of the Member States analysed in this Study have failed to carry out a ‘prompt and 
thorough’ investigation. In Poland and Romania the investigations have never reached 
the trial phase, while in Lithuania and the UK the trials have recently restarted (2014) after 
having been stopped for lack of evidence/state secrets. Under the Cooperation and 
Verification Mechanism Romania is still monitored by the European Commission in order to 
assess its progress in the field of judicial reform and the fight against corruption.176 
However, none of the yearly reports on the issue have touched on the topic of renditions, 
despite the fact that criminal claims have been raised on behalf of torture victim Al Nashiri 
and despite the fact that former Romanian public officials have admitted that Romania 
allowed the CIA to run a secret detention centre in Bucharest. 
In some Member States there have been aggravating factors in the lack of compliance with 
their obligation to conduct effective investigations. In the political inquiries conducted by the 
five Member States under investigation, either the parliamentary bodies cleared the 
authorities involved (Poland, Italy, Romania, the UK) or the executive bodies of the 
government intervened in the investigations, or both. In the UK, the first inquiry was led by 
the Intelligence Service Committee within the Parliament. There were allegations 
questioning the impartiality and independence of the democratic oversight exercised by this 
Committee.177  
The UK Prime Minister later commissioned the ‘Gibson Inquiry’, which was supposed to be a 
judge-driven independent investigation into the allegations. However, after its 
establishment many international organisations questioned the independence of the 
investigation.178 The investigation was dismissed in 2012. In Romania, the independence of 
                                          
175 See www.statewatch.org/analyses/no-254-abu-omar-yasha.pdf. 
176 S. Carrera, E. Guild and N. Hernanz, 2013, The Triangular Relationship between Fundamental Rights, 
Democracy and the Rule of Law in the EU – Towards an EU Copenhagen Mechanism, DG IPOL, European 
Parliament, Brussels available at www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/etudes/join/2013/493031/IPOL-
LIBE_ET(2013)493031_EN.pdf. 
177 The Venice Commission raised concerns about this legislative body and its ties to the executive, see 
www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201314/cmselect/cmhaff/231/23110.htm, paragraph 11. For further details 
and analysis on this the Thematic Contribution by Ivanova in Annex 3 of the 2013 Parliament study deals with the 
topic extensively. 
178 See Annexes 1 and 2, pp. 51, 66-69. 
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the 2007 Senate Committee of Inquiry was questionable given that the two lead 
investigators running the Committee were close to the intelligence community. It is 
therefore no surprise that the Committee found that Romanian authorities had no 
involvement in the CIA operations. Ever since, the authorities have systematically denied 
their involvement in the CIA rendition programme, despite clear declarations and 
incontestable evidence of a black site in Romania.  
In terms of governmental interference in national inquiries, although several countries 
have held some form of inquiry in connection with their collusion in the CIA rendition 
programme (Italy, Lithuania and the UK), the investigations had often been biased because 
of various degrees of involvement by executive bodies. In Italy, the public prosecution 
claimed that the investigations have been undermined by Italian and American governments 
that tried to influence the investigations.179 In the Abu Omar case, where, thanks to the 
efforts of Italian journalists and Prosecutor Armando Spataro in Milan, the investigations 
advanced to the benefit of the truth, American diplomats intervened when information about 
CIA operations were to be disclosed. In May 2006, the American ambassador in Rome even 
mentioned that any arrest warrant issued against CIA officials might lead to diplomatic 
disputes and would jeopardise bilateral relations between the two countries. Most of the 
public authorities directly involved in the collusion with the CIA have not been held liable for 
the serious human rights violations (e.g. Poland and Italy have started criminal 
investigations against public officials belonging to the intelligence community and allegedly 
guilty of involvement in the CIA rendition programme, but the investigations have either not 
reached the prosecution stage or have been arbitrarily suspended). A Polish criminal 
investigation started in 2008, but as shown in Annex 2, the investigations have been 
delayed by the authorities for seven years and the ECtHR in its joint decision in the Al 
Nashiri and Abu Zubaydah cases found Poland in violation of Article 38 of the ECHR for not 
complying with the request of the Court to provide the necessary facilities and 
information/documentary evidence for a proper and effective examination of a pending 
case. 
Regarding the additional criterion put forward by the ECtHR in defining what an effective 
investigation consists of – its refusal to accept the ‘state secrets doctrine’180 or privilege 
(the classification of information as ‘state secrets’ in the name of ‘national security’ or state 
interests) – it is clear that this has constituted one of the main obstacles to effective 
democratic and judicial accountability in all states under analysis. It is worth 
mentioning that four of the five countries investigated have raised this argument for not 
providing evidence or for preventing a court from judging the acts (e.g. Italy, the UK in the 
Belhaj case, Poland before the ECtHR,181 etc.). In addition to these obstacles, the 2011 Dick 
Marty Report and information gathered during interviews held for the purposes of this study 
have revealed that in some cases lawyers’ access to evidence has been fundamentally 
obstructed, which poses fundamental challenges to the rights of the defence and fair 
trial principles. Immunity for government agents, such as in Italy and the UK, is an 
additional concern in terms of effective and independent inquiries.  
                                          
179 J. Goetz and M. Gebauer, 2010, “US pressed Italy to influence the judiciary”, Der Spiegel, 17 December, 
available at www.spiegel.de/international/europe/0,1518,735268,00.html. 
180 European Parliament, 2014, op. cit., see Section 2.6 on the different meanings of national security in each 
Member State. 
181 § 373 Al Nashiri Case.  
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6. ASSESSING THE CHALLENGES IN EUROPEAN 
INSTITUTION RESPONSES TO ACCOUNTABILITY  
KEY FINDING 
 There is an absence of political will within the other European institutions to 
follow up on the findings and recommendations put forward by the 
Parliament, and more generally to ascertain the truth and ensure proper 
accountability. 
 The lack of independence in judicial investigations and other obstacles to 
effective inquiries raise profound challenges to Article 2 TEU. 
 A new Copenhagen Mechanism could be built upon the current Article 7 TEU 
to develop the practical phases of its implementation. This would not 
require Treaty change, but could take the form of a Commission legislative 
proposal, which should primarily focus on the ways in which this Article is 
to be activated.  
 Judicial scrutiny still applies to Member States’ action or inaction even in 
cases involving state secrets and national security. 
 
Section 3.3 above on “Responses by European Institutions” has illustrated the scope and 
nature of the complaints expressed by the Parliament about the lack of “appropriate follow-
up actions” by the European Commission and the Council on the basis of the findings and 
recommendations of various Parliament reports, and in particular the 2012 Flautre Report 
and subsequent 2013 and 2015 Resolutions. Interviews conducted for the purposes of this 
study have revealed a general absence of political will at the highest levels of the 
other European institutions to follow up the findings and recommendations put 
forward by the Parliament, and more generally to ascertain the truth and ensure 
proper accountability for the illegal activities at issue. Obstacles to EU accountability 
do not only raise political issues, however. There are also far-reaching legal considerations 
which need to be taken into account when assessing this climate.  
The following arguments have often been advanced to by the relevant European institutions 
to justify their current inaction. The first argument relates to the timing of the events and 
the tendency to frame these events as ‘something of the past’ – that the fundamental 
human rights violations at stake are not ongoing but rather happened ‘in the past’. The 
second argument concerns the weakness of EU law in force when the events actually 
occurred, which alludes to the limited competence enjoyed by the European Commission to 
act against relevant Member States. A third argument for European institution inaction is 
linked to the commonly unchallenged mantra that transnational intelligence services 
activities and cooperation in the fight against crime and terrorism fall by and large within 
national competence, as they take us close to the concept of ‘national security’. 
This section studies these arguments in light of the responses of the European Commission 
during the last three years, and the current state of EU Justice and Home Affairs law in a 
post-Lisbon Treaty framework. The following questions are addressed: How can the lack of 
appropriate and further actions by relevant EU actors be understood? What are the main 
obstacles facing the EU’s accountability and possible ways forward concerning Member 
States’ active/passive complicity with the CIA-led extraordinary rendition programme? 
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6.1. The Commission Letters to Member States 
One of the main responses by the previous Commission to the 2012 Resolution was to send 
letters to all Member States. At the time of writing, these letters and any responses remain 
confidential and not accessible to the authors. A request for public disclosure of information 
was submitted to the European Commission yet no answer has been received so far. A few 
letters have been leaked to civil society actors and were made available to the authors of 
this study.  
What is their main content? The Commission letters reminded Member States of their 
obligation to conduct impartial, independent, effective and in-depth investigations into 
allegations in light of the ECHR and ECtHR jurisprudence on effective investigations.182 The 
letters stated that “in no circumstance should secrecy take priority over inalienable 
fundamental rights or limit states’ legal obligations to conduct effective investigations”. They 
also referred to the relevant paragraphs of the 2012 Parliament Resolution related to the 
specific Member States concerned (Finland, Denmark, Portugal, Italy, the United Kingdom, 
Germany, Spain, Ireland, Greece, Cyprus, Romania and Poland). The Commission asked the 
country involved to provide information on the state of play of all the investigations. They 
equally underlined Member States’ obligation to ensure that these events do not occur 
again. The Commission added that in recent years the EU has developed several legal 
instruments which have reinforced its collective capacity to fight terrorism while respecting 
human rights. Particular reference was made to the existence and entry into force of the 
EU-US agreements on Mutual Legal Assistance and extradition, “which clarify and unify the 
legal framework of judicial cooperation in criminal matters”, and that the Commission “is 
determined to ensure that all Member States actually use, where they apply, all relevant 
European Union instruments, and that Member States comply with the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights when they implement those instruments”. 
As indicated in section 3 above, the Parliament reiterated concerns about the 
Commission’s response to its requests, not least the lack of a substantive 
discussion of the Flautre Report. The Parliament also signalled that the sending of the 
letters has not been part of a wider Commission agenda and strategy. Indeed, the 
sending of letters can be seen as an ‘ad hoc’ and rather self-constraining exercise both in 
nature and scope. Interviews for this study revealed a lack of clarity as regards the 
actual legal value of the letters by the current Commission and a great degree of 
obscurity concerning any potential follow-up in cases where Member States have replied 
unsatisfactorily or not at all to the letters.  
That notwithstanding, the significance of these letters should not be underestimated. They 
deal with and raise far-reaching issues related to Member States’ compliance with 
the rule of law and their respective obligations, not least those derived from the 
standards developed by the Strasbourg Court in its recent jurisprudence related to effective 
investigations following allegations of serious human rights violations. This has been one of 
the few occasions where the Commission has formally demanded Member States to provide 
detailed information on the conduct of effective and independent domestic investigations in 
an area of particular sensitivity for Member State government sovereignty. Also, the 2013 
letters are clear that, when it comes to the Member States’ cooperation with the US in the 
                                          
182 ECtHR, El-Masri v. The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Application no. 39630/ 09. 
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fight against terrorism and judicial cooperation in criminal matters, the EU now has a 
specific Union legal framework of multilateral agreements which Member States are under 
an obligation to use and duly implement in compliance with the EU Charter of Fundamental 
Rights, and through which the Commission has proper enforcement powers (see Section 6.3 
below).  
Our interviews have additionally confirmed that the new Commission does not see the 
letters as part of a pre-Article 7 TEU procedure, therefore they are most centrally related to 
the protection of rule of law and fundamental rights as legal foundations enshrined in Article 
2 TEU. That notwithstanding, and as has been studied in section 4 above when dealing with 
the latest ECtHR rulings against Poland, a wealth of evidence now shows that certain 
Member States have failed in their duty to cooperate in good faith with inquiries 
conducted by supranational actors (e.g. the United Nations or the Council of 
Europe), and perhaps most gravely, in the conduct of investigations by the ECtHR 
in direct contravention of Article 38 of the ECHR. This constitutes undisputed evidence 
that certain Member States are not complying with the rule of law. The ECtHR has also 
accepted as fact that some Member States have failed to ensure in their domestic arenas 
effective and independent investigations into the alleged human rights violations. 
6.2. Rule of Law Challenges  
Obstacles to effective investigations and the lack of judicial independence indeed 
raise profound challenges to Article 2 TEU, which the European institutions, in 
particular the Commission, have the obligation to duly monitor and safeguard under Article 
7 TEU. The extent to which the EU has the necessary instruments and powers to monitor 
and safeguard Member States’ compliance with these founding principles after they accede 
to the Union has been subject to increasing EU inter-institutional debate over the past five 
years.183 This has been especially so since the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty at the 
end of 2009, when the Union’s competences on fundamental rights and Justice and Home 
Affairs (Area of Freedom, Security and Justice, AFSJ) were reinforced.184 The only 
preventive and sanctioning instrument in the hands of the Union to deal with these matters 
is laid down in Article 7 TEU. This provision, however, has never been used due to its 
                                          
183 J. Barroso, 2013, State of the Union Address, 11 September, European Parliament, Speech/13/684. In March 
2013 the Ministries of Denmark, Finland, Germany and the Netherlands sent a letter to the President of the 
Commission calling for the EU values of the rule of law, democracy and fundamental rights to be more vigorously 
protected and calling for a new ‘mechanism’ to safeguard them.  
184 As regards fundamental rights protection, the Treaties have conferred the value of EU primary law, and 
therefore attributed a legally binding nature to the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. The Lisbon Treaty has also 
scrapped the former Pillar divide, which used to characterise Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) cooperation, and 
brought judicial cooperation in criminal matters and policing generally under the Community method of 
cooperation. Since the end of 2014, and following the end of the transitional period envisaged in Protocol 36 of the 
Lisbon Treaty, the European Commission and the Court of Justice of the European Union have been recognised as 
possessing full enforcement powers to ensure Member States comply and implement EU criminal justice and 
policing legislation. For a detailed analysis see Mitsilegas, V., Carrera, S., and Eisele, K., 2014, “The End of the 
Transitional Period for Police and Criminal Justice Measures Adopted before the Lisbon Treaty: Who Monitors Trust 
in the European Criminal Justice Area?” DG IPOL, European Parliament, Brussels.  
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predominant political nature, the elevated threshold necessary for its activation and the 
significant room for manoeuvre at the Council’s disposal to decide when to use it.185 
The previous European Commission tried to address some of these challenges through the 
adoption in 2014 of the so-called ‘EU Framework to Strengthen the Rule of Law’.186 The 
Commission Communication states that its purpose is “to enable the Commission to find a 
solution with the Member State concerned in order to prevent the emerging of a systemic 
threat to the rule of law in that Member State that could develop into a ‘clear risk of a 
serious breach’ within the meaning of Article 7 TEU, which would require the mechanisms 
provided for in that Article to be launched”.187 
This could be seen as one of the few tangible responses by the Commission to the 
Parliament’s and other key EU actors’ calls to reinforce the Union’s capacity to 
prevent and address rule of law/human rights deficits in Member States at EU 
level. However, a key weakness of the proposed framework is the absence of any role 
for the Parliament in supervising (it is only to be informed) or in carrying out high-
level inquiries into Member States’ compliance with the rule of law and 
fundamental rights.188  
The Communication envisaged a procedure where the Framework would be activated in 
practice. This would cover cases where Member States are in the process of adopting 
measures or tolerating situations which could be expected to systematically and adversely 
affect or constitute a threat to the integrity, stability and proper functioning of their 
institutions in safeguarding the rule of law. Such situations would cover questions 
concerning their constitutional structures and separation of powers, their systems of judicial 
scrutiny and the independence of the judiciary.189  
The EU Framework to Strengthen the Rule of law would be operationalised in cases where 
there is a ‘systemic threat’ to the rule of law in one Member State. The Communication did 
not provide any clear and concise definition of what ‘systemic’ actually means. This is 
problematic as it leaves the activation of the Framework entirely in the hands of the 
Commission, which, as we have mentioned above, seems to lack any political appetite to 
pursue this dossier.  
The Communication authors formulated a general procedure through which the situation 
would be handled in practice with the Member State concerned. This procedure would take 
the form of a ‘structured exchange’ or ‘dialogue’ between the Commission and the national 
government involved. The exchange would be organised in the following three phases: 
                                          
185 For an analysis of Article 7 TEU and the currently fragmented and incomplete toolbox of instruments and tools 
currently in the hands of the European institutions in monitoring, assessing and/or evaluating rule of law-related 
domains, refer to Carrera et al., 2013, op. cit. 
186 European Commission, 2014, Communication, A New EU Framework to Strengthen the Rule of Law, 
COM(2014)158, 11.3.2014; see also http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-15-4402_en.htm. 
187 Ibid., p. 6. 
188 As regards the role of the Parliament and the Council, the Communication highlights that they would be kept 
“regularly and closely informed of progress made in each of the phases”.  
189 Ibid., p. 7. The Communication states: “The Framework will be activated when national ‘rule of law safeguards’ 
do not seem capable of effectively addressing those threats”. For an assessment of the Communication and its 
deficits refer to S. Carrera and E. Guild, 2015, "Implementing the Lisbon Treaty: Improving the Functioning of the 
EU on Justice and Home Affairs", DG IPOL, European Parliament, Brussels. 
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First, the Commission would carry out an assessment, which would result in a 
‘rule of law opinion’, giving substance to its concerns and granting the Member 
State the possibility to respond.  
Second, the Commission would issue a ‘rule of law recommendation’ in cases 
where the controversy is not resolved. The recommendation would provide a 
fixed time period or deadline for addressing the Commission’s concerns and 
provide specific indications on ways and measures to address them. 
Third, a follow-up or monitoring of the rule of law recommendation would ensue, 
which, if not satisfactorily carried out by the Member State(s), could create the 
possibility for activating Article 7 TEU.  
The Communication was acknowledged by the General Affairs Council meeting of 18 March 
2014.190 Yet it has not been effectively followed up by Council. Several questions were 
posed within the Council as regards institutional and procedural issues that the 
Commission’s initiative for an EU Framework on the Rule of Law would pose from an 
institutional and procedural viewpoint and in light of the current Treaty arrangements. The 
Council Legal Service (CLS) issued an Opinion about these matters in May 2014191 that 
stated that a violation of Article 2 TEU may only be invoked against a Member State when 
acting in a subject matter where the EU has a conferred legal competence. The CLS held the 
opinion that “the respect of the rule of law by the Member States cannot be the subject 
matter of an action by the institutions of the Union irrespective of the existence of a specific 
material competence to frame this action, with the sole exception of the procedure 
described in Article 7 TEU”. It added that Article 7 TEU does not establish any appropriate 
basis for further developing or revising/amending the procedure.  
The CLS Opinion was an important reminder that the recommendations issued in the 
context of the Article 7 TEU procedure do have specific legal effects, and therefore the Court 
of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) could supervise their legality and interpret them via 
preliminary rulings and actions for damages. The Opinion also disregarded Article 70 of the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) as a possible legal basis for a new 
mechanism, as this provision could not cover Member States’ actions/omissions falling 
outside Title V of the Treaties (AFSJ) or secondary legislation developed on this basis.192 In 
light of this, the CLS concluded that the Commission’s proposal was not compatible with the 
principle of conferral and stated, in paragraph 24,  
“It follows that there is no legal basis in the Treaties empowering the 
institutions to create a new supervision mechanism of the respect of the rule 
of law by the Member States, additional to what is laid down in Article 7 TEU, 
either to amend, modify or supplement the procedure laid down in this 
Article. Were the Council to act along such lines, it would run the risk of being 
found to have abased its powers by deciding without a legal basis”. 
                                          
190 Council of the EU, 2014, Press Release on General Affairs Council meeting, 3306th, Brussels, 18 March.  
191 Council of the EU, 2014, Commission’s Communication on a new EU Framework to Strengthen the Rule of Law: 
Compatibility with the Treaties, Doc. 10296/14, Brussels, 27 May. 
192 Similarly, the CLS concluded that Articles 241, 337 and 352 TFEU could not offer a legal basis independent from 
Article 7 TEU. 
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As an alternative, the CLS proposed an intergovernmental international agreement (agreed 
by the Member States and not adopted by the Council) designed to supplement EU law and 
to ensure the respect of the Union’s values. Such an agreement “could” allow for the 
participation of EU institutions, and lay down the specific consequences that Member States 
would encounter from such a ‘review system’. This possibility would clearly not affect the 
powers provided for in Article 7 TEU or those stipulated in Articles 258, 259 and 260 TFEU, 
but it would altogether disregard the Community method of cooperation and supranational 
accountability by the Commission and the European Parliament. The CLS Opinion has been 
criticised by authors such as Kochenov & Pech (2015), who convincingly asserted:  
“One may on the contrary assert that since the Commission is one of the 
institutions empowered, under Article 7 TEU, to trigger the procedure 
contained therein, it should in fact be commended for establishing clear 
guidelines on how such triggering is to function in practice. In other words, a 
strong and convincing argument can no doubt be made that Article 7(1) TEU 
already and necessarily implicitly empowers the Commission to investigate 
any potential risk of a serious breach of the EU’s values by giving it the 
competence to submit a reasoned proposal to the Council should the 
Commission be of the view that Article 7 TEU ought to be triggered on this 
basis. Moreover, given the overwhelming level of interdependence between 
the EU Member States and the blatant disregard for EU values in at least one 
EU country, the Commission fulfilled its duty as Guardian of the Treaties by 
putting forward a framework that would make Article 2 TEU operational in 
practice.”193 
One can only agree with these concerns. We have previously argued that a new 
Copenhagen Mechanism could be legally built upon current Article 7 TEU in order 
to develop the phases preceding its preventive and coercive arms. Treaty change 
would not be an absolute must for this to take the form of a legislative proposal by 
the Commission,194 which should mainly focus on the ways in which this Article is 
to be activated. Its actual functioning and operability could be developed in a soft law or 
policy instrument which would present the periodic evaluation/coordination system on the 
rule of law according to the model already used in fields such as anti-corruption policy195 or 
the so-called ‘EU Justice Scoreboard’.196 
                                          
193 See D. Kochenov and L. Pech, 2015, “Upholding the Rule of Law in the EU: On the Commission’s Pre-Article 7 
Procedure as a Timid Step towards the Right Direction”, EUI Working Papers, RSCAS 2015/24, Florence, p. 11. 
194 Carrera et al., 2013, op. cit., p. 39. Here we also argued, “In a longer-term perspective, other measures could 
be taken that would require an amendment of the current normative configurations delineating the EU Treaties. 
The activation phase of the Copenhagen mechanism in cases of alleged risk or existence of serious/persistent 
breach of Article 2 TEU could be improved by liberalising its current form and threshold, which remain too 
burdensome in practice. A revised Copenhagen mechanism should focus on ensuring its own rule-of-law 
compliance by guaranteeing a high degree of democratic accountability and judicial control during the various 
phases comprising the procedure and supervision processes, as well as the substantive decisions potentially taken 
against member states”. 
195 European Commission, 2014, EU Anti-Corruption Report, COM(2014)38 final, 3.2.2014. For more information 
refer to http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/organized-crime-and-human-
trafficking/corruption/anti-corruption-report/index_en.htm. 
196 European Commission, 2015, Communication, EU Justice Scoreboard, COM (2015)116 final. See 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/effective-justice/scoreboard/index_en.htm. 
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Since then, regrettably, the Commission’s proposal has not been effectively followed up by 
the Council. Instead, the General Affairs Council of 16 December 2014 adopted conclusions 
on “ensuring respect for the rule of law”.197 The Council called for the establishment of an 
annual dialogue among Member States to promote and safeguard the rule of law “in the 
framework of the Treaties”, which will be organised around thematic subject areas.198 The 
limited reaction by the Council has been qualified by Kochenov & Pech (2015) as a “façade 
action”, meaning the Council is “in denial about the internal challenges faced by the EU or 
no other compromise could perhaps be found within an institution which represents the 
Member States”.199 
It would be difficult not to legally link the sending of the above-mentioned letters 
with Article 7 TEU and even more so with the proposed EU Framework to 
Strengthen the Rule of Law. The current Commission’s position on their value or 
relevance, as well as its current lack of action on any follow-up measure, raises a number of 
important questions, particularly with respect to how the activation phase of any EU action 
against Member State threats to the rule of law and fundamental rights takes place in 
practice. The legal and political meaning of the sending of the letters would make sense as a 
phase preceding the launch of the EU Framework’s ‘structured dialogue’. However, the lack 
of any follow-up action by the Commission in light of the limited or non-existent nature of 
Member States’ responses to the letters calls for careful reconsideration of the activation of 
the three procedural steps envisaged by the EU Framework, which should be more carefully 
designed for future reference and made subject to proper legal/judicial scrutiny and 
democratic control.  
Another challenge which the Commission might cite as a reason ‘not to act’ is the extent to 
which a Member State’s complicity in the CIA rendition and secret detention programme 
falls within the scope of a current ‘risk of a serious breach’ or even ‘a persistent serious 
breach’ of the Union’s values enshrined in Article 2 TEU and as envisaged in Article 7 TEU, 
or a ‘systemic’ threat to the rule of law (which could later on develop into a risk of a serious 
breach) as framed in the Commission’s EU Framework to Strengthen the Rule of Law. In 
fact, the EU Framework gives very little information as regards the notion or material scope 
of ‘what’ makes a threat to the rule of law ‘systematic’.200  
As evidenced in this study, the fact that certain Member States have been held in 
violation of their obligations to cooperate with the Strasbourg Court proceedings 
                                          
197 www.consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/gac/2014/12/16. The Council also agreed that this dialogue will take 
place once a year in the Council General Affairs configuration and prepared by COREPER (Presidency). By the end 
of 2016, the General Affairs Council will evaluate the experience. 
198 The Conclusions highlighted that the annual dialogue would be based on the principles of objectivity, equality 
and non-discrimination. It would operate in accordance with an evidence-based and non-partisan approach. 
199 See www.robert-schuman.eu/en/european-issues/0356-upholding-the-rule-of-law-in-the-eu-on-the-
commission-s-pre-article-7-procedure-as-a-timid-step. 
200 The few details provided by the Communication can be found in footnote 18 of the Commission Communication 
which states: “With regard to the notion of ‘systemic deficiencies’ in complying with fundamental rights when 
acting within the scope of EU law, see, for example, Joined Cases C-411/10 and 493/10, N.S., not yet published, 
paragraphs 94 and 106; and Case C-4/11, Germany v. Kaveh Puid, not yet published, paragraph 36. With regard 
to the notion of ‘systemic’ or ‘structural’ in the context of the European Convention of Human Rights, see also the 
role of the European Court of Human rights in identifying underlying systemic problems, as defined in the 
Resolution Res(2004)3 of the Committee of Ministers of 12 May 2004, on Judgments Revealing an Underlying 
Systemic Problem.” 
A Quest for Accountability? EU and Member State Inquiries into the CIA Rendition and Secret Detention Programme 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
69 
 
or to conduct supranational inquiries constitutes a current rule of law deficit  that 
has little to do ‘with the past’. Allied to this, ongoing obstacles to effective 
investigations that comply with ECtHR legal standards are also sound evidence of 
current breaches of the rule of law and the fundamental rights of individuals, some 
of whom have received victim status, which now falls within the scope of EU law (see 
Section 6.3 below). 
Therefore, the current state of Commission inaction on Member States’ complicity in the 
extraordinary rendition and secret detention programme illustrates the key deficits in the 
proposed 2014 EU Framework on the Rule of Law. It also demonstrates that a purely 
intergovernmental framework on the rule of law would not be conducive to 
properly and effectively addressing threats posed by national governments to 
fundamental rights.  
6.3. EU Law in a Post-Lisbon Treaty Context 
Beyond important questions formally related to rule of law considerations, there are also 
open EU law issues which challenge the European Commission’s inaction on the basis of the 
Flautre Report. The Commission has so far failed to convincingly comply with the 
Parliament’s recommendation to examine carefully the extent to which Member States’ 
complicity in the CIA-led rendition and secret detention programmes undermined their legal 
obligations under the EU Treaties, their founding values and legal principles, the EU Charter 
of Fundamental Rights and relevant EU secondary legislation. This is indeed surprising in a 
post-Lisbon Treaty context. 
The Lisbon Treaty gives the Commission new powers and re-positions it in a new 
institutional and legal landscape. True, as the Commission insisted in its 2013 letters to 
Member States, the legislative instruments that the EU has given itself during the last 
decade leave limited grounds for arguing that, as EU law stands at present, the Commission 
would not be entitled to act and enforce fundamental rights. The EU Criminal Justice 
Area is now composed of various secondary law instruments setting up common 
rules on extradition and surrender of suspected criminals, the exchange and 
processing of evidence and the rights of suspects in criminal proceedings.201 This 
has come in parallel to the emergence of an international framework of multilateral 
agreements, including with the US on questions related to Mutual Legal Assistance (MLA) 
and extradition since 2003.202 
                                          
201 Mitsilegas, V., 2009, EU Criminal Law, Oxford: Hart Publishing. 
202 Agreement on extradition between the European Union and the United States of America, OJ L181, 19 July 
2003, p. 27; Agreement on mutual legal assistance between the European Union and the United States of America, 
OJ L181, 19 July 2003, p. 34. See also the Council Decision, on the basis of Articles 24 and 38 TEU, concerning the 
signature of these agreements: OJ L181, 19 July 2003, p. 25; House of Lords Select Committee on the European 
Union, EU-US Agreements on Extradition and Mutual Legal Assistance, 38th Report, session 2002-03, HL Paper 
153; Mitsilegas, V., 2003, “The New EU-US Co-operation on Extradition, Mutual Legal Assistance and the Exchange 
of Police Data”, European Foreign Affairs Review, Vol. 8, pp. 515-536. S. Carrera, E. Guild, G. Gonzalez and 
Mitsilegas, V., 2015, Access to Electronic Data by Third-Country Law Enforcement Authorities: Challenges to EU 
Rule of Law and Fundamental Rights, Paperback, Brussels: Centre for European Policy Studies. 
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The EU also has a body of European legislation covering the status of victims of crime.203 
The EU Directive 2012/29204 has established minimum EU standards and rights in order “to 
ensure that victims of crime receive appropriate information, support and protection and are 
able to participate in criminal proceedings”.205 These EU rights include victims’ participation 
in criminal proceedings (Articles 10-17), the provision of information and support (Articles 
3-9) as well as specific protection needs for certain individuals. While Recital 28 of the 
Directive enables Member States not to withhold information when this could “affect the 
proper handling of a case or harm a given case or person, or if they consider it contrary to 
the essential interests of their security”, this exception is now subject to EU supervision by 
the Commission and potential judicial scrutiny by the CJEU. As has been illustrated in 
section four on the state of play of Member States’ accountability processes, some of the 
individuals who alleged their human rights were violated as a consequence of certain 
Member States’ cooperation with the CIA have been given victim status, which brings them 
within the personal scope of Directive 2012/29 and therefore under EU legal supervision.  
Furthermore, EU law in the domain of judicial cooperation in criminal matters is based on 
the principle of mutual trust both between Member States206 and between Member 
States and the European institutions, the assumption being that they comply with the rule 
of law and fundamental rights in their national realms. The EU Criminal Justice Area is 
founded on and operates under the premise of the principle of mutual recognition, 
according to which Member State authorities accept each other’s judicial decisions as their 
own. In cases of allegations of serious fundamental rights violations, the CJEU has held that 
a rebuttable presumption exists and that the relevant domestic authority still needs to 
carefully examine these allegations before ‘mutually recognising’ the extradition request and 
rendering the suspect to that legal system.207 If, in light of the evidence provided by 
supranational human rights monitoring actors and the judicial investigations by the ECtHR, 
it is now beyond doubt that relevant Member States have obstructed justice and 
not ensured independent judicial review of individual’s allegations of human rights 
abuses, how can mutual trust remain valid? 
                                          
203 For a general explanation of the current framework refer to 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/criminal/victims/rights/index_en.htm. 
204 Directive 2012/29/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2012 establishing minimum 
standards on the rights, support and protection of victims of crime, and replacing Council Framework Decision 
2001/220/JHA. See also the European Commission Guidance Document for its implementation and transposition 
available at: http://ec.europa.eu/justice/criminal/files/victims/guidance_victims_rights_directive_en.pdf. 
205 Article 1 of the Directive also states, “Member States shall ensure that victims are recognised and treated in a 
respectful, sensitive, tailored, professional and non-discriminatory manner, in all contacts with victim support or 
restorative justice services or a competent authority, operating within the context of criminal proceedings.” On the 
personal scope of who is a ‘victim’ for the purposes of EU law, refer to Article 2 of the Directive. 
206 Mitsilegas, V., 2012, “The Limits of Mutual Trust in Europe’s Area of Freedom, Security and Justice. From 
Automatic Interstate Cooperation to the Slow Emergence of the Individual”, Yearbook of European Law 2012, Vol. 
31, pp. 319-372; see also W. van Ballegooij, 2015, The Nature of Mutual Recognition in European Law: Re-
examining the Notion from an Individual Rights Perspective with a View to its Further Development in the Criminal 
Justice Area, Maastricht: Intersentia. 
207 Refer to Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 21 December 2011. N. S. (C-411/10) v Secretary of State 
for the Home Department and M. E. and Others (C-493/10) v Refugee Applications Commissioner and Minister for 
Justice, Equality and Law Reform. The CJEU held in paragraph 104: “In those circumstances, the presumption 
underlying the relevant legislation, stated in paragraph 80 above, that asylum seekers will be treated in a way 
which complies with fundamental rights, must be regarded as rebuttable.” 
A Quest for Accountability? EU and Member State Inquiries into the CIA Rendition and Secret Detention Programme 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
71 
 
Finally, and as argued and examined in a previous Parliament study,208 Member States’ 
action or inaction (even in cases related to state secrets and national security) are 
still subject to judicial scrutiny. The CJEU has considered effective judicial accountability 
a key principle in the EU legal system. This principle acquires especial importance in cases 
where individuals allege serious human rights violations by Member States’ governments 
and/or authorities. This includes state practices said to fall within national security or state 
secrets, which, according to both the ECtHR and the CJEU, must still be subject to 
independent judicial review. Judicial scrutiny is designed to ensure that EU Member 
States cannot invoke ‘national security' and 'state secrets’ in order to avoid 
supranational accountability or to otherwise evade their legal responsibilities. 
Anything else would undermine the effectiveness of EU law and Member States' compliance 
with the principle of loyal and sincere cooperation enshrined in Article 10 TEU. 
 
  
                                          
208  European Parliament 2014, op. cit. 
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7. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The analysis conducted in the Study leads to the following key conclusions, which have 
informed the policy recommendations formulated below. 
Firstly, the Feinstein Report provides a particularly important insight into the cooperation of 
European and other states with the CIA in its detention and interrogation programme. While 
it is difficult to determine the exact identities of the countries referred to,209 the Report 
has revealed three main aspects of European involvement in the programme.  
The first involves remaining silent in the face of unfounded CIA claims as to the efficacy of 
the torture programme in generating important information to prevent terrorist attacks. This 
appears to relate primarily to the UK authorities and agencies with knowledge of the 
situation, which kept silent in the face of CIA claims about providing intelligence on threats 
to the UK – claims that were obviously unfounded. Second, the Report reveals that the 
CIA’s arrangements with countries to host detention sites were highly unstable. The CIA 
was constantly on the run from the ICRC, and states which entered into agreements with 
the CIA invariably withdrew sooner or later (in some cases even before the sites came into 
use) because of the problems which complicity in torture creates. States appear to have 
been much more sensitive to their own publics and international institutions, which 
condemn torture and secret detention, than to the wishes of the CIA. Third, the CIA, 
through its use of torture and secret detention, isolated itself not only within its own 
administration and country but internationally. The more information that became available 
regarding the torture programme, the greater the distance former allies wished to put 
between themselves and the CIA.   
Secondly, the degree of effective accountability for alleged complicity with the CIA varies 
considerably across the five Member States under examination. While political inquiries have 
taken place in all five Member States, their nature and scope have differed considerably. 
Moreover, in Italy, Romania and the UK there is evidence of government involvement in the 
inquiries, which has fundamentally jeopardised their effectiveness and independence. All the 
political inquiries have been dismissed, having found no authorities guilty of any act. All 
government-led or parliamentary inquiries have by and large rejected any claims of 
involvement in the CIA rendition and detention programme. 
The analysis has revealed that national criminal investigations have been/are being 
conducted in the five Member States. Four of them (with the exception of the UK) have 
been subject to closed or still pending proceedings before the ECtHR. As a consequence of 
these supranational and national judicial investigations, some of the affected individuals 
have been granted victim status and received financial reparations. 
The responses by the European Commission and the Council have been mixed. By and large 
they have not fully followed the requests and recommendations put forward by the 
European Parliament’s Temporary Committee on the alleged use of European countries by 
the CIA for the transportation and illegal detention of prisoners (TDIP) or the subsequent 
2012 Flautre Report on the alleged transportation and illegal detention of prisoners in EU 
countries by the CIA “follow-up of the European Parliament TDIP Committee Report”. The 
most concrete response by the European Commission was the sending in 2013 of a set of 
letters to all Member States requesting information on their obligation to conduct effective 
                                          
209 The actual names have been removed and replaced with a colour code which Amnesty International has 
managed to decipher in their 2015 report “Breaking the Conspiracy of Silence: USA’s European ‘Partners in Crime’ 
must act after Senate Torture Report”, op. cit. 
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investigations into these allegations. The actual legal value of this correspondence (if any) 
remains unclear. There has been no specific further action by the Council or any of the 
subsequent EU Presidencies in response to the Parliament’s recommendations. 
Third, in July 2014, the ECtHR issued two landmark judgments against Poland in the Al 
Nashiri and Abu Zubaydah cases. The rulings provide a wealth of evidence concerning 
Poland’s complicity in the CIA programme, as well as the lack of compliance by the Polish 
government with the obligation laid down in Article 38 ECHR to cooperate fully with ECtHR 
investigations. The Strasbourg Court found Poland in violation of various human rights 
enshrined in the Convention, chiefly the prohibition against torture and inhuman and 
degrading treatment and the lack of effective remedies to the victims (Articles 3 and 13 
ECHR).  
Both cases are in effect test cases in assessing the legality of Member States’ complicity 
with the CIA. In particular, the ECtHR gave further substance to the set of rule of law 
standards necessary to ensure “effective official investigations” into alleged serious human 
rights violations. The standards include, inter alia: the need for a prompt and thorough 
investigation; independence and impartiality from the executive and secret services; 
participation in the proceedings and access to information for the victims and families, and 
public scrutiny of the main facts and findings; and the fact that governments may not 
invoke ‘state secrets’ to keep out of judicial scrutiny evidence deemed fundamental to 
examining the case at hand. 
Fourth, the study has paid special attention to the existence of challenges and barriers to 
accountability, and examined their nature and scope in the Member States under 
investigation. Our assessment has concluded that no official national investigation has been 
conducted in compliance with the ECtHR rule of law standards highlighted above. The two 
primary obstacles identified are the lack of independence and impartiality of the judicial 
investigations and the use of the ‘state secrets’ or ‘classified information' doctrine to evade 
responsibilities and prevent disclosure of the facts. These have in turn posed profound 
challenges to the rights of the defence and fair trial principles. 
Fifth, the study also explores the arguments advanced by the European Commission and 
the Council to justify not taking action against the concerned Member States. The European 
Parliament has reiterated concerns that the European Commission has not fully or duly 
responded to the actual substance of its reports and resolutions on the matter. It has 
welcomed the letters sent by the Commission, but regretted that they have not been part of 
a wider enforcement agenda and strategy to ensure the rule of law and an effective 
application of EU legislation.   
In our analysis, the importance of the Commission's decision to sending letters to Member 
States should not be underestimated, either legally or politically. They constitute a tangible 
step that requires Member States to provide information on their human rights obligations 
and thereby promote independent investigations into alleged wrongdoing, which lies at the 
heart of safeguarding the rule of law as enshrined in Article 2 TEU. The letters should 
constitute a first step towards the activation of the 2014 Commission proposal for an EU 
Framework to Strengthen the Rule of Law and, where required, the more powerful sanctions 
laid down in Article 7 TEU.  
There is now evidence validated by the ECtHR that certain Member States have deliberately 
not complied with their duty to cooperate in the administration of justice and provision of 
effective remedies to victims, including before the Strasbourg Court. This constitutes a 
serious threat to the rule of law which needs to be debated and properly addressed at the 
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EU level. The Council's failure to act in the wake of any of the European Parliament’s 
requests shows that a purely intergovernmental EU rule of law framework would not 
satisfactorily address fundamental rights threats.  
These observations are of particular importance in the post-Lisbon European Criminal 
Justice Area. The principle of mutual recognition in judicial cooperation in criminal matters is 
based on the ‘mutual trust’ that all Member States comply with fundamental rights 
protection. The current state of investigations into certain Member States’ complicity in the 
CIA-led programme and, most important, the impunity of the perpetrators and the obstacles 
to effective national and supranational political and judicial inquiries profoundly undermine 
this trust. Allied to this, the failure of Member States to deliver proper remedies and 
protection to affected individuals is at odds with the EU legal framework on the protection of 
victims. 
 
In light of the key findings of the Study, the following Policy Recommendations can be 
formulated:  
 
 Recommendation 1: More effort should be invested in reinforcing regular and 
structured dialogue between the Parliament, particularly the LIBE Committee, and 
relevant counterparts in the U.S. Congress and Senate. Such a dialogue would not 
only further facilitate the existing Transatlantic Legislators’ Dialogue (TLD),210 but 
also ongoing Parliament delegations to Washington. It would also constitute a new 
framework for sharing information and cooperating more closely on interrelated 
inquiries in the expanding policy field of Justice and Home Affairs. A collaborative 
approach to inquiries into the CIA-led programme would have enhanced their 
effectiveness.  
 
 Recommendation 2: The Parliament should build upon its previous work on ways 
to properly ensure the democratic rule of law and fundamental rights in the EU. This 
is particularly relevant where Member States’ action and inaction may fall outside the 
scope of EU law, yet have profound repercussions on the EU legal principles 
enshrined in Article 2 TEU. In this regard, the decision taken by the LIBE Committee 
to draw up a Legislative Own-Initiative Report on an EU mechanism on democracy, 
the rule of law and fundamental rights under the rapporteurship of Ms In't Veld is an 
important step211.  The focus of the Legislative Own-Initiative Report should be 
mainly on developing and bringing further legal certainty to the activation phases 
preceding the use of Article 7 TEU.  
 
This would provide a concise and secure legal framework to exercises such as the 
2013 letters sent by the Commission to all Member States, requesting information on 
the state of play regarding investigations into their alleged complicity in CIA-led 
extraordinary rendition and secret detention programmes. It would also facilitate 
more effective follow-up where Member States act (or fail to act) unlawfully to 
hamper accountability.  
                                          
210 For more information see www.europarl.europa.eu/intcoop/tld/default_en.htm . 
211 See www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+RULES-EP+20140701+RULE-
046+DOC+XML+V0//EN&language=EN&navigationBar=YES. 
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Contrary to the Council’s Legal Service Opinion on the Commission’s Proposal for an 
EU Framework to Strengthen the Rule of Law, which argued that there is no legal 
basis empowering the EU institutions to create a new supervisory mechanism for the 
rule of law, Article 7 TEU in fact grants powers not only to Member States to 
monitor/launch the procedure, but also to the Commission and the Parliament when 
monitoring rule of law threats212. The Parliament is also called on to give its consent 
to a reasoned proposal stating that one or several Member States are putting at risk 
Article 2 TEU legal principles. The Council retains considerable discretion when it 
comes to censuring or sanctioning a Member State. Therefore, a purely 
intergovernmental treaty would be contrary to the powers currently granted to the 
Commission and the Parliament in Article 7 TEU. 
 
Moreover, and in parallel to this legislative framework, the Parliament should insist 
that the Commission develops a ‘policy’ coordination framework of periodic 
evaluation of Member States’ compliance with fundamental rights and the rule of law 
in the form of a ‘Copenhagen Mechanism’.213 The already proposed EU Framework on 
the Rule of Law should be properly followed up and implemented, while ensuring 
more efficient democratic and judicial scrutiny of its activation and implementation 
phases. The Parliament should remind Member States of their duty of loyal and 
sincere cooperation and ensure that the Annual Dialogue in the General Affairs 
Council forms part of a wider EU Policy Cycle where both the Parliament and the 
Commission play specific and active roles in ensuring legal and democratic 
accountability.  
 
 Recommendation 3: The Parliament should call for the adoption of a Professional 
Code for the transnational management and accountability of data in the EU.214 The 
Code would bring together existing supranational legal and judicial standards 
applicable to transnational intelligence communities’ cooperation in the EU, 
standards on the conduct of effective investigations as well as guidelines when 
‘national security’ and ‘state secrets’ are invoked by national governments and 
authorities. It would lay down the basis on which ‘national security’ and ‘state 
secrets’ could not be invoked (i.e. define what national security is not) in the EU 
legal system. These would include grounds such “as personal interests, official 
wrongdoing, poor quality of the law, interference with freedom of expression and 
information, and absence of sufficient and effective judicial controls”.215 
 
The Parliament could lead cooperation with national parliaments in identifying 
‘promising’ and ‘bad’ practices in the scrutiny of law enforcement authorities and 
                                          
212 In the Communication COM (2014) 158 final of the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on 
a new EU Framework for the Rule of Law, the role the European Commission is playing in the field of ensuring 
effective and equal protection of the rule of law in all Member States is strengthened. 
213 As recommended and further developed in Carrera et al., 2013, op. cit. 
214 As already proposed in European Parliament 2014, op. cit. 
215 Ibid. p. 50. 
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intelligence services in the EU.216 Cooperation with national parliaments could lead to 
guidelines for cross-border security cooperation, fundamental rights guarantees and 
accountability standards in the fight against terrorism. 
 
The Code would also pay particular attention to ways of enhancing current systems 
and instruments of accountability in relation to the work of EU Home Affairs bodies 
(such as Europol, Eurojust, the Standing Committee on Operational Cooperation on 
Internal Security (COSI), the EU Intelligence Analysis Centre,217 etc.) so as to ensure 
that the information and ‘intelligence’ that is exchanged and processed does not 
originate from torture or inhuman/degrading treatment. The Professional Code would 
in this way be imbued with the necessary legal certainty, which is at present lacking. 
As we have previously proposed, a ‘yellow card, red card system’ should be adopted. 
This system should guarantee that any exchange or processing of tainted information 
in breach of the common accord would first be signalled by a warning (‘yellow card’) 
and, if repeated, would entail exclusion (‘red card’) from the information-sharing 
network.218 
 
 Recommendation 4: There are two key ‘lessons learned’ from the previous 
European Parliament contributions to achieving accountability for Member States’ 
complicity in the CIA renditions are. The first is that Member States and European 
institutions and agencies should always have the duty, ‘in the spirit of loyal and 
sincere cooperation’, to collaborate fully and provide all necessary evidence and 
information, even in cases where national security is invoked by national authorities. 
The second is that the recommendations and substantive requests for action issued 
by a parliamentary committee (whether or not a committee of inquiry in formal 
terms) should be discussed in depth and properly followed up/implemented by 
relevant European and domestic actors. The Parliament should demand proper and 
swift follow-up by the Commission on the substance and recommendations included 
in its Reports and Resolutions from 2007 through 2015. The Commission should:  
 
1. report back to Parliament on the state of play with regard to the 2013 
sending of letters to all Member States and carry out a proper follow-
up in the context of the EU Framework on the Rule of Law;  
 
2. formally address non-compliance by certain Member States with their 
obligations under the European Convention of Human Rights and the 
EU Charter to cooperate with relevant human rights inquiries and the 
                                          
216 This recommendation was also adopted by the Parliament in the 2012 Flautre Report, which, in paragraph 55, 
“[u]ndertakes to devote its next Joint Parliamentary Meeting with national parliaments to reviewing the role of 
parliaments in ensuring accountability for human rights violations in the context of the CIA programme, and to 
promoting stronger cooperation and regular exchange between national oversight bodies in charge of scrutinizing 
intelligence services, in the presence of national authorities, EU institutions and agencies.” 
217 See www.statewatch.org/analyses/no-223-eu-intcen.pdf. 
218 F. Geyer, 2007, “Fruit of the Poisonous Tree – Member States’ Indirect Use of Extraordinary Rendition and the 
EU Counter-Terrorism Strategy”, Centre for European Policy Studies, 3 April; D. Bigo, 2006, “Intelligence Services, 
Police and Democratic Control: The European and Transatlantic Collaboration”, in D. Bigo and A. Tsoukala (eds), 
Controlling Security, Paris: Centre d’Etudes sur les Conflits/L’Harmattan, pp. 163-82. This has already been 
proposed in Carrera et al., 2012, op. cit. 
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judicial investigations carried out by the European Court of Human 
Rights in compliance with Article 38 ECHR;  
 
3. properly enforce existing EU secondary law with direct relevance in 
this matter, such as the EU legal framework on the rights of victims; 
and  
 
4. ensure an independent and objective evaluation and detailed 
assessment of the functioning/use of the EU-US agreements on Mutual 
Legal Assistance (MLA) and Extradition (and parallel bilateral 
agreements between Member States and the US) so as to ensure 
consistent and uniform application in compliance with the EU Charter 
of Fundamental Rights and existing EU legal standards in the sharing 
of evidence in criminal proceedings.219 
 
 Recommendation 5: In light of the findings of the U.S. Senate Intelligence 
Committee Report and the recent rulings by the European Court of Human Rights, 
the Parliament should call on the President of the European Council to issue an 
official statement to Plenary on the matter. The Council should issue an official 
Declaration on Member States’ complicity in the CIA-led programme as well as the 
obstacles to accountability, truth-seeking and the delivery of justice to victims in 
various Member States. The Council should also commit unconditionally to 
preventing impunity from serious fundamental rights violations and to supporting 
supranational human rights monitoring, and to ensuring judicial/democratic 
supervision in the fight against terrorism and crime. 
 
 Recommendation 6: The Feinstein Report has also provided evidence on the 
existence of considerable funds provided by the CIA to some EU governments to 
encourage them to host clandestine CIA detention sites. The Parliament should call 
for an effective investigation into these allegations of possible bribes or other acts of 
corruption linked to the CIA. Judicial investigations should be launched in relevant 
Member States as well as in the US. Eurojust could be called on to encourage and 
coordinate potential cooperation between EU and US judicial authorities and the 
effective use of the existing EU-US MLA Agreement to investigate these matters. This 
would also require proper and enhanced protection of whistle-blowers so that the 
origin and destination of this money can be ascertained.
                                          
219 As proposed in Carrera et al., 2015, op. cit. 
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ANNEX 1: THE STATE OF PLAY OF INQUIRIES IN FIVE EUROPEAN COUNTRIES 
 
 
 
 
 
STATE 
Nature 
of 
inquiries 
(political/ 
judicial) 
Curren
t 
status 
(open/ 
closed) 
Results 
Alleged 
participatio
n  
State reaction to 
allegations 
Sanctions 
/judicial 
redress/ 
reparation(
to 
authorities/ 
individuals) 
Parties 
involved 
(intelligen
ce, 
military, 
private 
sector) 
Main 
obstacles 
(excluding 
diplomatic 
assurances) 
POLAND 
Judicial – 
national 
 
Internation
al ECtHR 
 
Ongoing 
 
Closed 
Two persons 
granted 
victim 
status;220 
One person 
granted 
injured 
person 
status; 
investigation
s ongoing; 
operation of 
CIA secret 
prison 
 
Rendition 
flights;221 
complicity in 
torture, 
detention and 
prisoner 
transfer; 
black sites 
Government officials 
acknowledge the 
existence of Stare 
Kiejkuty CIA prison222 
ECtHR 
rulings of 
June 2014 
not complied 
with 
Former 
head and 
deputy 
head of the 
secret 
service, 
former 
prime 
minister223 
US 
authorities 
do not offer 
mutual legal 
assistance, 
secrecy 
issues 
(classified 
information); 
prosecutor 
removed 
from the 
case; 
delays; 
lack of 
political 
will224 
UK Political and Ongoing 
APPC 
ongoing; 
Complicity in 
interrogation 
UK Government denied 
knowing about secret 
Compensation 
paid to 
MI5 and 
MI6 officers 
Gibson 
Inquiry 
                                          
220 Open Society Justice Initiative, 2010, “Polish Prosecutor Recognizes Guantánamo Prisoner as Victim in CIA Black Site Investigation”, Press Release, Open 
Society Foundations, 27 October, available at www.soros.org/initiatives/justice/news/poland-cia-nashiri-20101027. 
221 Amnesty International, 2011, “Current evidence: European Complicity in the CIA Rendition and Secret Detention Programmes”. 
222 Rzeczpospolita, op. cit. 
223 A. Rettman, 2012, “Poland indicts former spymaster over CIA renditions”, EU Observer, 29 March, available at http://euobserver.com/22/115745. 
224 A. Singh, 2011, “As Poland’s Legacy of CIA Torture Erupts, Europe’s Human Rights Court Must Act”, Open Society Foundations, available at 
https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/voices/poland-s-legacy-cia-torture-erupts-europes-human-rights-court-must-act /. 
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judicial225 ISC non-
effective; 
Gibson 
Inquiry 
abandoned; 
insufficient 
evidence to 
press 
criminal 
charges; 
out-of-court 
settlements 
 
and mistreat-
ment; 
knowledge of 
illegal 
transfers; 
Diego Garcia 
interrogation 
site 
prisons several 
victims226 
secretive and 
not 
independent; 
insufficient 
evidence for 
criminal 
charges; MI6 
officers 
protected for 
acts abroad 
in specific 
cases; 
state secrets 
doctrine; 
lack of 
sufficient 
evidence in 
two pending 
cases due to 
the British 
government 
invoking 
state secrets 
doctrine227. 
                                          
225 See www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/feb/13/uk-investigations-torture-rendition-guide?intcmp=239. 
226 P. Wintour, 2010, “Guantánamo Bay detainees to be paid compensation by UK government”, The Guardian, 16 November, available at 
www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/nov/16/guantanamo-bay-compensation-claim. 
227 In the case Belhaj v. former MI6 Agents, the High Court ruled against the UK government and called for the “act of state” and “state immunity” doctrine to 
be lifted in order to ensure efficient and effective criminal proceedings. For more information, see Neutral Citation Number EWCA Civ 1394/ 2014 in the case 
no. A2/2014/0596 between Abdul-Hakim Belhaj and Fatima Boudchar v. the RT. Hon. Jack Straw MP, Sir Mark Allen CMG, the Secret Intelligence Service, the 
Security Service, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office.  
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ITALY 
Political228 
and 
judicial229 
Political: 
closed; 
judicial: 
national 
closed; 
ECtHR 
ongoing 
Court 
judgment in 
absentia of 
CIA, Italian 
and US 
military for 
the 
kidnapping 
of Abu Omar  
Involvement 
and/or 
knowledge of 
CIA’s 
intention to 
abduct Abu 
Omar230 
Government denied any 
knowledge of the 
case231 
 
 
Italian court 
convicted in 
absentia 22 
CIA agents 
and one US 
military 
official, as 
well as two 
Italian 
intelligence 
operatives 
(SISMI);232  
compensatio
n unpaid; 
no arrest 
warrants 
issued; 
ECtHR 
application233 
waiting final 
ruling, 
reached last 
hearing on 23 
June 2015 
CIA agents, 
US military 
official and 
Italian 
intelligence 
operatives 
(SISMI) 
Prosecution’s 
effectiveness 
undermined 
by 
successive 
Italian 
governments
234; 
‘state 
secrets’ 
privilege 
invoked by 
appeal 
court;235 
alleged US 
pressure; 
state 
intervening 
in judiciary 
LITHUA-
NIA 
Political236 
and 
Political: 
closed; 
 
Judicial 
Two secret 
detention 
Parliamentary inquiry 
acknowledged presence 
Abu 
Zubaydah241 
American 
company 
Halting of 
judicial 
                                          
228 Statewatch, Italy’s reply to European Parliament TDIP questionnaire (both Senate and Chamber) in European Parliament, Questionnaire - National 
Parliaments' activities on alleged CIA activities in European countries – Italy (Senate), available at http://www.statewatch.org/rendition/rendition.html.  
229 BBC, 2009, “CIA agents guilty of Italy kidnap”, 4 November, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8343123.stm. 
230 European Parliament, Questionnaire - National Parliaments' activities on alleged CIA activities in European countries – Italy (Chamber), available at 
http://www.statewatch.org/rendition/rendition.html; European Parliament, Questionnaire - National Parliaments' activities on alleged CIA activities in European 
countries – Italy (Senate), available at http://www.statewatch.org/rendition/rendition.html. 
231 Ibid.  
232 BBC, 2009, op. cit. 
233 Nasr and Gali v. Italy (Pending), Communicated 22.11.2011. 
234 Amnesty International, 2013, Press release, available at https://www.amnesty.org/en/press-releases/2013/09/italy-must-not-pardon-former-cia-agent-
involved-rendition/  
235 Amnesty International, 2011, “Current evidence: European Complicity in the CIA Rendition and Secret Detention Programmes”. 
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judicial237 judicial: 
reopene
d; 
ECtHR 
ongoing 
inquiry 
halted in 
January 
2011 on 
“dubious” 
grounds and 
state 
secrets238 
and 
relaunched 
in December 
2014 by 
Vilnius 
Regional 
Court; 
ECtHR 
application 
ongoing 
sites;239 
rendition 
flights;240 
aiding and 
abetting CIA 
in renditions 
of two CIA rendition 
sites 
v. Lithuania 
ongoing 
(Elite 
LLC);242 
Lithuanian 
secret 
services 
(SSD) 
inquiry in 
January 
2011 on 
“dubious” 
grounds, 
including 
‘state 
secrets’ 
privilege;243 
Lithuanian 
customs 
officials 
prevented 
from 
inspecting 
flights244 
ROMANI
A 
Political245 
and 
judiciary 
Political: 
closed; 
Judicial: 
ongoing 
at 
national 
and 
Senate 
report 
adopted in 
2007 
concluded 
accusations 
were 
Hosting a 
secret 
detention 
facility247 
Romanian authorities 
still deny many 
allegations despite 
compelling evidence; no 
effective investigation 
started 
  
Senate 
report 
coordinated 
by people 
with close 
connections 
to Romanian 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
236 Ibid., p. 4-5. 
241 Cobain, op. cit.  
237 Ibid.  
238 Amnesty International, 2013, Report, “Unlock the Truth: Poland’s involvement in CIA secret detention”, p. 5. 
239 L. Phillips, 2009, “Secret CIA prison revealed in Lithuania”, EU Observer, 20 November, available at http://euobserver.com/13/29029. 
240 Ibid. 
242 Ibid.  
243 Ibid. 
244 Ibid. 
245 Amnesty International, 2011, “Romania must come clean…”, op. cit.; Letter sent by the Romanian Prime Minister’s Office to the European Parliament, op. 
cit.; Letter sent by Romanian Senator Nicolai to the European Parliament, 12 January 2006, available at www.statewatch.org/cia/documents/romania-letter-
parl-committee.pdf; Letter sent by the Ambassador of the EU’s Romanian Mission to the European Parliament, 28 February 2006, available at 
www.statewatch.org/cia/documents/letter-romania-perm-rep.pdf. 
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ECtHR 
levels 
groundless;
246 new 
evidence on 
CIA black 
site in 
Bucharest 
intelligence 
community; 
lack of 
effective 
investigation
; lack of 
political will; 
no 
parliamentar
y oversight 
of 
intelligence 
services 
since 
committee 
responsible 
has ties to 
intelligence 
community 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
247 Amnesty International, 2011, “Romania must come clean…”, op. cit. 
246 Ibid.; Amnesty International Romania – AI Romania Country Report 2010, op. cit. 
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ANNEX 2: A DETAILED OVERVIEW OF INQUIRIES BY 
COUNTRY 
 
POLAND 
 
Nature of inquiries  
Political:  -    Parliamentary, in Nov. - Dec. 2005. Ended briefly with no results. 
Judicial:   
‐ Case of Abu Zubaydah (stateless Palestinian born in Saudi Arabia): 
transferred from Thailand to Poland by the CIA on 5 December 2002 
and held there for nine or ten months; investigation into Polish 
officials’ role in the CIA programme and in rendition flights that 
transported Abu Zubaydah into and out of Poland.248 
‐ Case of Abd al-Rahim Al Nashiri (Saudi Arabian national): investigation 
into secret detention and alleged ill treatment in Poland in 2002 and 
2003. 
‐ Charges against the former head of the Polish Intelligence Agency and 
his deputy: assisting the CIA in operating a secret prison in Poland and 
allegations of torture there.249 
‐ ECtHR Al Nashiri and Abu Zubaydah cases (closed); the Court found 
Poland guilty of failure to investigate detention and torture in a prison 
facility operated by the CIA on Polish territory. 
 
Current status:  
‐ Al Nashiri and Abu Zubaydah cases: ongoing (granted victim status in 
January 2011 and in October 2010). 
‐ ECtHR Al Nashiri and Abu Zubaydah cases: closed. 
‐ Criminal charges against the former Polish head of security Zbigniew 
Siemiatkowski250 charges have been dropped.251  
Outcomes 
‐ ECtHR rulings in the Al Nashiri and Abu Zubaydah cases. 
 
 
                                          
248 Interights, Abu Zubaydah v. Poland, available at http://www.interights.org/abu-zubaydah/index.html .  
249 See http://jurist.org/paperchase/2012/03/poland-former-head-of-intelligence-faces-possible-charges-for-
involvement-in-secret-cia-prison.php. 
250See https://euobserver.com/justice/116088 and http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/02/19/us-poland-cia-
siematkowski-idUSBRE91I10F20130219. 
251 See www.rt.com/news/poland-drops-charges-investigation-136/. 
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State’s alleged participation 
‐ Rendition flights. 
‐ Stare Kiekjuty secret detention site. 
‐ Complicity in torture, detention and prisoner transfer. 
 
State’s reaction to allegations 
‐ Poland has consistently denied any complicity in the CIA rendition and 
secret detention programme and has even refused to disclose case 
evidence to the ECtHR. 
 
Sanctions/judicial redress/reparation 
‐ Abu Zubaydah and Al Nashiri: granted victim status. 
‐ Financial reparations: paid. 
 
Parties held accountable/under investigation 
‐ Former head of the Polish secret service, and former interior minister, 
Zbigniew Siemiatkowski;252 charges dropped in 2013.253 
Main obstacles  
‐ Lack of political will to conduct effective investigations. Interference 
with the judiciary by changing prosecutors, offices, delaying the 
proceedings on grounds that MLA requirements not fulfilled by the 
American authorities.254 
‐  ‘State secrets doctrine’ invoked in the criminal proceedings against 
former head of the security services. 
 
 
  
                                          
252 Rettman, op. cit. 
253 See www.rt.com/news/poland-drops-charges-investigation-136/. 
254 Singh, 2011, op. cit.   
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The UK 
 
Nature of inquiries 
Political:   
‐ All-Party Parliamentary Group on Extraordinary Rendition (APPG): 
ongoing investigations. 
‐ Intelligence and Security Committee (ISC): 2007 inquiry not 
conclusive. 
‐ Executive Gibson Inquiry/Detainee Inquiry 2010-12 abandoned255 
because of lack of independence and transparency; the UK 
government decided that all matters raised by the Detainee Inquiry’s 
report would be addressed by the ISC.256 
‐ New claims concerning the Diego Garcia interrogation site. 
Judicial: 
‐ Closed: Operation Hinton, Operation Iden: police investigation into the 
actions of the MI6 officer who interrogated suspects at the US-run 
prison at Bagram, Afghanistan.257 
‐ Reopened by Court of Appeal: Operation Lydd and the Yunus 
Rahmatullah case.  
‐ In the case of Abdul-Hakim Belhaj and Fatima Boudchar against Rt. 
Hon. Jack Straw MP, Sir Mark Allen CMG, the Secret Intelligence 
Service, the Security Service, the Attorney General, the Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office and the Home Office, in the ruling of December 
2013, the High Court upheld the “act of state” doctrine.258 The practice 
refers to a rule of common law, which prevented a court from judging 
the acts of foreign states committed on their own territory. In October 
2014 the London Court of Appeal ruled against this decision and 
allowed the case to continue.259  
Current status  
‐ Executive Gibson Inquiry/Detainee Inquiry: inconclusive.260 
‐ APPG: ongoing.  
‐ ISC: ongoing.  
‐ Case of Yunus Rahmatullah: ongoing. 
‐ Operation Lydd: ongoing. 
 
Outcomes  
                                          
255 See Amnesty International, 2012, “UK: Detainee Inquiry Closure Presents an Opportunity for Real 
Accountability,” EUR 45/005/2012, 18 January, www.amnesty.org/en/library/info/EUR45/011/2011/en. 
256See decision www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201212/cmhansrd/cm120118/debtext/120118-
0001.htm. 
257 See www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/feb/13/uk-investigations-torture-rendition-guide?intcmp=239. 
258 See www.justsecurity.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/12/Belhaj-Judgement-UK.pdf. 
259 See www.reprieve.org.uk/press/2014_10_30_court_of_appeal_belhadj_libya/. 
260 See www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-16614514. 
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‐ Gibson Inquiry: abandoned due to ongoing criminal investigations. 
‐ ISC 2007 report: inconclusive. 
‐ Operation Hinton: members of the Security Service provided 
information to the US authorities about Binyam Mohamed and supplied 
questions for US authorities to put to Mr Mohamed while he was 
detained between 2002 and 2004, but the evidence does not suffice to 
prosecute any individual.261 
‐ Operation Iden: unsuccessful in getting statements from a person 
allegedly mistreated in the presence of an MI6 interrogator; not 
possible to ascertain individual’s identity.262 
‐ Case of Yunus Rahmatullah: Court of Appeal order of December 2011 
to return him to UK custody; request to the US to return him was 
refused; in February 2012 the Court of Appeal decided it could do no 
more.263 In November 2014 a UK High Court decided that the case 
against the British government could proceed264.  
‐ Civil claims: ‘friendly settlement’; compensation for the victims. 
‐ The High Court is dealing with Mr Mohamed’s request for documents 
from the British intelligence service to be used in his trial in the US; 
seven paragraphs detailing the US interrogation techniques that were 
previously redacted from the Divisional Court judgment had to be 
made public.265 
‐ The Divisional Court is considering certificates of public interest 
immunity lodged by the Foreign Secretary regarding the disclosure of 
documents to Mr Mohamed (obiter dictum): Mr Mohamed had been 
subjected – at the very least – to cruel, inhuman and degrading 
treatment by the US authorities, and the UK secret services were 
aware of this.266 
 
State’s alleged participation 
‐ MI5 and MI6 agents are alleged to have aided and abetted torture, war 
crimes, false imprisonment, assault and misconduct in public office 
during the interrogation and detention of Mr Mohamed in Pakistan and 
at the US-run prison in Bagram, Afghanistan. 
 
State’s reaction to allegations 
‐ The UK government denies any knowledge of secret prisons.  
‐ In February 2008 the Foreign Secretary confirmed that two rendition 
flights with detainees on board refuelled on the British island of Diego 
Garcia. 
                                          
261 Cobain, op. cit.  
262 Ibid. 
263 Court of Appeal [2012] EWCA Civ 182. 
264 See http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/defence/11241339/Man-detained-by-US-for-10-years-can-
sue-Britain-for-damages-says-High-Court.html 
265R. (on the application of Mohamed) v. Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs [2010] 
EWCA Civ 6. 
266 Ibid., Annex. 
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‐ February 2009: confirmation by the Defence Secretary that two 
detainees captured by UK forces in Iraq and transferred to US forces 
had been rendered to Afghanistan; proposal to criminalise the use of 
British facilities for extraordinary rendition flights and the failure to 
prevent extraordinary rendition flights using those facilities.267 
Sanctions/judicial redress/reparation 
‐ Settlement: millions of pounds paid in compensation to former 
Guantanamo Bay detainees (including Binyam Mohamed, Bisher al-
Rawi, Jamil el-Banna, Richard Belmar, Omar Deghayes, Moazzam Begg 
and Martin Mubanga) who alleged UK complicity in torture and 
extraordinary renditions, in order to protect the security service’s 
methods from scrutiny after High Court ruling that confidential 
documents would have to be released in court.268 
 
Parties involved 
‐ MI5 and MI6 officers. 
 
Main obstacles 
‐ Gibson Inquiry: too secretive and lacks independence; government 
decides which documents remain unpublished. 
‐ Criminal investigations: insufficient evidence. 
‐ MI6 officers are protected from liability for criminal acts abroad as long 
as their actions were authorised by a cabinet minister. 
‐ State secrets doctrine. 
‐ Settlements out of court. 
 
 
  
                                          
267 APPG, 2009, “Extraordinary Rendition: Closing the Gap: A Proposal to Criminalise UK Involvement”, 
available at www.statewatch.org/news/2009/nov/uk-apg-extraordinary-rendition-closing-the-gap.pdf. 
268 Wintour, op. cit.  
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ITALY 
 
Nature of inquiries  
Political:  
‐ Parliamentary inquiry. 
‐ Italian security services inquiry.269 
Judicial:  
‐ In absentia judicial investigation and trial by Milan Prosecutor’s Office about 
the abduction of Nasr Osama Mustafa Hassan, alias ‘Abu Omar’.270 
‐ ECtHR Application Nasr and Ghali v. Italy:271 pending. 
 
Current Status 
Political inquiries: closed 
Judicial inquiries: 
‐ National judicial investigation and trial: closed. 
‐ ECtHR application: expecting ruling. 
 
Results 
Judicial 
‐ November 2009: The 4th Criminal Section of the Milan Ordinary Court 
convicted 22 CIA agents, one US military official and two Italian intelligence 
(SISMI) operatives, Nicolo Pollari and Marco Mancini, for involvement in the 
abduction of Abu Omar.272 However, it dismissed cases against five high-
ranking Italian and three US officials on the basis of ‘state secrets’ and 
diplomatic immunity.273 The Constitutional Court upheld the claims of state 
secrets privilege.  
‐ 2010: following the decision of the Constitutional Court, the Milan Court of 
Appeal increased the lengths of the sentences of the CIA agents and of the US 
military official but it dropped the charges against Mr Pollari and Mr Mancini.  
‐ 2012: The Supreme Court overturned the decision of the Court of Appeal. It 
decided to reopen the trial, provided that SISMI denied involvement in the 
operations and therefore the Court concluded that the Italian officials involved 
in the kidnapping acted without an official mandate. 
‐ 2013: The Court of Appeal sentenced Mr Pollari and Mr Mancini to 10 and 9 
years respectively (Judgement 985/2013).  
                                          
269 European Parliament, Questionnaire, National Parliaments’ activities on alleged CIA activities in European 
countries – Italy (Chamber), available at www.statewatch.org/rendition/rendition.htm. 
270 Tribunale di Milano, Sezione Giudice per le indagini preliminari, n. 10838/05 and n. 1966/05. 
271 ECtHR, Terrorism Factsheet – April 2012, Press Unit. 
272 BBC, 2009, op. cit.  
273 Amnesty International, 2010, “Italy Prevents trial of intelligence agents over Abu Omar rendition”, 16 
December, available at www.amnesty.org/en/news-and-updates/italy-prevents-trial-intelligence-agents-
rendition-abu-omar-2010-12-16. 
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‐ 2014: The ruling is dismissed once again by the Constitutional Court on the 
basis of the state secrets privilege and the Court of Cassation acquits the two 
Italian officials.274  
 
State’s alleged participation 
‐ Before Abu Omar’s abduction, the CIA’s station chief in Rome allegedly 
briefed, and sought approval from, his Italian counterpart – according to three 
CIA veterans with knowledge of the operation, and a fourth who reviewed the 
matter after it took place.275 
‐ The Italian government may have known about Abu Omar’s abduction by CIA 
agents.276 
‐ There was interference in the national judicial proceedings from higher-ranking 
authorities277 when, for example, Italian President Giorgio Napolitano decided 
on 5 April 2013 to pardon US Colonel Joseph Romano for his involvement  in 
the abduction of Abu Omar in Italy278. 
 
State’s reaction to allegations 
Political inquiries: 
‐ Ineffective. 
Judicial:  
‐ Not entirely effective: financial reparations have not been paid, arrest 
warrants have not been issued and the decisions of the Court have not been 
enforced. 
 
Sanctions/judicial redress/reparation 
‐ A Milan court convicted 22 CIA agents, one US military official and two Italian 
intelligence operatives for their involvement in the abduction of Abu Omar. 
The 22 CIA agents were sentenced in absentia to five years in prison, and the 
CIA station chief in Milan was sentenced to eight years in prison. The Italian 
intelligence agents were given three years in prison each.279 
‐ A Milan Court of Appeal subsequently lengthened the sentences of the 22 CIA 
agents and one US military official to seven and nine years respectively.280 
‐ The Court of Cassation upheld the guilty verdicts.281 
‐ Abu Omar was awarded €1 million in damages. His wife was awarded 
€500,000 in damages.282 
                                          
274 See www.statewatch.org/analyses/no-254-abu-omar-yasha.pdf. 
275 D. Priest, 2005, “Italy knew about plan to grab suspect”, The Washington Post, 30 June, available at 
www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/06/29/AR2005062902971.html. 
276 Ibid.  
277 See http://jurist.org/paperchase/2014/03/italy-high-court-upholds-convictions-of-cia-agents-in-
extraordinary-rendition.php. 
278 See http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-22048932  
279 Hooper, op. cit.  
280 Amnesty International, 2010, op. cit.  
281 See http://jurist.org/paperchase/2014/03/italy-high-court-upholds-convictions-of-cia-agents-in-
extraordinary-rendition.php. 
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‐ The ECtHR application by Abu Omar and his wife is pending.  
 
Main obstacles  
‐ The effectiveness of the prosecution was undermined by the refusal of 
successive Italian governments to transmit the extradition warrants for the 
US nationals to the US government.283 
‐ In 2009 the Italian Constitutional Court also invoked the ‘state secrets’ 
privilege to justify the impossibility of ruling against high-level officials of 
SISMI. The Milan Court of Appeal gave the same justification in dismissing the 
cases against five high-ranking Italian officials in December 2010.284 
‐ The US allegedly pressured the Italian government to influence the 
judiciary.285 
  
                                                                                                                                 
282 Hooper, op. cit.  
283 Amnesty International, 2011, “Current evidence: European Complicity in the CIA Rendition and Secret 
Detention Programmes” p. 4. 
284 Ibid.  
285 Goetz & Gebauer, op. cit.  
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LITHUANIA 
 
Nature of inquiries  
Political: 
‐ 5 November 2009: Parliamentary inquiry concluded that two secret sites were 
prepared to receive suspects with the help of the Lithuanian Secret Services 
(SSD).286 
Judicial: 
‐ January 2010: the Lithuanian Prosecutor General’s Office opened a criminal 
investigation.287 However, this investigation was suddenly halted in January 2011 
due to the ‘state secrets’ privilege.288 
‐ December 2014: Vilnius Regional Court upheld the previous ruling and restarted 
the investigation. 
‐ ECtHR Abu Zubaydah v. Lithuania: ongoing. 
Current Status 
‐ Political: closed. 
‐ Judicial: reopened. 
 
Results 
Political:  
‐ The Lithuanian Parliament Committee’s report indicated that two sites were 
prepared to receive prisoners. It determined that one of them had not held any 
prisoners, and could not find any evidence about the second site. It requested the 
General Prosecutor’s Office to investigate the SSD’s possible abuse of 
authority.289 
Judicial:  
‐ No outcomes so far. 
 
State’s alleged participation 
‐ In November 2009, an American broadcasting channel (ABC) revealed that 
Lithuania had harboured secret black sites where detainees were interrogated by 
the CIA in the framework of the ‘global war on terror’.290 The Baltic News Agency 
(BNS) reported that two CIA-chartered aircraft, a Boeing and a Gulfstream5, 
traversed Lithuanian airspace “dozens of times between 2001 and 2003” en route 
to Poland and Afghanistan. Lithuanian air traffic officials referred to the 
Gulfstream5 as the ‘Guantanamo Express’.291 
                                          
286 Amnesty International, 2011, “Current Evidence…”, op. cit., p. 4-5. 
287 Ibid.  
288 Amnesty International, 2011, “Unlock the Truth in Lithuania…”, op. cit., p. 5. 
289 Amnesty International, “Current Evidence…”, op. cit., p. 4-5. 
290 Phillips, op. cit. 
291 Daily Kos, Tail Number Watch, 17 November 2005. Available at: 
http://www.dailykos.com/story/2005/11/17/165806/-Tail-Number-Watch. 
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State’s reaction to allegations 
‐ The Lithuanian government admitted the existence of two secret detention sites.  
 
Sanctions 
‐ The Lithuanian government is currently facing legal action in the ECtHR, pursued 
by Abu Zubaydah.292 
 
Parties involved 
‐ A now defunct American company Elite LLC, registered in Delaware and Panama, 
which allegedly purchased the riding school where one of the secret detention 
centres was established.293 
‐ Lithuanian Secret Services (SSD) 
 
Main obstacles 
‐ State secrets doctrine.294 
‐ Lithuanian customs officials were prevented from inspecting CIA flights.295 
‐ Lack of effective investigations. 
  
                                          
292 Cobain, op. cit.  
293 Ibid. 
294 Amnesty International, 2011, “Unlock the truth in Lithuania…”, op. cit., p. 5. 
295 Ibid., p. 10. 
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ROMANIA 
 
Nature of inquiries: 
Political: 
‐ 2007 parliamentary inquiry: ineffective, denied any involvement in the CIA 
rendition programme.296 
‐ Former officials acknowledged the existence of the ‘Bright Light’ detention site in 
Bucharest. 
Judicial: 
‐ 2012: APADOR-CH, as part of the Open Society Justice Initiative, filed a civil case 
against the Romanian state.297 
‐ ECtHR Al Nashiri v. Romania: ongoing. 
 
Current Status 
‐ Political: closed. 
‐ Judicial: ongoing both at national level and at the ECtHR. 
 
Results 
‐ None so far. 
 
State’s reaction to allegations 
‐ The new evidence was considered pure speculation. Deputy Head Adrian 
Camarasan of ORNISS (The National Registry Office for Classified Information, 
where the Black Rendition Site was allegedly hosted) dismissed the allegation.298 
Former Romanian President Traian Băsescu denied any knowledge of the 
subject.299 Former Romanian President at the time of the detentions, Ion Iliescu, 
acknowledged, in April 2015, the existence of CIA black sites in Romania.300 
 
 
                                          
296 ECtHR, Al Nashiri v. Romania, Application, paragraphs 101, 102: The relevant parts read as follows: “To the 
question whether secret American bases exist or existed in Romania, the Investigation Committee replies 
negatively. To the question whether in Romania, in the researched period, there exist or existed facilities for 
the detention of prisoners, other then penitentiary ones (real, secret, ad-hoc, buildings usable in the form 
improvised for this purpose), potentially in the proximity of airports Timişoara, Bucharest – Henri Coanda or 
Baneasa, and Constanta, the Investigative Committee replies negatively. (…) 8. To the question whether the 
purpose of the stops in Romania of the flights presented at chapter 5, the Investigative Committee has solid 
grounds to reply that they had nothing to do with potential illegal transports of prisoners on the territory of 
Romania.” 
297 ECtHR, Al Nashiri v. Romania, Application, paragraph 105 states: “No official decision to open a criminal 
investigation was communicated up to date”. 
298 Ibid.  
299 Goldman & Apuzzo, op. cit.  
300 See www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/04/romania-president-admits-allowing-cia-site-
150427140351035.html. 
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Sanctions/judicial redress/reparation 
None. 
Parties involved 
Romanian Secret Services. 
Main obstacles 
‐ Lack of a formal inquiry, both at the judicial and political levels, specifically 
regarding the new evidence that was recently revealed by the public declarations 
of former President Ion Iliescu and former Head of the Secret Services Mr. Ioan 
Talpeș, in office when the renditions took place in Bucharest. 
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